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Abstract 
The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of 
democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist 
organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group‘s (and its supporting 
elements‘) decision-making calculus.  In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been 
chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it 
offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, 
military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides 
into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary.  However, 
strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate 
terrorist organizations.   
 
As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming 
deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable.  
The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of 
strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key 
coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the 
hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and 
C) Isolation of popular support.  It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as 
the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO‘s campaign of violence and effectively 
manipulating its decision-making process.  Implementation of these three elements, moreover, 
must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other.   
 
The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis.  In pursuing this 
end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of 
the methods of focused, structured comparison.  The cases examined are those of: 1) The United 
Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs 
(1967-present).   
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Chapter I:  
Strategic Coercion versus Substate Terrorism 
 Referencing the Strategy of Conflict by Thomas Schelling, strategy can be understood as 
the series of moves initiated by an actor (or actors) aimed at influencing the choice of an 
opposing actor, in a manner favorable to itself.  In the words of Schelling, the ultimate aim of 
such strategic moves is to ―set up for one‘s self and communicate persuasively to the other player 
a mode of behavior… that leaves the other a simple maximalization problem whose solution for 
him is the optimum for one‘s self, and to destroy the other‘s ability to do the same.‖1  The aim of 
this dissertation, simply put, is to establish a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy—and 
strategic moves—of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of a substate 
terrorist organization, and effectively manipulating the terrorist group‘s (and its supporting 
elements‘) decision-making calculus—or choice—in a manner favorable to itself. 
 To be sure, a multitude of attempts have been made to guide strategy against substate 
threats—be they against specific types of terrorist organizations, insurgency more broadly, or 
otherwise.  What makes this dissertation unique is that it marks a first attempt to develop such a 
framework through primarily drawing upon strategic coercion theory.  Developed by scholars 
such as Thomas Schelling, Alexander George, Lawrence Freedman and others, strategic coercion 
theory elaborates upon developing and employing strategies that apply the full gamut of national 
power instruments—military, diplomatic, economic, political, etc.—in an integrated fashion to 
attain desirable political outcomes.    What makes strategic coercion theory so important, 
however, that it would merit such a focused application in this context?   
The answer is two-fold.  First, only very few strategies exist that comprehensively ponder 
how to utilize all elements of national power to counter the threat of substate terrorism.  Strategic 
coercion, a well-established theoretical cornerstone in contemporary strategic thought benefiting 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, 160. 
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from a wealth of decades of research and analysis, offers the promise of readily contributing in 
this regard to better understanding how to leverage these elements of national power for strategic 
gain against such substate adversaries.  Second, strategic coercion offers unique insights on how 
to affect the decision-making calculus of substate terrorist organizations; insights vital to better 
understanding how to compel such hostile groups to take a choice of action desired—i.e. 
ceasefire, modified end-objectives, renunciation of violence, disarmament/decommissioning, the 
signing of a peace treaty, etc.  Ultimately, strategic coercion offers a unique and valuable way for 
the construction of strategy at the highest levels to meet the threat of substate terrorism. 
Surprisingly, only limited efforts have been made to apply this aspect of strategic thought 
to one of the most pressing security challenges of the modern day: substate terrorist 
organizations.  As will be discussed in further detail over the course of this chapter and the next, 
attempts to consider strategic coercion vis-à-vis substate terrorist organizations have been rather 
limited, often constraining their focus to the challenges associated with it.  To date, no such work 
has established a clear and comprehensive theory for successfully employing strategic coercion 
to counter the threats of substate terrorist organizations. 
 This dissertation marks a divergence from these limited, prior attempts.  In doing so, it 
has referenced the lessons and principles of strategic coercion and related literature to establish a 
theoretical framework for guiding a democratic state‘s strategic moves against a formidable 
substate terrorist organization (or organizations).  And in order to test this theory, an extensive 
case-study analysis is employed, empirically evaluating its validity over the course of 
approximately 80-years of strategic coercion waged by democratic states against substate 
terrorist organizations. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
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 Prior to proceeding with the establishment of such a theoretical framework, however, it is 
important to elaborate in further detail on what comprises strategic coercion, and what current 
limitations are associated with applying it within the context of substate terrorist organizations. 
 
What is Strategic Coercion? 
The study of strategic coercion is concerned with attaining desirable political outcomes—
or avoiding undesirable ones—through the threatened or actual application of limited military 
force and/or economic and political sanctions, often assisted through diplomatic action.  These 
mechanisms, which can be accompanied by economic and political inducements, are thus applied 
with the intention of favorably altering the decision-making calculus of an adversarial political 
entity to pursue ongoing or threatened hostilities.  In short, strategic coercion aims to either 
dissuade an opponent from taking an undesirable course of action, or to stop and undo an 
undesirable course of action (or series of actions) already taken, by making the costs of said 
action(s) exceed the benefits of possible rewards associated with pursuing it/them.   
Of importance to note, force and sanctions applied in strategic coercion are the minimal 
necessary to manipulate the hostile adversary‘s choice.  In other words, the intention of strategic 
coercion is not to accomplish its objective by bludgeoning the targeted opponent to the point of 
utter destruction, whereby it simply can no longer pursue hostilities.  Such a strategy is generally 
referred to as the application of brute force
2, and in today‘s age is both difficult to achieve and—
in most instances—politically unviable for democracies.  Rather, strategic coercion is about 
applying just enough force and/or sanctions to persuade the targeted political adversary to choose 
not to engage in, or continue, the undesired hostilities. 
Considering that the amount of force required to completely eliminate an adversary‘s 
ability for organized resistance is tremendous in the modern age, and, of foremost importance, 
                                                 
2
 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 3. 
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that democracies are unwilling to countenance such a wholesale and destructive application of 
force for normative reasons, strategic coercion proffers a valuable means for considering 
applications of power instruments, threatened or actual, for achieving victories against hostile 
political entities.  Moreover, literature devoted to strategic coercion help to provide the 
policymakers of democracies with a better understanding of how to utilize their power 
instruments on the politico-strategic level in order to attain desired political outcomes from 
hostile opponents. 
 
Regrettably, Current Literature in Strategic Coercion is Deficient 
Unfortunately, despite the apparent utility that it might offer in the context of a better 
understanding of how democratic states can counter substate terrorist organizations, the existing 
literature on the this aspect of strategic coercion has only been sparingly investigated. The source 
of this problem is two-fold.  First, in the field of strategic coercion, most existing research is 
rooted in the Cold War era, preoccupied with deterrence and state-actors.  As the mass-casualty 
producing terrorists of today are often too fanatical to defeat through a strategy of deterrence 
alone and are non-state in existence, these facts render much of this literature limited in utility.  
Second and furthermore, the majority of the literature produced after the Cold War is still 
predominantly concerned with state-centric applications of power. 
As explained above, this dissertation will endeavor to take the first necessary steps for 
surmounting this dearth of knowledge and helping further pioneer the field of strategic coercion 
into that of counter-terrorism.  It will accomplish this by examining how democratic states may 
utilize strategic coercion to effectively counter and stop the hostilities of nationalistic substate 
terrorist organizations. 
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Why Democratic States?   
 There are pragmatic and normative reasons for the selection of states of a democratic 
variety, where strategies of counter-terrorism are pursued.  Pragmatically, the reason that 
democratic states are ideal subjects is that they constitute those states that are most interested in 
utilizing the minimum force necessary to accomplish their objectives, and most constrained in 
their options regarding the application of it.
3
  Strategic coercion theory—which is concerned 
with limited applications of force—thus provides the most value to this subset of states.  From a 
normative perspective, this dissertation is concerned with exploring strategies constituted by the 
proportional and justified use of force by a legitimate government in pursuit of its (or its allies‘) 
self-defense.  While democracies certainly do not always use force in a proportional or justified 
manner, they do provide the most likely candidates to hypothetically fit such a consideration, and 
are most likely to constitute states willing to act along these normative lines. 
 What are considered to be democracies?  This study considers a state to be a democracy 
if it possesses a government of freely elected representatives (where all/nearly all adult aged 
citizens are free to vote or run for office); subjected to a constitution (written or unwritten) 
ensuring individual rights and limits of government power; possessing some form of active 
check on the government‘s (and especially the executive‘s) power by the domestic courts and/or 
a specific system of checks and balances.   
 
Why Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organizations? 
The subset of substate terrorist organizations to be investigated includes those of a 
nationalistic orientation such as the IRA, ETA, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.  Nationalistic groups 
                                                 
3
 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of 
Military Might. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 108-111; Rob de Wijk, The Art of Military 
Coercion: Why the West’s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters, Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2005, 110; Wyn Q. 
Bowen. ―Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism.‖ Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds). Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment. Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, 444. 
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have been chosen for reasons related to research expediency and policy relevance.  Regarding 
research expediency, two primary reasons stand for the selection of cases involving nationalistic 
substate terrorist organizations.  First, where the application of strategic coercion against substate 
terrorist organizations is concerned, most available and relevant historical cases applicable to this 
type of research only involve nationalistic cases.  Second, and furthermore, as nationalistic 
groups have often been considered by many to be what Paul Wilkinson dubs corrigible terrorist 
organizations
4—that is, their hostile behavior is recognized as being rational and susceptible to 
correction and pacific modification—they appear the best starting point for investigating how 
strategic coercion can be used to modify the behavior of violent substate terrorist organizations. 
Selecting cases of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations, moreover, is also 
important in terms of policy relevance.  Nationalistic groups tend to be the best organized, highly 
motivated, well-supported, and capable of inflicting a great number of casualties over time.  
Indeed, better understanding how strategic coercion can be applied to nationalistic cases of 
substate terrorist organizations is also very important for better understanding how to conduct a 
―war on terror‖ against Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups that, in seeking to re-establish the 
Islamic Caliphate
5—are in many ways similar to nationalistic groups themselves (discussed in 
Chapter VI).    
Thus, this dissertation will examine how democratic states may utilize strategic coercion 
to effectively counter nationalistic substate terrorist organizations.  However, prior to elaborating 
upon exactly how this dissertation will accomplish this, it is first important to expound upon a 
number of points, including: 1) the definitions of terrorism and (nationalistic) substate terrorist 
                                                 
4
 Paul Wilkinson. ―The War Without Frontiers,‖ Scotland on Sunday, 8 September 2002.  Available Online at: 
http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/without_frontiers.html [Last Viewed 23 August 2009]. 
5
 Essentially a single, united Islamic nation for the world‘s Islamic community or ―Ummah‖, in place of a variety of 
states considered apostate regimes. 
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organizations used in this study; 2) the concept of strategic coercion; and 3) the general 
applications of strategic coercion that are possible vis-à-vis substate terrorist organizations. 
 
Defining Terrorism and Substate Terrorist Organizations 
 Drawing from a number of elements in oft-cited definitions
6
, this dissertation defines 
terrorism as:   
A form of premeditated, violence-based communication aimed at (repeatedly) harming 
and/or threatening to harm noncombatants and symbolic targets for the purpose of 
creating and exploiting fear within a targeted audience to compel a political change, 
coerce a desired action, advance a cause, generate propaganda, or destabilize critical 
political, constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures.   
 
Terrorism, moreover, can be pursued by individuals, substate groups and organizations, 
clandestine agents, and state actors.  The audience it seeks to target can range from an entire state 
or states, governments, international organizations, ethnic or religious groups, political parties, 
and public opinion in general.  Finally, the defining characteristics of terrorism that set it apart 
from other forms of organized violence is that it specifically wreaks destruction upon 
noncombatants and symbolic targets; its main target is not the victims it assaults but the audience 
it intimidates and exploits as a consequence; and its objective is not destruction in itself but the 
political change it can compel as a result.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 See: Walter Lacqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Boston: Little Brown, 1987, 72; U.S. Department of State, Patterns 
of Global Terrorism, Washington: Dept. of State, 2001, vi; Council of the European Union, Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA),  Official Journal 164, 22/06/2002 P.0003 – 
0007; Her Majesty‘s Stationary Office (HMSO), Terrorism Act 2000, Chapter 11,  London: The Queen's Printer of 
Acts of Parliament, 2000.  Available Online at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2000/00011--b.htm [Last Viewed 
23 August 2009]; Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 
1985; Bruce Hoffman, ―Defining Terrorism.‖ Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds), Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment. Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, 23; Alex 
Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, 
and Literature, Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988. 
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Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organizations (NSTOs) 
 With a clear definition of terrorism put forth, it is important to also elaborate upon what 
constitutes a substate terrorist organization.  A substate terrorist organization is defined in this 
work as:  
An organization, which does not constitute a state government or recognized state 
apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, intelligence service, etc.) that is dedicated in 
whole or in part to employing terrorism aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or 
threatening to harm noncombatants and symbolic targets for the purpose of creating and 
exploiting fear within a targeted audience to compel a political change, coerce a desired 
action, advance a cause, generate propaganda, or destabilize critical political, 
constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures.   
 
 Importantly, it is necessary to distinguish what nationalistic substate terrorist 
organizations are.  Labeling them ―nationalist terrorists‖, Paul Wilkinson refers to this subset of 
terrorist organizations as those groups ―seeking political self-determination,‖ who may ―wage 
their struggle entirely in the territory they seek to liberate, or… may be active both in their home 
area and abroad.‖7  Dubbing substate terrorist organizations of this nature to be those that follow 
―ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism,‖ Bruce Hoffman gives a comparable description.8  
Following a similar tangent, this study will consider any substate terrorist organization as 
nationalistic whose primary objective is self-determination and/or self-liberation, whether in the 
form of gaining regional sovereignty, separating/emerging to form or reform a new nation-state, 
overthrowing the existing regime, and/or removing an occupying force. 
 However, this study‘s classification of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations—also 
referred to as NSTOs—importantly differs from the oft-cited ones espoused by Wilkinson and 
Hoffman.  The reason for this differentiation is that both Wilkinson and Hoffman consider 
terrorist organizations that are nationalistic in nature to differ from those which are inspired by 
                                                 
7
 Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, 
19. 
8
 Hoffman, 45-65. 
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religious motivations or justifications.  Considering it possible, however, for nationalistic 
terrorist organizations to have religious motivations and/or justifications—as has been the case 
with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, and others—this study does not make this distinction.  
Rather, in this work, such religiously motivated terrorist organizations are considered a subset of 
NSTOs.  Thus, where the primary objective remains various forms of self-determination and 
freedom from occupation, this study considers those groups—regardless of their motivations or 
justifications—to be nationalistic in orientation. 
In returning to and concluding the matter of defining nationalistic substate terrorist 
organizations, the following definition will hold for this study: 
Nationalistic substate terrorist organizations are organizations, which do not constitute a 
state government or recognized state apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, 
intelligence service, etc.), that are dedicated in whole or in part to achieving the primary 
objective of self-determination/nation (re)formation and/or freedom from occupation 
through employing terrorism aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or threatening to harm 
noncombatants and symbolic targets with the intent of creating and exploiting fear within 
a targeted audience, generating propaganda, or destabilizing critical political, 
constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures. 
  
Clarification for What is Intended by “Substate” Terrorist Organizations 
 Prior to proceeding, it is important to briefly clarify what is intended by the designation 
―substate‖ when referring to substate terrorist organizations.  In applying the term substate, the 
intention is not to pass judgment upon any group of people/nation, neither inferring that the land 
they currently (or strive to) occupy does not constitute a state, nor that they are not entitled to 
one.  Rather, the designation ―substate‖ is used to refer to the nature of the (terrorist) 
organization under question; being that these organizations do not constitute a state government 
or recognized state apparatus.  Moreover, as such terrorist organizations operate below the state 
level—the highest level of recognizable sovereignty—they are designated as ―substate‖. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
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 Of course, it should also be pointed out that just because the term ―substate‖ is used this 
does not imply that such terrorist organizations may not constitute an important political party or 
element of a recognized state government or authority.    Such groups may very well be a 
significant (or minor) party in a state government (i.e. Hezbollah in Lebanon); they may be 
clandestine instruments of a state government or authority (see the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
linked to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority); or such organizations may possess political 
representation, officially or unofficially from a third party (i.e. Sinn Fein for the IRA).  However, 
as the organization itself neither constitutes a state government, nor a recognizable state 
apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, intelligence service, etc.), it is thus classified as being a 
―substate‖ terrorist organization, regardless of its potential state connections. 
      
All NSTOs are “Insurgents”; Not All Insurgents are NSTOs 
 All nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs) comprise insurgent groups.  As 
loosely defined by David Galula, ―an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, 
step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of 
the existing order.‖9  According to Michael Boyle, ―In most cases, insurgency is a form of 
asymmetric warfare, because the insurgent forces are generally weaker than the government or 
occupying army...  Insurgent warfare is marked by the absence of fixed battle lines, by the use of 
secrecy and ambush, and by the competition for the support of the population between the 
insurgents and their opponents…‖10  The activities of NSTOs, and the objectives they pursue, 
clearly match such descriptions.  However, while NSTOs may constitute ―insurgent 
organizations,‖ not all insurgent organizations may be identified as NSTOs. 
                                                 
9
 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of Counterinsurgency Era Edition), 
New York: Praeger Security International, 2006, 2. 
10
 Michael Boyle, ―Terrorism and Insurgency,‖ Contemporary Security Strategy, 2nd Edition, edited by Craig A. 
Snyder, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 186. 
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 Mao‘s communist insurgency and the Red Army/People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), the 
Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the Viet Cong, etc. are all examples of insurgent 
organizations that would not be considered NSTOs.  The key difference between such groups 
and organizations such Hezbollah, Hamas, the Provisional IRA, etc. that do constitute NSTOs, is 
that while terrorism may have been used as a tactic (though certainly not in all cases
11
), it did not 
comprise a primary strategy of the insurgent organization—which were typically focused on 
guerrilla warfare, exerting control over territory, and eventually overcoming conventional forces.  
For NSTOs, terrorism is one of, if not the primary strategy of asymmetric violence pursued 
against an opposing state/government.  It should thus be understood that while all NSTOs may 
constitute insurgent groups, not all insurgent groups are nationalistic substate terrorist 
organizations.   
  
The Concept of Strategic Coercion 
Theoretically speaking, strategic coercion involves the deliberate and targeted use of (or 
threat to use) hard power instruments—be they diplomatic, economic or military—in order to 
manipulate and influence the politico-strategic choices of an actor or player in international 
relations.  It is precisely defined by Lawrence Freedman of King‘s College London, as the 
―deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another‘s strategic choices.‖12  
Strategic coercion can be conceptualized as a process that takes place over a spectrum of 
increasing severity.  At the beginning and more moderate side of this spectrum there is coercive 
diplomacy.  Coercive diplomacy can be understood as the limited use or threat of force in 
conjunction with economic sanctions, and possibly inducements, aimed at compelling or 
                                                 
11
 Mao Tse Tung for example, did not embrace terrorism and rejected it as a tactic against noncombatants.  Boyle, 
186. 
12
 Lawrence Freedman, ―Strategic Coercion,‖ Lawrence Freedman (ed.) Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 15. 
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deterring an opponent towards or against pursuing a certain type of behavior.
13
  The general 
objective is to back one‘s demands on an adversary with a threat of punishment for 
noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply.
14
  
When the application of force is chosen in coercive diplomacy as part of this punishment, its use 
is conducted in a limited and exemplary manner, meaning that just enough force is used to 
demonstrate sufficient resolve to protect one‘s interests and to establish the credibility of one‘s 
determination to use more force if necessary.
15
   
When a political entity such as a state moves past latent or very limited applications of 
force and begins to pursue the application of military power instruments in a broader and more 
active sense, that actor has moved along the spectrum of strategic coercion into that of military 
coercion.  Here, coercion involves the application of force on a massive scale to achieve political 
and military objectives.
16
  Specifically, force is used to change the behavior of the opponent by 
manipulating costs and benefits in such a way that compels it to alter its behavior.
17
  In the 
modern vernacular, military coercion is generally referred to as an intervention.
18
  In undergoing 
military coercion, political actors seek to change the behavior of an adversary that still retains the 
capacity for organized military resistance.
19
 If the state decides to bludgeon its adversary past 
this point, where resistance is no longer possible and total destruction ensues, then the state has 
moved beyond the most extreme spectrum of strategic coercion and into the realm of brute force. 
                                                 
13
 De Wijk, 12-13. 
14
 Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991, 4. 
15
 George, 5. 
16
 De Wijk, 13. 
17
 Pape, 4. 
18
 De Wijk. 
19
 Pape, 12. 
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Using Strategic Coercion against Substate Terrorist Actors  
 The application of strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations is about the 
deliberate application, or threat to use, diplomatic, economic and military power instruments for 
the purpose of manipulating the politico-strategic choices of a substate terrorist entity.  More 
simply put, it is about the application of power instruments by the state against substate terrorist 
groups to compel them to renounce violence, disarm/decommission, and if necessary, to agree to 
a viable political solution.  It is important to distinguish here that strategic coercion is not about 
the application of brute force to crush a terrorist organization out of existence.  Rather, strategic 
coercion is aimed at compelling a terrorist organization—as well as those it is composed of and 
receives support from—to alter or undo a course of action; in this case violent terrorist hostilities.  
Thus, the objective of employing strategic coercion against terrorist organizations is not 
necessarily about the elimination of the organization itself, but rather about compelling it to 
cease hostilities
20
 and/or removing its capacity to enact or threaten violence against the 
democratic state and its interests.   
 
 
When Does the Process of Strategic Coercion Begin? 
 Pursuing strategic coercion against a substate terrorist organization is a serious 
undertaking.  Typically, a democratic state does not engage in strategic coercion until it becomes 
clear that the substate terrorist organization has become completely intractable to the police and 
criminal justice system.  As Yezid Sayigh puts it, ―States, for their part, do not usually move 
beyond conventional policing as a response until the non-state adversary has built a popular 
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following sufficient to disrupt normal administration and economic activity or… has developed 
its base on a scale that both requires a strategic coercive effort and offers suitable targets for it.‖21 
 A second, and important, indicator that a state will engage in strategic coercion occurs 
when the substate terrorist organization no longer only formulates claims and demands, but 
actually has come to exercise physical control over an appreciable number of inhabitants and a 
corresponding geographical area of the state itself (if not, additionally, another state as well).
22
  
Such a development may also be accompanied by a basic level of institutional development in 
the terrorist organization, including a discernible command structure, identifiable leadership, and 
distinct decision-making processes.
23
  While all substate terrorist organizations may not share 
this organizational formulation
24
, they do generally consist of five common elements at this 
stage:  1) movement leaders; 2) combatants; 3) political cadre; 4) auxiliaries (active followers 
who provide important services); and 5) a mass base (comprised of the supporting elements of 
the population).
25
 
 Thirdly, and perhaps the most critical indicator of when a democratic state will engage in 
a campaign of strategic coercion against a substate terrorist organization is linked to whether or 
not the insurgent organization has come to threaten the vital interests of the state.  These vital 
interests, which may be political, strategic, territorial, economic or the very physical and 
psychological well-being of the nation‘s populace, compel the democratic state to act when these 
interests are plausibly threatened.  Indeed, under these circumstances, it will often be the 
overwhelming position of the democratic state‘s constituency to act in a manner that utilizes all 
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aspects of the nation‘s power in order to confront this threat—thereby initiating the process of 
strategic coercion. 
 Finally, it should also be noted out that while the above criteria point out the 
circumstances for which a campaign of strategic coercion may ―begin‖, strategic coercion may 
also ensue following a resumption of violence by a terrorist organization.  Such an instance 
typically occurs throughout the course of a long conflict as a consequence of stalled peace talks, 
failed negotiations or unimplemented agreements, and can mark a new or simply resumed 
campaign of strategic coercion against said substate terrorist organization.  Indeed, as Sayigh 
remarks, ―strategic coercion involving non-state actors is likely to be part of inseparable, 
continuous adversary relationships rather than one-off episodes‖26—an issue that will be 
revealed more in depth in Chapters IV and V, which examine the various episodes of strategic 
coercion against NSTOs in two historic cases. 
 
Differences in Strategic Coercion Translate into Difficulties to Achieving Success 
 The differences present in applying strategic coercion against state actors vis-à-vis its 
application against substate terrorist organizations entail difficulties for state governments in 
achieving success.  A major reason for this can be accounted for in the complexities of coercing 
a terrorist organization, whose form and composition is uncertain and susceptible to change.  
Beyond this, moreover, a wide array of factors, including state vulnerability to counter-coercion 
from terrorist organizations, lack of clear targets for coercive force, the ease with which such 
organizations can hide, extremely high terrorist motivation, little susceptibility to deterrence or 
punishment, and the extensive length of time and costly commitment of ground troops required 
in coercive efforts against terrorist organizations all serve to make such an actor difficult for 
states to strategically coerce.  To sufficiently address and surmount this difficulty a better 
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understanding is required of the process of strategic coercion against substate terrorist actors.   
This, of course, brings the discussion to the objectives of this study. 
  
Research Objectives 
 The research objectives of this study are twofold.  The first objective is to adapt strategic 
coercion theory, so that it might yield valuable insights for democratic states formulating a 
strategy to be employed against nationalistic substate terrorist organizations.  In pursuing this 
objective, the following questions are asked: 
 What key strategic elements are necessary for successful coercion against 
nationalistic substate terrorist organizations? 
 How can these key elements be incorporated into a theoretical framework of 
strategic coercion directed against nationalistic substate terrorist organizations? 
 
The second research objective involves empirically testing the conclusions formulated in 
response to the first research question.  Namely: 
 Do its conclusions about the necessary conditions for success hold true within the 
context of real world examples?  And can this modified theory be used to 
prescribe effective policies for strategic coercion against NSTOs? 
 
Research Objective 1:  Adapting Strategic Coercion Theory 
 In order to fulfill this research objective, two steps are taken (in Chapter III).  The first 
involves drawing from existing strategic coercion theory and adapting it to fit the context of 
application by a (democratic) state actor against an NSTO (or NSTOs).  The second will then 
involve drawing from additional sources of literature, primarily derived from counter-insurgency 
Michael Andrew Berger 
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(COIN) theory—classic and contemporary.  COIN theory is drawn from given the insight it 
possesses in state efforts against substate groups employing asymmetric strategies of violence; as 
mentioned earlier, all NSTOs may be considered insurgent organizations.  Moreover, given its 
richness and depth, COIN literature contains important lessons for guiding the construction of 
any strategic framework against NSTOs, and also possesses important information regarding the 
operational breakdown of strategic designs—the latter of which is important for both elaborating 
on guidance for achieving strategic objectives, as well as providing an observable breakdown for 
measuring the phenomena of strategic coercion against NSTOs.  In this way will strategic 
coercion theory be adapted vis-à-vis substate terrorist threats, addressing the questions: 1) What 
strategic elements are vital to success against an NSTO?; and 2) What action would a modified 
theory of strategic coercion prescribe to achieve such conditions? 
 
Research Objective 2: Methodology for Empirical Testing 
 In seeking to select the most appropriate methodology for the purpose of testing the 
hypotheses of the modified theory put forth, this dissertation draws upon the work of Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett, entitled Development in the Social Sciences.  This quintessential 
work on methodology has been chosen as a guiding reference in that it: 1) serves as one of the 
definitive works for the employment of the case-study method; and 2) serves as a high utility 
guide for testing the validity of mid-range theories, such as those associated with strategic 
coercion.  Moreover, the choice of this work makes particular sense in that its primary author, 
Alexander George, is one of the pre-eminent scholars in the field of strategic coercion, and in it 
he distills his methodology for related studies here.  That being said, the methodology chosen 
employs the following: 
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The Case-Study Method 
 For the purpose of testing the validity of the theory on strategic coercion put forth, this 
study employs the case-study method.   This method was chosen over alternative methodologies 
because case-studies provide some of the strongest means of assessing whether and how a 
variable matters—as opposed to more quantitative methods that assess how much it matters.27  
This is key, in that this study is more concerned with discovering the conditions under which a 
specified outcome occurs, and the mechanisms through which this occurrence takes place—i.e. 
when and how democratic states are successful in employing strategic coercion to end the 
hostilities of NSTOs—rather than uncovering the frequency with which such conditions and their 
outcomes arise. 
 
Applying the Within-Case Method and Cross-Case Comparisons 
 In addition to choosing the case-study method, this study also employs a combination of 
the within-case method and cross-case comparisons.  Such an approach has been chosen due to 
the growing consensus in the academic field that ―the strongest means of drawing inferences 
from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons 
within a single study or research program.‖28  The rationale for the utility of applying both 
within-case analysis and cross-case comparison can be attributed to the fact that it greatly 
reduces the risks of inferential errors that can arise from using either method alone.
29
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Cross-Case Comparison and Selection Criteria for Cases 
 In implementing a cross-case comparison, cases should be chosen in order to provide the 
kind of control and variation required by the research problem.
30
  Moreover, the scope and 
domain of the generalizations to be made must also be clearly specified.  Finally, cases chosen 
should abide by the criteria of being historically significant, theoretically relevant, and 
possessing of both multiple episodes for within-case analysis and ample evidence for research.   
 Regarding the scope and domain, the theory here put forth focuses on democratic states, 
in contemporary times, which seek to end the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist 
organizations through the application of strategic coercion.  Based upon these criteria, two cases 
in particular stand out as providing excellent models for observation: 
1. The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007) 
2. Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-Present)31 
 
 Both cases, moreover meet the initial requirement of control and variation.  Regarding 
control, both cases offer instances where: 1) the state pursuing strategic coercion is a Western-
styled democracy; 2) the NSTOs involved are well supported by a popular cause, and very well 
organized; 3) the ongoing conflict between the state and the NSTOs is underpinned by long-
running historical grievances and dissatisfaction with the political status quo; 4) strategic 
coercion took place during a similar time period, influenced by similar international events (i.e. 
decolonization, the Cold War and its collapse, 9/11, etc.); 5) both cases involve a conflict that is 
clearly divided along religious lines; and 6) the motivation for conflict in both cases is essentially 
over the issue of control of land. 
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 Variation, meanwhile, is clearly present in a number of instances, including: 1) the degree 
of international/external support widely varies in scope between the two cases
32
; 2) geographical 
differences in terms of the scope of surrounding hostile countries; 3) the international reach of 
attack by the NSTOs in question; 4) the presence, or lack, of suicide bombings as a component 
of terrorist attacks; 5) cultural differences, both amongst the coercing states and the NSTOs and 
their supporters;  6) the presence of a single dominant NSTO involved in the conflict versus 
multiple significant groups
33
; and 7) the presence, or lack, of third parties in the conflict
34
.  
 
Applying the Method of Focused, Structured Comparison 
 In applying the cross-case comparison, the method of focused, structured comparison will 
be employed.  Here the method is ―focused‖ in that it deals only with certain aspects of the 
historical cases examined—i.e. those dealing with strategic coercion.  It is ―structured‖, 
moreover, in that a general set of questions are posed for each case-episode that reflect the 
research objective of this study, for the purpose of guiding and standardizing data collection, and 
thereby, in the words of George and Bennett, ―making systematic comparison and cumulation of 
the findings of the cases possible.‖35 
 
Within-Case Analysis 
 In addition to employing a cross-case comparison, this study will also draw on the 
method of within-case analysis, which serves as a supplement for the comparative methods here 
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pursued.  Within-case observations can be especially helpful due to their ability to reduce the 
over-simplification, or omission of contexts, often found in case-studies examined through the 
comparative method alone.
36
  Therefore, in adherence to within-case analysis, both the case of 
the United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs, as well as Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs will 
be broken up into several coercive (with-in case) episodes for examination. 
 This within-case analysis, moreover, will attempt to trace the links between aspects of 
state coercive actions (i.e. the independent variables) and observed outcomes (the dependent 
variable).  This will be achieved by examining histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, memoirs and other sources of information in order to determine if the causal process 
the theory here hypothesizes is actually evident in the cases examined.   
 Further, with-in case analysis will also be used to assess the predictive utility of the 
theory of strategic coercion here espoused.  In doing so, it will both measure the outcome in light 
of the presence and value of the independent variables specified, as well as actively watch for 
possible alternative explanations/hypotheses or intervening variables, unsupported by the theory 
posited, which may account for the outcome observed.  Such alternative explanations and 
intervening variables may include different elements of strategic coercion (i.e. punishment and 
decapitation) that directly influence the outcome observed, international events that shape the 
process and outcome of strategic coercion, and/or other salient occurrences/circumstances 
attributed causal significance present in the histories examined. 
 By employing this method, a check will be placed on whether the explanations 
hypothesized by the posited theory are spurious through monitoring for alternative determinants 
or equifinality.  Equifinality is the case where the same type of outcome can emerge in different 
cases via a different set of independent variables—in other words, the observed outcome may 
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emerge as the result of an alternative explanation.
37
  Through the within-case analysis conducted, 
the potential for this occurrence is reduced, as is the possibility that spurious conclusions related 
to the theory will be made. 
 
Structure of this Dissertation 
 In concluding this chapter, the following dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter II 
provides a review of literature pertaining to considerations of strategic coercion vis-à-vis 
NSTOs.  Chapter III proceeds with the construction of the new theoretical framework, based 
upon the principles of strategic coercion, and asserts a set of hypotheses for empirically assessing 
its validity.  Chapters IV and V extensively cover case-study analysis over multiple within-case 
episodes in the historic instances of the UK versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007), and Israel 
versus Palestinian NSTOs, (1967-present).  Chapter VI concludes with a discussion of the 
results, assessment of validity of the new theoretical framework established, implications of 
findings, and considerations of if and how the new framework might offer advice in countering 
the contemporary substate terrorist challenge: Al Qaeda. 
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Chapter II: 
Evaluating Literature on Strategic Coercion against Substate Terrorist 
Organizations  
 This chapter evaluates the literature on strategic coercion theory as it applies to substate 
terrorist organizations.  In doing so, it provides: 1) a brief examination of the origins of strategic 
coercion theory; 2) an assessment of the most influential strategic coercion literature; 3) a review 
of strategic coercion literature as it applies to substate terrorist organizations; 4) an appraisal of 
the limitations of current literature; and 5) an assertion of the need for more research to properly 
adapt strategic coercion theory towards confronting substate terrorist organizations.   
 
The Origins of Strategic Coercion 
 Strategic coercion theory, and its associated body of literature, comprises a sub-section of 
strategic theory.  Daniel Moran defines strategic theory as the ―branch of social theory 
concerned with the use of force to achieve the goals of one community in conflict with others.  It 
explores how to employ armed forces to advance political, social, economic, cultural, or 
ideological interests.‖1  In strategic theory, war—and the general application of force—is 
considered instrumental, subordinated to objectives outside itself.  Accordingly, Colin Gray 
defines strategy as ―the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither 
military power per se nor political purpose.  By strategy [it is meant] the use that is made of 
force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.‖2 
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The Evolution of Strategic Theory 
 Still, it was not until work published by Carl von Clausewitz that strategic theory began 
to be broadened to considerations other than the efficient application of forces on the battlefield 
and in the potential area of operations.  The genius of Clausewitz‘s work derived from 
underscoring that politics permeates all levels of military action.  Moreover, as war was, in 
Clausewitz‘s perception, a ―continuation of politics by other means‖, it was made clear that such 
politics held a primacy in militant conflicts, meaning that there could never be a purely military 
solution to any strategic problem.
3
    
 In time, Clausewitz‘s wider considerations for strategic theory would be complemented 
by others.  Alfred Thayer Mahan came to consider ―sea power‖ as the key to cutting off a nation 
from its overseas suppliers and markets, thereby depriving an enemy state of the capacity to 
wage industrialized war.
4
  Meanwhile, in considering airpower, Giulio Douhet considered the 
potential for a tremendous psychological shock conveyed by airpower that could force 
governments to surrender.
5
  And Billy Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard, conceived of applications 
for airpower that could wear away at an enemy‘s material resources through the destruction of 
war industries and civil infrastructure over an extended period, and potentially compel an 
adversary nation to concede in face of the costs incurred.
6
 
 
The Emergence of Strategic Coercion Theory 
 The central goal of strategic theory has involved considerations of preserving war‘s 
political utility through limiting its social costs and subordinating its violent character within the 
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parameters of rational control
7
.  Following the Second World War, this central premise would 
not change, however strategic theory would come to be challenged by a new environment, 
possessing its own unique strategic challenges.  This new environment was characterized by the 
Cold War, and the ever-present threat of a clash between nuclear-armed superpowers possessing 
a global reach. 
 In the 1960s and 1970s, a new subset of strategic theory began to emerge to help guide 
policy in considerations of this new environment.  This subset of strategic theory came to be 
known as strategic coercion theory, and quickly emerged as a quintessential cornerstone in 
contemporary strategic thought.  The manifestation of this branch of theory transpired during the 
height of the Cold War, when both scholars and policymakers considered how each superpower 
used threats of nuclear attacks to manipulate its rival, as well as the ways in which limited 
amounts of force could be used to pursue strategic interests across the globe without sparking 
wider (if not nuclear) conflagrations.
8
   
In Arms and Influence (1960), the first and perhaps most influential work specifically 
dedicated to the concept, Thomas Schelling developed the theoretical structure of coercion 
theory, applying his prior work on the strategy of conflict to assert that rational adversaries often 
use the threat of military force as a quintessential part of their diplomacy.
9
  Furthermore, he 
concluded that through gradually raising the costs of resistance, a targeted adversary could be 
induced to concede.  The crux of Schelling‘s conclusion rested on the approach he identified as a 
―risk strategy,‖ whereby threatening the civilian population and presenting the prospect of 
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(mutual) terror, the actor could force his opponent to change its behavior for fear of further 
assault and damages.
10
 
Alexander George further helped to develop the concept in The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy in 1971 (later expanded with an investigation in 1991 aided by William Simons) and 
other works, reviewing a series of studies so as to draw lessons pertaining to the success and 
failure of coercive threats.  Importantly, this work distinguished between defensive ―coercive 
diplomacy‖ and offensive ―military strategy,‖ asserting that coercive diplomacy involves the use 
of diplomatic means, reinforced by power instruments—with the purpose being to force an 
adversary to cease unacceptable activities.
11
  From this work, important insights were found, 
including the conclusions that the relative strengths of parties‘ motivations and the clarity and 
urgency of their objectives are critical determinants as to the success of coercive diplomacy.
12
 
In other instances of classic works on strategic coercion, William Simons produced 
independent work that offered valuable insights on the ability to inflict costs while denying the 
adversary the capability to do so.
13
 Scholars such as Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice 
Gross Stein and others meanwhile further explored Schelling‘s rationality assumption and—
finding it lacking—argued that ―abstract rationality fails to provide an adequate description of 
how states actually behave.‖14 And finally, David Baldwin provided the field with valuable 
contributions, as he explained the situational nature of power and the choices that often go into a 
strategy of coercion.
15
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Research during the Viet Nam War on Applications of Strategic Coercion in 
the Context of Counter-Insurgency Strategy 
Despite the focus on nuclear-deterrence-centric coercion throughout the Cold War, some 
research was undertaken to examine the applications of strategic coercion in the context of 
counter-insurgency strategy during the period of the Viet Nam war.  Sir Robert Thompson wrote 
on the possibility of using force against the civilian population as a punishment against joining or 
supporting violent insurgent organizations, and as a means of compelling its cooperation with the 
governing authority.  According to Thompson, such coercion could play a key role in deterring 
defection in the populace to the insurgency and the provision of support through linking a clearly 
understood set of threatened punishment.
16
 
Meanwhile, some researchers were beginning to question the utility of more traditional 
―hearts and minds‖ approaches to countering an insurgency.  In 1968, Edward Mitchell 
discovered through statistical analysis of South Viet Nam that there was little evidence to suggest 
that the appeal of the Viet Cong was impacted through material poverty, nor that it could be 
mitigated through rural development, land reform, education, official honesty and other forms of 
material benefits.
17
  Samuel Huntington took heed of this, writing in the ―Bases of 
Accommodation,‖ that the answer to countering ―wars of national liberation‖ might be to 
implement ―forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country in 
question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate 
sufficient strength to come to power.‖18  Through this, Huntington implied that coercive 
firepower that drove the masses to seek refuge and resettle in cities might be the solution to 
improving control and security over the population and eliminating support for the insurgency. 
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 Along the lines of these perspectives, research was undertaken by analysts at the RAND 
institute, who attempted to develop a coercive strategy for reducing popular support for 
insurgents within a broader framework of counter-insurgency.  Charles Wolf began this research 
in 1965, contesting approaches that were overly concerned with mitigating social injustices and 
boosting economic development in order to win over ―hearts and minds‖ and reduce popular 
support for substate insurgent groups.
19
  Wolf argued about the impracticality of such a strategy; 
for him the real concern was about reducing the availability of ―inputs‖20 needed for the guerrilla 
group to carry out its insurgency, while curtailing the ―outputs‖—the violent manifestations of 
the insurgency—through blocking/destroying them and interfering with the conversion of inputs 
to outputs.
21
 
In order to reduce inputs necessary to fuel the insurgency, Wolf recommended an 
approach—later referred to as cost/benefit or coercion theory—that entailed making recruitment 
and the provision of assistance to the insurgency from within the local populace less desirable in 
the decision-making calculus of ―hypothetical men at the margin‖ through increasing the 
potential costs of lending such assistance, and providing a system of tangible inducements to the 
population and local security forces to encourage cooperation with the government against 
insurgents.
22
  Wolf also wrote about affecting the decision-making calculus of active members of 
the insurgency through amnesty and resettlement programs.
23
  Further, when it came to issues of 
providing economic and social improvement programs, Wolf recommended targeting the 
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implementation of such programs to assist strategic coercion through rewarding villages willing 
to cooperate with the government, particularly in areas susceptible to insurgent influence.
24
   
In Wolf‘s work with Nathan Leites in Rebellion and Authority (1970), his theory was 
refined, this time openly considering coercion against the populace to be an important 
component of counter-insurgency strategy.  As Leites and Wolf remarked, ―Unfortunately, the 
contest between R [the Rebellion] and A [the Authority] is often as much a contest in the 
effective management of coercion as a contest for the hearts and minds of the people.‖25  In 
effectively carrying out such coercion to ensure the populace refrain from supporting the 
insurgent organization, Leites and Wolf recommended avoiding ―damage-infliction on the 
population‖ from activities not part of a ―conscious design‖ (i.e. excessive violence from security 
forces), while adhering to the following advice where punishment affecting the population would 
be required:
26
 
Effective coercion—―effective‖ in the sense of obtaining compliance from the 
population—depends on several specific complex elements: (a) the degree of 
understanding on the part of the population as to what is intended and why; (b) the 
appropriateness of the penalties; (c) the extent of their enforcement through time; (d) the 
extent to which innocents are spared; and (e) the degree of protection available if 
compliance is forthcoming, in the face of countercoercion by the other side. 
 
Research assuming this perspective would run into heavy criticism both publicly and in 
the face of researchers from the hearts and minds school of counter-insurgency.  Regarding 
criticism from researchers who contested their perspective, Daniel Ellsberg and Constantin 
Melnik in particular warned about the problem of government coercion and over reaction leading 
to an increase in support for the insurgency that—in a form of ―revolutionary judo‖—could be 
                                                 
24
 Wolf, 22-3. 
25
 Charles Wolf, Jr., and Nathan Leites, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, Santa 
Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, February 1970, 155. 
26
 Wolf and Leites, 156. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
37 
turned against the state.
27
  Melnik noted in particular that: ―it is necessary to eliminate the 
negative feelings on which the insurgency is based.  However, the use of force and violence runs 
the risk of increasing these same negative feelings.‖28   
Following the ignominious end to the Viet Nam war, further research on strategic 
coercion in the asymmetric contexts of insurgency largely came to a halt.  Literature dealing with 
strategic coercion would meanwhile resume an almost exclusive focus on either deterrence or 
more limited forms of coercion between states—the superpowers in particular—until the end of 
the Cold War. 
 
End of the Cold War and the Contemporary Evolution of Strategic Coercion 
Theory 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, literature on 
coercion would undergo a metamorphosis.  In the post-Cold War era, U.S. actions were no 
longer dominated or restrained by the prospect of a cataclysmic nuclear exchange, and 
consequently a number of dynamics that affected coercion underwent a shift, with focus moved 
from nuclear threats to active applications of coercive tools such as air power and economic 
sanctions.
29
  Moreover, as the restraints of a bipolar world no longer apply, works on coercion 
also began to shift in their consideration of the latent to the active application of force. 
 This first became evident following the U.S.-led coalition‘s success against Iraq in the 
Gulf War, whereby the heavy reliance on precision airpower against Iraqi assets moved Colonel 
John Warden to write on the active uses of airpower for the purpose of incapacitating enemy 
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leaders and paralyzing their capabilities to make war.
30
  In his work, he argued that the entire 
state system could be targeted by airpower in a strategy aimed at weakening or incapacitation, 
and thus the destruction of the regime‘s power base could lead to its collapse.31 
 Shortly after Warden‘s publication, Robert Pape also produced a significant work in the 
field of strategic coercion concerned with the active application of force.  In Bombing to Win, 
Pape argued (in contrast to Warden) that where coercive uses of airpower were concerned, 
denial—the tactic of targeting a state‘s military strategy to prevent it from obtaining its 
objectives—has been the only application of coercive airpower to prove effective.32  Moreover, 
Pape posited that coercion is most effective when it aims at the cost-benefit calculation that 
every actor makes in considering continued resistance.  Thus, for a coercive strategy to be 
effective, the opposing side must consider the cost of surrendering to the demands of intervening 
states to be lower than the cost of resistance.  Consequently, Pape argued that this outcome is 
only possible when the coercer withholds military success from the opponent, while offering a 
reward after demands have been met.
33
 
 
Research on Strategic Coercion Related to Substate Terrorist Organizations 
 While work on strategic coercion following the end of the Cold War may have come to 
consider more active applications of coercive force, the focus remained largely state-centric with 
considerations being limited to symmetric coercive exchanges.  Even following the events of 
9/11, much of the literature still reflects this—an unfortunate reality, considering that strategic 
coercion has come to be perhaps the dominant, and most developed branch of contemporary 
strategic theory.  Accordingly, only a handful of authors have written any substantial work in 
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relation to the issue of using coercive means to affect the decision-making calculus of, and 
thereby counter, substate terrorist organizations.  Fortunately, from the endeavors of these 
scholars and analysts, some nascent understanding has been developed regarding the process of 
state strategic coercion applied against substate terrorist organizations. 
 Regarding the process of engaging in strategic coercion against substate terrorist 
organizations, it has been found that states do not usually move beyond conventional policing as 
a response to substate actors that pose a threat, until the non-state adversary has built a popular 
following sufficient for the purposes of disrupting normal administration and economic and 
social activity; or as Yezid Sayigh puts it, ―[the substate adversary] has developed its base on a 
scale that both requires a strategic coercive effort and offers suitable targets for it.‖34  Thus, 
according to Sayigh, two specific criteria must be met before strategic coercion is relevant in the 
case of non-state actors.  These criteria include that: 1) the non-state actor not only challenges 
state authority with its acts, but ―ultimately seeks to exercise state power, whether by taking over 
an existing state, inducing significant structural changes to its political, legal, and administrative 
systems, or acquir[es] territory to establish a new state,‖35; and 2) that the non-state actor has 
moved beyond formulating claims and demands, to the point that it exercises actual control over 
―an appreciable number‖ of inhabitants and a corresponding geographical area of one sovereign 
state or another.‖36    
Indeed, in 1998, both Stephen Cimbala and Syed Ali identified in separate works that 
substate terrorist organizations may pursue their own ends through strategic coercion against a 
state or states.
37
  Robert Pape, in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 
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provided important insights into such strategic coercion employed by substate terrorist 
organizations, finding that ―most [such] terrorism is undertaken as a strategic effort directed 
toward particular political goals; it is not simply the product of irrational individuals or an 
expression of fanatical hatreds.‖38  Regarding suicide terrorism in particular, Pape found that the 
main purpose is ―to use the threat of punishment to compel a target government to change policy, 
and most especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorists 
perceive as their national homeland.‖39     
 
The Challenges of Attempting Strategic Coercion Against Substate Terrorist Organizations 
 According to the extant literature, many are the challenges of attempting strategic 
coercion against substate terrorist organizations.  In his book, The Art of Military Coercion, Rob 
de Wijk comments on the serious difficulties encountered by Western governments in attempting 
to coerce substate terrorist organizations and other asymmetric actors.  Problematically, the 
asymmetric nature of substate terrorist organizations ―create insurmountable problems for the 
[state] coercer,‖ making military victories at the hands of Western forces difficult to achieve. 40  
As a result, enforcement costs
41
 are high in such undertakings, especially in light of the reality 
that operations against unconventional actors tend to be protracted by nature, demanding 
considerable time, lives and resources. 
 Work by Byman and Waxman, moreover, highlights the specific weaknesses that 
American forces possess when attempting strategic coercion against asymmetric and substate 
actors.  In particular five exploitable factors can be used against the United States, which are: 1) 
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a preference for multilateralism
42
; 2) an intolerance for US casualties; 3) an aversion to enemy 
civilian suffering; 4) a reliance on high-technology options; and 5) a commitment to international 
norms.
43
  These factors, furthermore, give rise to a series of ―countermoves‖ applied by 
asymmetric adversaries in neutralizing American coercive strategies.
44
   
 In pursuing these countermoves against the democratic state, the substate terrorist 
organization becomes involved in its own strategy of counter-coercion.  In doing so a substate 
terrorist organization will seek to raise enforcement costs to the democratic state, meanwhile 
clearly warning the coercing democratic state of painful reprisals to come, while insisting that 
anything that the state demands is non-negotiable.
45
  In particular, the strategy of counter-
coercion most likely to be employed will be what Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman call 
―denial plus unrest.‖46  Here the terrorist organization will seek to deny the resisting democratic 
state‘s preferred path to victory, while eroding the public support for maintaining the campaign 
of strategic coercion.  Regardless, it must be accepted that a determined substate terrorist 
organization will continue to increase enforcement costs, as well as imposing additional costs of 
its own, through counter-coercion waged at the democratic state.  Moreover, if current terrorist 
and guerilla hostilities prove insufficient to counter-coerce the state, then the substate terrorist 
organization will likely adopt even more extreme measures over time—including mass-casualty 
suicide attacks.
47
  Thus the potential for counter-coercion by a determined substate foe poses a 
formidable challenge as well. 
 Moreover, counter-coercion and high enforcement costs are not the only problems that 
states face in undertaking strategic coercion against substate threats.  In case-study analysis of 
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strategic coercion by India involving Sudhan rebels, tribal Pathan ―Lashakrs‖, the National 
Volunteer Defence Army (NVDA) of the Khampa and Amdoan guerrillas, and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Syed Ali uncovered a troubling reality for would-be state 
coercers.
48
  Ali found that the impact of strategic coercion was difficult to control in such a 
―complex setting‖ that often involved coercion and counter-coercion from state supporters as 
well as substate militant groups.  The problematic result being that in the cases studied, Ali 
concluded that strategic coercion ―led to a buildup of tensions that were only resolved, if 
temporarily, through more overt warfare.‖49  Thus, where significant state supporters exist that 
identify with the terrorist organization(s) in question, the democratic state runs the risk of 
embarking upon full-scale warfare triggered by tensions associated with its application of 
strategic coercion.  
In The Dynamics of Coercion, Byman and Waxman also present the problems involved 
with attempting coercive strategies against substate actors.  The first and most apparent problem 
for policy planners is that substate adversaries ―often lack the types of assets that military 
planners are schooled in identifying and targeting,‖ as these actors ―seldom possess munitions 
factories, electric grids, power plants, or other elements of a modern military-industrial 
infrastructure.‖50  Further, as substate actors do not control the state, ―efforts to target national 
infrastructure may hold less promise of moving adversary decision than they might against a 
state.‖51 
Perhaps most problematically, substate terrorist organizations also pose the potential 
challenge of being unable to implement negotiated settlements; a fact that may prove a daunting 
challenge to resisting democratic states.  This challenge is a reality, due largely to the substate 
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organization‘s structure, whereby leadership often exercises only limited control over its 
component parts.  Thus, even if leadership decisions can be modified, changes to policy may not 
trickle down to those who carry it out.
52
  The situation will be even more difficult in cases where 
there are multiple substate terrorist organizations.  Ultimately, this challenge may make it appear 
that any sustainable resolution is impossible when negotiated settlements and ceasefires 
consistently breakdown.  
Moreover, the dispersed organization of substate terrorist organizations may also cause a 
problem for strategic coercion in another regard.  This concerns pursuing a decapitation strategy, 
aimed at compelling a meaningful change in terrorist organization‘s behavior through the arrest 
or liquidation of the group‘s leading members.  The problem is that lack of hierarchy, easy 
access to the internet to facilitate communication, and the emergence of a number of small 
groups with no organized links entails that attempts at decapitation may ultimately prove 
fruitless.  As Stephen Cimbala wrote in Coercive Military Strategy on this matter, ―Cutting off 
the head of the scorpion no longer renders its tail nonlethal.‖53                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Joseph Lepgold, writes of other challenges in pursuing strategic coercion against substate 
terrorist organizations.  According to Lepgold, utilizing denial tactics may be difficult, in that 
while passive forms of denial ―may work for protecting key buildings and high-level officials, 
there is no way to deny terrorists access to open public spaces.‖54   Further, active denial in the 
form of pre-emptive strikes is problematic as well, because substate terrorist organizations have 
few assets to lose, leave few traces, and often hide in cities so that it will be difficult to attack 
them without seriously alienating the local populations.   
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Finally, Lepgold laments that substate terrorist organizations are extremes cases of 
―asymmetric motivation‖, whereby the ―potential targets of coercion find the activities so 
attractive that it is very hard to deny or punish them enough to make them stop.‖55  This in itself 
is a tremendous problem, given that a key proposition in the literature is that success is likeliest 
when the coercer is more motivated that the target.  Moreover, returning to the work of Byman 
and Waxman, this problem is compounded in that ―the costs of acquiescence to an outside 
power‘s demands can be prohibitively high.‖ As with any group that relies on resistance to 
attract new members, ―concessions may destroy the group more effectively than the coercer 
could ever hope to do.‖56  Thus, while a terrorist organization‘s motivations for resistance are 
exceptionally high, so too may their motivation be for giving in to coercion. 
 
On Applying Strategic Coercion to Counter Substate Terrorist Organizations 
 While the outlook may appear grim for pursuing strategic coercion against substate 
terrorist organizations, scholars and analysts have advanced a number of proposed applications 
and recommendations in effectively pursuing it.  According to Joseph Lepgold, strategic 
coercion can be aimed against terrorist organizations via two different forcible responses.  The 
first of such responses involves conducting a campaign designed to attack the terrorist 
organization‘s infrastructure.  This type of response would involve the disruption of lines of 
communication and supply, infiltrating terrorist‘s cells to gather intelligence, and so on.  The 
coercive objective would be to raise the costs to the terrorist organization enough so as to disable 
them.  The second type of response, meanwhile, includes ―protracted military interventions,‖ 
conducted with the intention of ―wip[ing] out the terrorist‘s infrastructure completely.‖57  
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However, Lepgold himself admits, ―this is hard to accomplish without risking a protracted war of 
attrition‖.58 
 Additionally, Lepgold also advocates a third method.  This method includes ―retaliatory 
coercion‖ against a state that ―is known to be involved in a pattern of terrorist activity,‖ in that 
―this gives victims a specific permanent ‗address‘ at which to knock.‖  59 The rationale for this is 
that, ―states are vulnerable to coercion and inducements in ways that shadow trans-state terrorist 
groups are not,‖ since these states will have fixed assets that can be threatened, and need other 
states ―to satisfy many of their security and economic needs.‖60   
 In his work, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, meanwhile, Robert Pape 
argues that the key to denying irregular forces from achieving success in strategic coercion, is to 
separate them from the populations that form the basis of their support.  This can be achieved, 
for instance, by relocating villages to more secure areas.  Moreover, ―when meaningful counter-
concentration does not occur and when logistic requirements are miniscule,‖ Pape argues that 
―air power is most effectively used directly against guerrillas rather than against their combat 
support functions.‖61   
In other works, Wyn Bowen and Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva write about 
employing deterrence against terrorist organizations.  In, ―Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism,‖ 
Bowen, proposes utilizing punishment and denial as deterrents against hostilities from (mass-
casualty-seeking) terrorist organizations.  In the case of threatening punishment, Bowen states 
that, ―the key question is whether there are suitable high-value targets that could be threatened to 
make radicals… weigh the relative merits of various courses of action.‖62  Such targets could 
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include family, supporters and even symbolic targets of commensurate value vis-à-vis the targets 
attacked by the substate terrorist organization.  However, such an approach would be difficult to 
pursue or legitimize by ―democratically elected governments because of political, legal, and 
ethical constraints.‖63 
Consequently, in the case of democracies, the more practical deterrent option available 
for use against terrorist organizations is denial.  Here, the denial approach would center on 
demonstrating that ―the capability exists to ward off—or to minimize damage in the event of—an 
attack, thus mitigating the desired effects of the terrorists.‖64  However this strategy is beset by 
the drawback that ―deterring an attack in one area can force a non-state enemy to change focus 
and strike at less protected areas with unpredictable and more heinous modes of attack.‖65 
Speaking of deterrence that implements denial, or ―deterrence by denial‖, Trager and 
Dessislava elaborate that this would involve the ―hardening‖ of targets ―in the hope of making an 
attack on them too costly to be tried and convincing terrorists of the state‘s determination not to 
make concessions in the face of terror tactics.‖66  Meanwhile, in discussing deterrence by 
punishment, Trager and Dessislava explain: ―we take deterrence by punishment to refer to the 
threat of harming something the adversary values if it takes an undesired action.  Such a 
threatened trigger of punishment might be a terrorist attack, but it might also be an action 
believed to be a precursor to an attack.‖67  While Trager and Dessislava note that some elements 
of terrorist organizations may be too extremely committed to deter, it is important to remember 
that terrorist organizations are not comprised of uniform members: there are leaders, lieutenants, 
financiers, logisticians, various facilitators, foot soldiers, supporting segments of the population, 
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religious and ideological figures—all of whom may vary in their susceptibility to coercion.  As 
Trager and Dessislava observe, ―Some elements of the terrorist system are more difficult to deter 
than others.  Financiers, for example, are sometimes less fanatically motivated than other 
elements of the system and thus easier to deter.‖68 
Moving on from advocated methods/applications of pursuing strategic coercion, several 
authors have also provided some important advice against substate terrorist organizations.  
Returning to Joseph Lepgold, he elucidates that a terrorist group‘s size can have an effect on its 
coerceability that cuts two ways.  Thus, in regards to smaller terrorist organizations, these may 
prove harder to find but easier to disable with a large blow once found.  Similarly, while larger 
terrorist groups leave more traces, they are ultimately harder to coerce through physical assault.
69
  
Rob de Wijk, meanwhile, asserts that in fighting terrorist organizations, it is only ―through the 
physical control of an area or isolation of the opponent that military objectives can be met.‖70  
Moreover, de Wijk recommends that in order for Western forces to be successful in strategically 
coercing asymmetric actors such as terrorist organizations, ―creativity and a flexible mind‖ are of 
the utmost importance.
71
 
Finally, returning to Pape, he advises that in devising a strategy to counter substate 
terrorist organizations employing suicidal means, it is important to heed a number of caveats.  
First, a clear conception of victory must be developed, where it is imperative to understand that 
the enemy ―is not ‗terrorism‘ per se‖, but rather a terrorist campaign or organization in particular.  
Secondly, offensive military action rarely works against terrorist organizations, in that while it 
can ―disrupt a terrorist group‘s operations temporarily, it rarely ends the threat.‖72  Third, dealing 
out concessions in any strategy of coercive diplomacy must be ―handled very carefully,‖ as 
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concessions leading to ―even [a] genuine resolution of the main dispute will not end terrorism 
immediately, since any concessions will almost always strengthen the terrorist leaders‘ belief in 
their own coercive effectiveness.‖73  Finally, in any attempts to successfully coerce a terrorist 
organization, the objective of preventing the rise of a new generation of terrorists must be 
effectively pursued.
74
 
  
Limitations of Literature and the Need for More Research 
 Current research, while valuable, clearly possesses a substantial number of limitations 
and provides only a murky picture of the puzzle that is strategic coercion against terrorist 
organizations.  This has been the result, perhaps, of a combination of two elements: 1) lack of 
studies dedicated to investigating the possibility of pursuing strategic coercion against substate 
terrorist organizations; and 2) the general absence of any concerted effort to divine a strategy to 
employ when undertaking strategic coercion against such a threat.  Moreover, as is apparent from 
a review of this literature, most of the extant work is overly pessimistic, placing disproportionate 
emphasis on the obstacles preventing states from successfully coercing substate terrorist 
adversaries, while often failing to account for how states have successfully coerced terrorist 
organizations in the past to end hostilities.  This perspective is problematic, in that while it may 
reflect the political motivations of academics and analysts in earlier time-periods who were wary 
of recommending any strategy that might require costly, drawn-out commitments against 
substate actors that their governments had only limited interests in fighting, it does not reflect the 
exigencies of the post-9/11 world. 
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What This Dissertation Brings to the Table 
It is thus the objective of this dissertation to address this deficiency in strategic coercion 
theory, so as to meet the exigencies of the contemporary era.  As such, it marks a first effort at 
specifically utilizing—and adapting—strategic coercion theory for providing insights into 
countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations.  In doing so, it is the 
aim of this dissertation to establish a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of states in 
resisting the violent hostilities of NSTOs.  This theoretical framework is established through 
identifying the key elements of strategic coercion necessary for success against an NSTO (or 
NSTOs)—and prescribing guidance for their implementation.   
In achieving this, this dissertation takes the unique initiative of identifying coercive 
elements based upon their importance in manipulating the choice of the NSTO (and its affiliated 
actors), in order to compel it to take a certain course of action (ceasefire, moderated objectives, 
disarmament, renunciation of violence, etc.).  This importantly differs in two ways from prior 
efforts in strategic coercion against substate threats (namely conventional insurgencies) arising 
during the Viet Nam era, couched under COIN literature.  In the first manner, such literature 
generally limited its considerations of coercion to manipulating the choice of potential supporters 
amongst the populace—the ―hypothetical men at the margin‖.  In the second, these 
considerations of coercion were principally limited to threatening and/or employing punishment 
against the population in conjunction with targeted inducements (applying a ―cost/benefit ratio‖) 
to ensure compliance.  Strategic coercion, however, is not such a simple (or barbaric) concept 
limited to threat of punishment against civilian populaces.  Accordingly, this dissertation 
considers a much broader variety of coercive elements, and focuses to a large extent on how to 
coerce the substate (terrorist) threat itself.
75
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Furthermore, having constructed this new theory of strategic coercion and its hypotheses, 
this dissertation will test it over the course of 80-years of coercion within the context of two 
historic cases and multiple within-case episodes to establish a broad basis for assessing its 
validity.  In accomplishing this, this dissertation provides an important effort in addressing the 
deficiencies noted above within the body of strategic coercion literature, while providing 
important insights for policy from a unique perspective in constructing a strategy against 
(nationalistic) substate terrorist organizations.  Such a strategy employs all aspects of national 
power in order to effectively compel them to moderate their positions, take a desired course of 
action (or avoid an undesired one), and/or weaken them to the point where they lack the strength 
to continue hostilities and can be eliminated. 
 
Chapter III: 
Towards a New Theoretical Framework of Strategic Coercion: 
The Balance Theory 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to create a theoretical framework drawn from the lessons of 
strategic coercion literature, which informs democratic states as to the most effective elements of 
coercion to employ in manipulating the decision-making calculus of nationalistic substate 
terrorist organizations (NSTOs) and ending the threat of hostilities posed by them.  However, 
strategic coercion literature as it currently stands is unable to help construct such a theory.  This 
chapter will thus seek to address this issue by both adapting valuable lessons in extant strategic 
coercion literature, and complimenting them, where additional insight is needed, with important 
contributions from other fields, namely counter-insurgency (COIN) literature.  As mentioned 
previously, COIN literature has been selected due to: a) the strategic insights it possesses in 
dealing with substate organizations employing strategies of asymmetric violence; and b) the 
operational insights it offers, which are invaluable to understanding how strategic objectives 
elaborated can be pursued.  Moreover, in the later, these insights are also very important for 
establishing an observable set of criteria for empirically measuring to what degree key strategic 
elements have been implemented. 
In developing this new theory of strategic coercion—geared toward NSTOs—this chapter 
provides the following: 1) an elaboration of the most essential strategic elements used to 
construct this new theory; 2) an operational/procedural breakdown of how to implement the 
strategic elements discussed; 3) a clear assertion of the new theory comprised by these key 
elements; 4) an establishment of the hypotheses of the theory asserted; and 5) a review of the 
methodology to be employed in measuring the validity of this new theory and its hypotheses. 
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An Elaboration of the Key Coercive Elements in the Development of a New 
Theory 
 In developing this new theory of strategic coercion, it is first important to identify the 
elements most fundamentally important to prevailing in any campaign directed against NSTOs.  
It is the contention of this paper that several key elements exist.  The first element is that of 
denial.  Denial is a concept of strategic coercion concerned with preventing an adversary from 
attaining their goals, with the objective of creating a form of hopelessness by demonstrating to 
the adversary the futility of their efforts.
1
  As Glenn Snyder elaborates, denial is the ability to 
deter an adversary through targeting ―his estimate of the probability of gaining his objective.‖2 
The end result is a cessation of the adversary‘s violent campaign through convincing them that 
their undesired course of behavior will not yield the results anticipated. 
 For many years, denial has been recognized for its fundamental value in strategic 
coercion.  Comparing the advantages of denial with that of punishment for the purposes of 
deterrence, Snyder noted that ―A threat of denial action will seem more credible on two counts: it 
is less costly for the deterrer and it may be effective in frustrating the aggressor‘s aims, or at least 
in reducing his gains.  A denial response is more likely than reprisal action to promise a rational 
means of defense in case deterrence fails; this consideration supports its credibility as a 
deterrent.‖3  In Bombing to Win, Robert Pape thoroughly investigated the value of denial—
especially in active compellance aimed at stopping an opponent from ceasing and/or undoing a 
course of undesired, violent action.  Through empirical research, Pape found that when denial is 
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successfully implemented, chances are very high that the opponent will be successfully 
compelled to halt its undesired course of action.
4
 
This dissertation accepts the premise that denial is a key element in strategic coercion.  
However, while denial is generally preoccupied with preventing battlefield successes and the 
seizure of territory when applied in the conventional sense between states, its essence changes 
somewhat in considerations tied to substate terrorist actors.  Here denial is concerned with 
preventing the NSTO from successfully conducting acts of violence against the state‘s interests, 
or compelling change through doing so.  The objective is to convey to the substate group‘s 
supporters and leadership that acts of terrorism will not yield the desired outcomes, nor compel 
the state to enact the political changes desired. 
Implementing denial against substate groups—in this case NSTOs—however, is not as 
straightforward as in conventional state-to-state cases.  Substate terrorist organizations do not 
tend to field large military formations or combat support functions/industry, nor offer as clear cut 
strategic targets for implementing denial operations.  This issue is made considerably more 
problematic in light of the elusive nature of these groups, which can hide amongst population 
centers, or foreign sanctuaries while receiving the support necessary to continue to strike.  As 
such, efforts at denial must be accompanied by another key strategic element—that of isolation. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, strategic coercion is about affecting an adversary‘s 
choice.
5
  In that sense, denial is concerned with creating a sense of ―hopeless‖6 through 
demonstrating the futility of pursuing continued (violent/terrorist) efforts.  In complimenting the 
efforts of denial to convey a sense of hopelessness, isolation aims to convey a sense of despair 
through manipulating the NSTO‘s perception of existential vulnerability.  Its purpose is to 
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demonstrate to the NSTO that is can indeed be targeted and eliminated (i.e. fatally held 
accountable), and will not be able to survive without the protection afforded to it by safe havens, 
willing populaces, and the material strength granted to it from external sources. 
 Isolation thus involves removing the NSTO from its sources of support, and can be 
broken down into two categories: 1) Isolation of external and international support; and 2) 
Isolation of popular support.  In the case of external/international support, no shortage of policy 
space can be noted in those expounding on the necessity of implementing this facet of strategy.  
Indeed, the Administration of George W. Bush in its ―Global War on Terror‖ clearly specified 
for years the need to crack down on states providing sanctuary and succor to substate groups.  
Isolation of external and international support is essential in order to limit or remove the tangible 
and political support, as well as the provisions of foreign sanctuaries to substate terrorist 
organizations that make them more difficult to coerce, while enabling them to conduct their 
campaign(s) of violence. 
 However external and international support is not the only source of support requiring 
isolation.  Isolation of popular support must also be enacted, which is critical to ―draining the 
sea‖ (in Mao‘s parlance) in which terrorist insurgent fish swim.7  While discussions of the 
importance of isolation of popular support are comparatively limited in the body of existing 
strategic coercion literature, the importance for conducting popular isolation can be found within 
works dedicated to the field of counter-insurgency (COIN).  The perspective of the importance 
of popular support within COIN literature can perhaps be traced to T.E. Lawrence‘s observation 
that ―Rebellion [or insurgency] must have a population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to 
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the point of not betraying a rebel movement to the enemy.  Rebellions can be made by two 
percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic…‖8   
This passively sympathetic population is perhaps most valuable to insurgents, in that it 
provides a ―wall of silence‖ behind which the substate group can hide.  However, the important 
support that a sympathetic population can provide is not limited to this—it can also provide 
moral and political support, as well as very tangible support such as manpower, materials, safe 
houses, logistical needs, etc.  It is therefore of the utmost importance to isolate these substate 
organizations from their sources of popular support.  Once this support has been cut off, these 
insurgent groups will, according to John Nagl, ―wither on the vine or [be] easily coerced to 
surrender or destroyed by the security forces with the aid of the local populace.‖9  Indeed, as 
David Galula clearly asserts, a victory emerges following the ―permanent isolation of the 
insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and 
with the population.‖10 
 This dissertation accepts this perspective espoused in COIN theory on the necessity of 
isolating the substate insurgent organization from its base of popular support.
11
  Isolation of 
popular support importantly serves to sap the NSTO of its support, protection, personnel and 
resources drawn from a complicit populace, thereby diminishing the capacity of the terrorist 
organization to conduct operations, and forcing it out into the open for targeting by the 
democratic state—all of which serves to enhance the sense of existential vulnerability felt by the 
NSTO.    In contrast, however, to early works on investigating strategic coercion towards this 
end during the Viet Nam era, this dissertation takes the position that the most effective approach 
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to isolating popular support does include coercing the populace to ensure its compliance—but 
rather through a ―hearts and minds‖ approach aimed at winning the support of populations 
championed by the terrorist organization, or at a minimum, persuading it to embrace non-violent 
options.  The reason is that this dissertation contends that the most effective way to isolate 
popular support is through winning over the populace and addressing their grievances (rather 
than through coercing their compliance).
12
  Furthermore, as elaborated by Melnik and Ellsberg 
(mentioned earlier), use of coercion also runs the direct risk of actually generating support within 
the populace for the insurgent organization.
13
   
Isolation of popular support is also fundamentally important for another reason—one that 
would likely be adversely affected from an approach that targeted the populace with punishment. 
This reason is concerned with effectively manipulating the NSTO‘s considerations of measured 
political expediency in its course of actions.  As it is assumed in this dissertation that 
nationalistic substate terrorist organizations depend (to at least some significant degree) on a 
specific population (or populations) for support—seeking to present themselves as ―champions‖ 
of the people‘s cause—then NSTOs will be concerned with maintaining the support of these 
people.  The aim of isolation of popular support is thus meant to convey to the NSTO that at the 
very least, the granting of concessions and renunciation of violence will be accepted by the 
people they claim to represent (and receive support from)—if not, in the best case scenario, met 
favorably by/be demanded by these people.  In lieu of such isolation of popular support, with 
populace(s) championed crying out for violence and revenge, it is unlikely that the NSTO will be 
willing to favorably comply with efforts at strategic coercion by the democratic state, as such 
compliance may entail an existential catastrophe for the NSTO.  
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Moreover, isolation of popular support also contributes to efforts at denial, in that without 
it an NSTO with substantial popular support will be both harder to target and stronger in its 
military capacity through the provision of recruits, intelligence, funding and possible weaponry.  
Isolating popular support also contributes to efforts at isolation of external/international support, 
in that foreign adversarial nations will be more forthcoming in their provision of external support 
upon witnessing what they perceive to be the dire plight of co-religionists, co-ethnic/national 
groupings, etc.  Furthermore, should negotiations through coercive diplomacy be necessary to 
bring the conflict to an end, then isolation of popular support will prove vital in developing and 
sustaining a willingness on the part of the NSTO to move forward towards negotiated progress. 
 
Identifying the Three Key Elements 
  Given the above breakdown, three key elements are made clear for strategic coercion 
targeted against an NSTO.  The first element, intended to instill a sense of hopelessness through 
demonstrating the futility of its violent efforts is denial.  The second and third elements, in turn 
both include forms of isolation.  They are isolation of external support and isolation of popular 
support.  Both lend to enhancing the existential vulnerability felt on the part of the substate 
terrorist organization.  Furthermore, isolation of popular support also helps to affect the NSTO‘s 
considerations of measured political expediency.  Taken together, it is the contention of this 
dissertation that these three elements are vitally important to conducting a successful campaign 
of strategic coercion against any NSTO.  Prior to specifically elaborating upon why and how 
these elements are so critically important to success in strategic coercion, however, it is first 
important to elaborate on what implementing these three elements entails.   
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An Operational/Procedural Breakdown of How to Implement the Key 
Strategic Elements 
 Having identified the key strategic elements to comprise this new theory of strategic 
coercion as isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support, it 
is now important to provide an operational/procedural breakdown of how these elements can be 
implemented against NSTOs.  The reason for this is two-fold.  First, it provides guidance for 
better understanding how these strategic elements can be pursued and enacted.  And second, it 
helps to establish a set of observable indicators that can be evaluated through empirical 
assessment.   
 
Isolation of External and International Support 
The more external and international support enjoyed by the substate terrorist 
organization, the more difficult it will be to strategically coerce.  Such support may manifest 
itself in a variety of forms, be it moral, political
14
, technical
15
, financial
16
, and/or military
17
 in 
nature.
18
  It is thus a top priority for the democratic state in executing strategic coercion to isolate 
the NSTO from as much external/international support as possible.  In attempting to achieve this 
objective, the democratic state can employ a number of coercive means. 
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The first of these involves applying coercive diplomacy, aimed at the state or states 
providing passive or active support
19
 to the substate terrorist organization, through using either 
the mechanisms of international law and organizations, or pursuing unilateral punitive action.  In 
the former case of coercive diplomacy, the primary lever that is applied is that of sanctions 
enacted in a broadly multilateral effort, organized under the auspices of a major regional or 
international organization.  Such sanctions, moreover, can be economic, military, or diplomatic, 
and may be threatened in conjunction with inducements.   
Unilateral punitive measures may also be applied to compel an end to the external 
sponsor‘s support.  When engaged in this effort, the resisting democratic state may take, in 
particular, a number of coercive actions.   These include: 1) levying wide spanning sanctions on 
a second state for either financially supporting a terrorist organization, or for being 
uncooperative with that state‘s counter-terrorist efforts; 2) sanctioning third countries or 
companies associated with them that support terrorist organizations or state sponsors; 3) promise 
the lifting of already existing sanctions as an incentive for compliance; 4) offering economic 
incentives, such as trade preference, loans, direct financial assistance, or otherwise, in order to 
entice the targeted state to cooperate; and/or 5) making a strong legitimacy appeal that stresses 
the coercing state‘s security concerns (and implicitly conveys how likely the coercing state is to 
act should these not be addressed). 
 Finally, whether pursued through multilateral or unilateral means, coercive diplomacy is 
not the only way through which a state may attempt to end external state support.  Military 
coercion also presents another possible option.  In this instance, a state may apply military force 
on a massive scale, often called an ―intervention‖, against the external supporter of the substate 
terrorist organization.  In addition to simply eliminating terrorists and their training camps 
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through brute force, military coercion employed in this manner will have the goal of either 
compelling the state to cease its support for the terrorist organization and/or properly securing its 
lands and borders, or removing the regime in power through decapitation, with the aim of 
installing a more amicable government which is willing to crack down on terrorists.  
Military coercion, however, can be much more costly than coercive diplomacy. One 
reason for this is that the operation may require tremendous amounts of time, effort and 
expenditures impossible for the democratic state to give and sustain under intense counter-
coercion from the terrorist organization and opposing state, as well as international and regional 
pressures to withdraw.  Another is that in the circumstances of attempting to replace the existing 
regime with a more favorable one, the democratic state may become indefinitely bogged down in 
nation-building efforts in order to ensure the success of the new government and the prevention 
of the return to power of the old one.  Finally, the intervention may simply cause the state‘s 
collapse, if it is fragile and weak, resulting—in the long run—in a situation that is even more 
chaotic and supportive for the activities of the opposing terrorist organization.  This option of 
military coercion, then, should only be pursued in the most extreme of circumstances, where no 
other alternatives exist. 
 
Denial 
In the substate context, denial is concerned with preventing the adversary‘s capacity to 
achieve political and military objectives.  Denial against NSTOs thus serves the purpose of 
reining in a terrorist organizations‘ capacity for violence and its ability to unleash terror amongst 
a targeted audience or audiences.  Effectively implementing denial is fundamentally important 
for bringing violence down to more ―acceptable‖ levels.  Moreover, denial may manifest itself in 
a number of forms during strategic coercion against an NSTO.  Most actively, denial may 
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transpire as direct military coercion that interdicts a planned attack, or launches a variety of 
operations against the members of the terrorist organization and its support structures.  It may 
also take on a more passive role, referred to by Trager and Zagorcheva as ―deterrence by 
denial,‖20 that targets the substate adversary‘s estimate of the probability of achieving his 
objectives.
21
  In considering deterrence by denial against terrorist organizations, Trager and 
Zagorcheva advise ―hardening‖ targets—i.e. fortifying embassies, placing air marshals on 
flights, upgrading border security, etc.—―in the hope of making an attack on them too costly to 
be tried and convincing terrorists of the state‘s determination not to make concessions in the face 
of terror tactics.‖22   
In addition to ―hardening‖ specific key targets, deterrence by denial may also entail other 
options.  Most benignly, this may include enhancing post-attack crisis management capabilities 
to minimize damage when attacks do successfully occur.  More controversially, it also may entail 
the construction of separation walls.  As Joseph Lepgold remarks, terrorist insurgents ―must be 
physically kept from achieving their goals or… reaping symbolic gains from their actions.‖23  
The erection of separation barriers can be key in working toward preventing NSTO access to 
targets.  Such barriers, moreover, may also involve physically separating members of the NSTO 
from vulnerable populations and target areas, possibly through demographic separation
24
, or in 
worst-case scenarios, the resettlement of populations into safer areas. 
In addition to deterrence by denial, several more active forms of denial are available for 
the democratic state to implement.  These include:  
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Denial of the Ability to Operate 
A fundamental prerequisite to denying an NSTO from achieving political and military 
objectives rests in denying it the ability to freely and effectively operate.  In order to achieve this 
end, the democratic state must strive to deny the substate terrorist organization the capacity to 
conduct basic, fundamental activities such as planning, training, recruitment, travel and 
communication.  This is accomplished through a variety of means, including: infiltration into the 
ranks of the substate terrorist organization; proactively gathering intelligence and using it to 
thwart operations; capturing, killing and/or arresting terrorists and their associates; the 
occupation and clearing of hostile areas controlled by the NSTO; creation of checkpoints to 
restrict movement; expansion of powers by the democratic state government for search and 
seizure; sending out regular patrols of cities, towns, villages, hamlets, roads, bridges, power 
sources and the countryside; and—where the state controls territory upon which the NSTO 
operates—possibly establishing a line of defended localities, with the intention of denying the 
opposing forces terrain in which to operate.
25
 
 
Denial of the Ability to Evade State Security Forces 
 Another key objective of military coercion applied against the NSTO is that of denying it 
the ability to evade democratic state security forces once an attack has been launched.  In order 
for the democratic state to accomplish such an interdiction capacity, the possession of lightly 
armed forces capable of high mobility and transport via airlift is of critical importance.  The 
democratic state‘s forces should be able to move quickly, capable of keeping up with and 
eliminating terrorist insurgents on their own terrain.  In their efforts, moreover, they should be 
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assisted with air power (especially helicopters), capable of moving their troops, equipment and 
supplies, as well as performing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.
26
   
 
Denial of Vital Resources 
 The final form of denial is that aimed at denying the NSTO of vital resources—namely 
armaments, explosive devices and the funds necessary to procure them.  Here the resisting 
democratic state‘s forces ought to pursue a number of ends.  The first of these involves seizing 
possible armaments and preventing further ones from coming into the country/area of operations.  
This will eliminate a major source of weapons and ammunition within the country/region.
27
  It 
will also serve to restore tranquility for the local inhabitants themselves by decreasing the 
number of firearms present in the conflict zone. 
 Secondly, the resisting democratic state must strive to cut off cash flows into the country.  
This can include freezing bank accounts, cracking down on ―hawala‖ networks, restricting the 
terrorist organization‘s capacity to transfer and access finances, ending illegal narcotics 
operations, etc. in order to deprive the NSTO of vital resources needed to conduct its hostilities.  
Finally, the resisting democratic state must move to interdict the movement of foreign arms and 
men across porous borders—be this through frequent patrols or the construction of walls/border 
detection systems.  Such action will be key to preventing external fighters and supplies from 
pouring into the country and replenishing the NSTO‘s capability for hostile action. 
 
Isolation of Popular Support: 
 Isolation of popular support is of essential importance in removing key material, 
personnel and political support for the NSTO, as well as driving it out into the open for targeting.  
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In order to provide for this isolation of popular support, the state must implement and observe 
the following measures: 
 
Successfully Conveying the Democratic State‘s Own Narrative: 
 In attempting to isolate an NSTO from its sources of popular support, one of the most 
important measures is to effectively communicate the state‘s position or narrative in the conflict.  
It is important that the state demonstrate its position in the conflict as benign and legitimate, 
refuting any attempts at demonization pursued by the NSTO to turn the populace against the 
state.  In attempting to do so, the promulgation of what is referred to in COIN literature as the 
single narrative is of fundamental importance.  The single narrative is a simple, unifying, easily 
expressed story/explanation that organizes people‘s experiences and provides a framework for 
understanding events.
28
  It is also a vital way for the resisting democratic state to frame a 
counter-cause to that promulgated by the NSTO.  As Paul Wilkinson once remarked, ―Against 
groups which enjoy at least some degree of mass support, democratic governments need to wage 
simultaneously both a security campaign to contain and reduce terrorist violence and a political 
and information campaign to secure popular consent and support and to sustain it.‖29 
 This end can be achieved through exploiting a well-constructed single narrative, passed 
through cooperative opinion makers in order to undercut the terrorist insurgent‘s attempts to co-
opt the populace.  However, in order for the government to successfully promulgate such a single 
narrative and win the populace over, three additional measures must be ensured.  These are: 
avoidance of excessive violence; addressing existing grievances; and—if applicable given the 
circumstances—providing for the security of the population. 
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Avoidance of Excessive Violence:  
 In employing a single narrative, the first and perhaps most important concept that must be 
adhered is the avoidance of excessive violence.  As Austin Long points out, the problem is that 
―repressive measures taken by the government in response to insurgency can actually stimulate 
insurgent activity.‖30  Such actions raise the ire of the population, create new sources of 
grievances, and work to drive the population into the hands of NSTOs, thereby completely 
undermining any attempts to win them over.  Constantin Melnik classically described this 
problematic situation as one where the state‘s use of force in counter-insurgency operations can 
be turned against it: ―[T]he counterinsurgent resembles an old boxer, huge but awkward, who 
becomes the toy of a small and youthful judo artist.  His hammer blows miss their mark or if they 
do not, his smaller adversary turns their force against him.‖31  Indeed, Daniel Ellsberg 
specifically warned of this strategy—noting that: ―many insurgent forces have thus relied vitally 
upon [such] a strategy that can be called ‗revolutionary judo‘ in which … a stronger opponent‘s 
… own strength and momentum are used to unbalance and overthrow him.‖32    
In avoiding excessive violence, the principle of minimum use of force must be strongly 
adhered to, and paired with equally appropriates rule of engagement.  It also entails establishing 
government oversight to constantly monitor military actions taken during operations, and 
redressing any immediate grievances that result during operations against the insurgent group.
33
  
Finally, avoidance of excessive violence also entails restraint from employing collective 
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punishment, which may under gird the substate terrorist organizations and its cause amongst the 
population.    
 
Redressing Grievances: 
Of utmost importance in convincing the populace that the state is not the villain it has 
been portrayed as, it is the task of the state to address the root causes driving the population away 
from it.  This involves redressing social, political and economic grievances that fuel rage and 
upset within the population, compelling many to either actively or passively support the NSTO.
34
  
It also means preventing new grievance from emerging that may serve to create terrorism 
triggers, such as salient political events or crimes used to rally people to the violent cause of the 
terrorist organization. 
As Thomas Schelling noted, ―insurgency warfare typically involves two actively opposed 
sides—the authorities and the insurgents—and a third group, a large population subject to 
coercion and cajolery.‖35  To win this third group and isolate it from the substate terrorist 
organization that is being fought against, it is imperative to redress salient grievances while 
preventing the emergence of new ones.  A fundamental component necessary for ensuring this 
involves the state demonstrating the ability to legitimately govern and provide law and order 
(whether during a temporary occupation, or if the land contested by the NSTO resides within the 
state‘s pre-existing territory).  As Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. stated, ―Demonstrating 
competence and acquiring a reputation for effective action constitute A [the Authority‘s] political 
tasks.‖36  If A is unable to effectively do so and democratic revision of the situation is in 
question, then this holds the potential to erupt as a major popular grievance. 
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Providing Security 
Under circumstances where the NSTO in question resides within the resisting democratic 
state‘s own territory—or the territory of a friendly government that it is intervening to assist—
then the state must strive early on to provide physical and psychological security to the 
population.  Providing security to the population under these circumstances is key to compelling 
the population to give up (coerced) support for the substate terrorist organization, through 
convincing them that the resisting democratic state will keep them safe and prevent further 
coercion against them by the NSTO.
37
  Should this not be done, the end result is that the terrorist 
organization will step in to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of the absence of the state‘s 
authority, and people—in the interests of their own survival—will inevitably come to at least 
passively side with their new (terrorist) caretakers.     
 According to counter-insurgency theory, the democratic state can prevent this from 
transpiring (or undo it once it has) through asserting  its authority over and protecting the 
population.  This objective is best achieved through clear-hold-build operations.  These 
operations are executed by clearing a city, town, village, or region of active insurgent members 
of the NSTO, establishing a semi-permanent presence there (until the indigenous population is 
strong enough to assume this task itself), and developing infrastructure and self-maintained 
security mechanisms, so that the population is rid of the terrorist insurgent fish attempting to 
swim in it.
 38
    As Sir Robert Thompson notes, the intention is to ―restore government authority 
and win the people to the sides of the government.
39
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 In conducting clear-hold-build operations, it is also fundamentally important to have a 
sufficient number of ―boots on the ground‖ in proportion to the population in order to provide the 
necessary security.  According to the research of James Quinlivan examining a series of 
stabilization operations, success was only found in instances with a minimum number of 10 
members of the security forces (military and police forces) to every 1,000 members of the 
population.
40
  Quinlivan also found that in successful British counterinsurgency operations such 
as the Malayan Emergency, a force ratio of approximately 20 members of the security forces to 
every 1,000 members of the population, or a ratio of 1 to 50, was present.
41
   
 It must also be noted that in deploying security forces to protect the population, these 
troops and police must be stationed ―where the population actually lives and not on positions 
deemed to possess a military value.‖42  To this end, the primary function of counterinsurgency 
forces is a police—not a military role.  Once police patrolling can provide security to local 
communities, only then will support for the resisting democratic state begin to be built.  
Critically, it is only at this point that the people will begin to have enough trust for government 
security forces, having daily contact with them, that they will begin to provide the valuable 
intelligence required for hunting down and eliminating members of the NSTO.
43
 
 
The Balance Theory of Strategic Coercion 
 Having discussed what this dissertation contends to be the three key elements of strategic 
coercion for implementation against NSTOs, and their procedural/operational breakdowns, the 
Balance Theory can now be established.  The Balance Theory assumes a mutual interdependence 
between the three key elements: isolation of external and international support, denial and 
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isolation of popular support.  In order for the NSTO to be made susceptible to strategic coercion, 
isolation of external/international support is a fundamentally important component: the NSTO‘s 
ability to find sanctuary and launch assaults from the territory of other states must be purged, and 
its ability to collect material and political support must be reduced if not eliminated.  If this is not 
achieved, denial efforts will suffer—passive denial efforts will be undermined by an adversary 
that can strike at will, and the efficacy of more active forms of denial targeted at reducing the 
NSTO‘s ability to operate, gather vital resources, and evade the democratic state‘s forces will be 
critically diminished. 
 Preferably with external/international support reduced—especially in terms of the 
availability of foreign sanctuary and the ability to infiltrate and assault from external states—it is 
a primary objective of the democratic state to implement denial operations.  The aim of this to 
provide a secure environment, whereby the state looks to: 1) demonstrate to the NSTO and its 
supporters that violence will not produce the outcome(s) they desire; and 2) contain the spread of 
terror so that cooler heads and policies may prevail—especially if negotiations are required to 
reach a political settlement.  Simultaneously, the state must also implement isolation of popular 
support and work to co-opt any susceptible populaces in the cause of peace.  This condition must 
be obtained so as to weaken the NSTO‘s capacity to carryout acts of violence, while making it 
vulnerable to other elements of strategic coercion. 
 Accordingly, the Balance Theory contends that effective isolation of 
external/international support is necessary to facilitate denial operations.  Denial, in turn, is 
required to create the secure environment necessary for protecting the state‘s populace and 
interests, while demonstrating to the NSTO and its supporting elements that grievances and 
unrealistic demands cannot be addressed by violent, non-democratic or undiplomatic means.  
Denial is also required to help enable efforts at isolation of popular support. As noted earlier, a 
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populace susceptible to force and the threat of it by substate insurgents is unlikely to willingly 
proffer its cooperation to the state.  Moreover, even if the implementation of violence may be 
perceived as repugnant by large swaths of the population, it is likely that they may sublimate 
their impulse to reject it should it prove highly effective and likely to attain the political outcome 
desired by the affected communities. 
Conversely, attempts at isolation of popular support will make NSTOs more susceptible 
to denial efforts, through removing passive and active support that NSTOs require to function—
while hopefully opening up greater sources of intelligence that the state can employ in denial 
operations.  Further, no matter how effective the denial operations, without significant gains in 
isolation of popular support, the democratic state is unlikely to enjoy anything more than a 
stalemate against the NSTO—that is a situation where violence continues indefinitely, albeit at 
reduced levels between both sides in absence of any meaningful political resolution.  The reason 
is that in lieu of such successful isolation, the will, drive and support for the terrorist organization 
will remain fueled by an angry population bent on seeing a political change in the status quo 
enacted by what they may consider to be the only effective recourse available: violence. 
Thus in line with the Balance Theory of strategic coercion‘s name, each of these three 
key elements must be pursued together in a balanced fashion.  Each element must be pursued 
simultaneously, as each element helps to complement the other.  But importantly, care must be 
taken not to sacrifice the success of one of these elements for success in another.  For example, a 
denial-centric strategy that does not adequately isolate external/international support will likely 
find its efforts consistently undermined through access to sanctuary, material aid and other forms 
of assistance that negate the state‘s constraint of the NSTO‘s ability to strike and operate.  
Further, overly zealous efforts at denial may produce excessive violence and new grievances, the 
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result being to undermine efforts to isolate popular support for the NSTO—if not stimulate 
renewed support all together.   
Alternatively, seeking to implement isolation of popular support cannot sacrifice denial 
and external isolation efforts.  For instance, a democratic state may find it tempting to focus its 
efforts almost entirely on winning over susceptible populaces through addressing ―root causes‖ 
of support for terrorist violence and inducement-based diplomacy against state sponsors, 
meanwhile eschewing or only reluctantly engaging in security-centric external isolation and 
denial operations.  However, if terrorist violence is not reined in through external isolation and 
denial operations, softer popular isolation efforts may be for naught as an NSTO given free sway 
will increasingly enlarge its scope of violence, while coercing the support it needs from the 
populace in absence of the implementation of law and order.  Under such circumstances, the 
result is likely to be an outbreak of increasingly violent terrorist attacks that cause the situation to 
spiral out of control.  Accordingly, each element of strategic coercion is of vital importance, and 
the effective implementation of the three elements is the sine qua non for success—being the 
renunciation of violence, the disbandment of the NSTO, and/or the forging of an equitable treaty 
that provides an acceptable end-state, and end of the conflict, for all parties. 
Finally, in achieving an enduring end to hostilities—that is a high level of success in 
efforts at strategic coercion—the Balance Theory recognizes that negotiations may be required, 
particularly when the NSTO is well-established and heavily supported.  In conducting these 
negotiations and providing for their implementation, it is imperative that the state continues its 
balanced approach to maintaining effective isolation of external/international support, denial and 
isolation of popular support.  Should the state fail to do so, it is unlikely that these negotiations 
will yield any results of benefit.  Without effective denial—aided by isolation of external 
support—it is unlikely that the NSTO(s) will be convinced that non-violent means are the most 
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effective way to get the best deal possible or achieve the changes they desire.  Without effective 
isolation of support from the populace meanwhile, the NSTO will likely find it neither prudent 
nor expedient to negotiate concessions while it still enjoys a large degree of popular support for 
continuing its armed campaign.  The NSTO may even consider concessions at this point 
anathema, as they could be seen as amounting to defeat—thereby prompting its supporters to 
abandon it.  Moreover, even if a settlement is negotiated under conditions for which there is still 
substantial support for a campaign of violence, then rival NSTOs or splinter groups looking to 
draw from this support are likely to emerge.  Consequently, for negotiations to be successful, the 
conditions must be established whereby the NSTO‘s position of strength for making gains 
through violent attacks must be eliminated along with any substantial popular support that it 
enjoys for pursuing its armed campaign. 
 
Achieving Success in Strategic Coercion against an NSTO: Hypotheses of the Balance Theory 
 The Balance Theory posits the following.  Three key elements are required to 
successfully compel an enduring end to hostilities from the NSTO: 1) isolation of external 
support; 2) denial; and 3) isolation of popular support.  An overall significant to high level of 
success in implementing these elements will result in the success of strategic coercion against the 
NSTO (or NSTOs).  From the perspective of strategic coercion—dealing specifically with 
affecting the choice of the adversary—the reason is that the presence of all three elements will 
help compel an enduring end to the NSTO‘s campaign of terror and a renunciation of violence 
through demonstrating the futility of such efforts, conveying a sense of despair through instilling 
a sense of existential vulnerability (particularly amongst the NSTO‘s leadership and supporting 
elements), and demonstrating the political expediency of ceasefire and pursuing/accepting a non-
violent settlement.  
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 Conversely, an overall level of failure or worse (backfire) in implementing the three key 
elements will result in a similar outcome of failure for strategic coercion efforts.  Here, the 
NSTO will not only be tangibly strengthened, but also inevitably encouraged, convinced of the 
effectiveness of its methods, invincibility of its position, and backing from the communities it 
claims to champion—either through their active call to violent ―resistance‖ or their passive 
acquiescence.  Accordingly, the democratic state must diligently work to prevent such broad 
failure in these elements of strategic coercion, lest the situation violently spin out of control and 
lead to the state‘s eventual defeat. 
Furthermore, each element plays its own part in contributing to the success (or failure) of 
strategic coercion against the NSTO(s).  Breaking the elements down in terms of their 
importance, isolation of external support and denial are necessary to rein in violence and the 
NSTO‘s capacity to operate and strike.  Limited progress in implementing these two elements of 
strategic coercion will result in an outcome of no more than limited success.  Moreover, should 
significant to high levels of denial be achieved—aided through at least the requisite of limited 
implementation of isolation of external support—then the minimum outcome should be no less 
than moderate success.  This will be the case, given the great reduction of violence-levels and 
demonstration to the NSTO that its campaign of terror will not produce an unconditional 
surrender on the part of the democratic state (thereby opening it up to the possibility of 
negotiations and moderating its objectives).  However, in order to attain levels above moderate 
success—also referred to as a ―stalemate‖—isolation of popular support will also be required.  
The reason for this is that higher levels of isolation of popular support will be necessary in order 
to further weaken, expose and pressure the NSTO, as well as bring about the requisite progress 
towards political resolution for ending the conflict and/or compelling the NSTO to end its 
campaign of terror and renounce violence against the state and its interests.   
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Accordingly, these assertions of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion against can be 
broken down into the following hypotheses: 
H1: The presence of overall significant to high levels of the key elements of isolation 
of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support will be 
associated with higher** levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
**Higher levels of success is considered anything to be a ―significant success‖ or 
higher.  
 
H2: The presence of overall levels of failure or worse in the key elements will be 
associated with similar levels of failure in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
H3: Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial will 
correspond with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against an 
NSTO(s). 
 
H4: Significant to high levels of denial will correspond with no less than moderate 
levels of success (stalemate) in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
H5: Significant to high levels of isolation of popular support will correspond with 
higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
Measurement Scales and Standardized Questions for Empirically Testing 
Hypotheses 
 In empirically measuring the hypotheses of the Balance Theory, a focused, structured 
comparison, including both cross-case and within-case analysis, will be employed, using the 
British experience against Republican NSTOs in Northern Ireland (1969-2007) and Israel‘s 
experience with Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present) as the examined cases.  In doing so, three 
independent variables—being the three key coercive elements—will be examined in relation to 
how they affect the dependent variable, which is the level of success achieved at the outcome of 
strategic coercion.  The following measurement scales will be employed in order to conduct 
empirical assessment of these variables. 
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Independent Variable Measurement (1): Level of External Isolation Achieved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High: All major sources of external support—financial, military, 
and political—are severely restricted, if not completely 
eliminated; foreign safe havens prevented/eliminated 
 
Significant: Major external sources of financial and military support 
significantly reduced/blocked; political/diplomatic support 
for the violent cause of the NSTO reduced; access to foreign 
safe havens significantly diminished 
 
Limited: Some blockage of external financial and military support 
achieved; ability of NSTO to freely use a foreign safe haven 
reduced 
 
Failure: Negligible or zero isolation of external support achieved; 
foreign safe havens, if present, remain in tact  
 
Backfire: External support significantly increases in military, financial 
and/or political terms; safe havens, if present, continue to 
provide shelter and launch pad for attacks and may even 
multiply 
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Independent Variable Measurement (2): Level of Denial Achieved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High: Through security measures, passive and active, the NSTO‘s 
ability to launch major terrorist attacks is nearly eliminated; 
the NSTO‘s access to vital resources is greatly reduced; the 
NSTO‘s ability to operate is heavily impeded through 
crackdowns on its capacity to recruit, train, communicate, 
move freely and plan; violence capacity of additional 
significant substate groups related to conflict reined in. 
 
Significant: The NSTO‘s ability to launch major terrorist attacks is 
significantly reduced; the NSTO‘s access to vital resources 
is hampered; its ability to operate in terms of recruitment, 
training, communication and planning is significantly 
reduced; violent capacity of additional significant substate 
groups related to conflict reined in. 
 
Limited: The NSTO‘s ability to launch major terrorist attacks is 
reduced, through remains a significant threat; the NSTO‘s 
access to vital resources is reduced, though negligibly so; 
the NSTO‘s ability to operate is minimally impacted. 
 
Failure: The NSTO‘s ability to launch major terrorist attacks remains 
unchanged; little if any impact on eliminating the NSTO‘s 
access to vital resources and its capacity to operate. 
 
Backfire: The NSTO‘s ability to launch major terrorist attacks 
increases; the NSTO‘s access to vital resources expands; the 
NSTO‘s capacity to operate is enhanced. 
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Independent Variable Measurement (3): Isolation of Popular Support: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Success in the Campaign of Strategic Coercion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High: Popular support is denied to the NSTO; grievances well-
addressed; excessive violence prevented; complete absence 
of collective punishment; security fully provided to 
susceptible populations within democratic state‘s control; 
populace accepts democratic state‘s political and strategic 
position.   
 
Significant: Popular support to the NSTO for conducting hostilities 
greatly reduced; existing grievances reduced; excessive 
violence limited; absence of collective punishment; security 
largely provided to susceptible populations within 
democratic state‘s control; large portions of the populace in 
question begin to accept the democratic state‘s political and 
strategic position. 
 
Limited: Popular support to the NSTO is reduced; emergence of new 
significant grievances avoided; excessive violence reduced; 
minimal collective punishment; limited progress in 
addressing existing grievances; security may be poorly 
provided for to susceptible populations within democratic 
state‘s control  
 
Failure:    No reduction of popular support for the NSTO or gains for  
the democratic state; existing grievances and issues of 
excessive violence not properly addressed; security poorly 
provided, is simply absent, or may even be deteriorating for 
susceptible populations within democratic state‘s control. 
 
Backfire: Support for the NSTO and popular opposition to the 
democratic state is significantly increased; primary 
grievances remain poorly addressed; excessive violence 
and collective punishment likely; new significant 
grievances emerging; security situation for population may 
rapidly deteriorate. 
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Dependent Variable Measurement (4): Success for Strategic Coercion versus the NSTO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High Success: Lasting end to conflict with all major NSTOs involved formally 
announcing an end to their violent campaign(s); all violence 
halted by the NSTO(s); satisfactory and enduring political 
resolution for all major issues achieved – OR – NSTO is 
eliminated all together, in instances where it is weak enough for 
this to be achieved 
 
Significant Success: Violence-levels kept low; some important political resolution 
achieved; possible establishment of an enduring ceasefire; 
possible deal established to end violence with some, but not all 
of the major NSTOs involved in the conflict 
 
Moderate Success    Violence levels are greatly reduced or maintained at 
(Stalemate):  ―acceptable levels‖**; stalemate results as a recognition 
emerges that neither side can claim victory over the other 
through force; limited or no political resolution is achieved; 
potential establishment of a temporary ceasefire; NSTO(s) 
remains committed to campaign of terrorist violence 
 
Limited Success: Violence levels are reduced or kept from expanding; limited or 
no political resolution achieved; potential establishment of 
temporary ceasefire; NSTO(s) remains committed to campaign 
of terrorist violence 
 
Failure: Violence levels remain high; limited or no significant political 
resolution achieved; situation remains highly problematic and 
unchanged despite coercive endeavors 
 
Backfire: Violence-levels are high and continue to increase; limited or no 
significant political resolution; new issues requiring political 
resolution likely to emerge; situation likely to rapidly 
deteriorate 
 
 
**What a democratic state considers relatively ―acceptable‖ levels of violence is a consideration unique to the concerns 
and culture of that state.  For the purposes of this dissertation, determining if levels of violence have been brought down 
to ―acceptable‖ levels is assessed on the basis of two criteria, being: 1) casualties from NSTO violence remain 
significantly lower in comparison to peak years; and 2) the state is not compelled to undertake drastic revisions to its 
current external isolation and denial strategies in order to rein in violence. 
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An Explanation of the Assessment of the Dependent Variable 
 It is important to note that observing the outcome of a phenomenon like strategic 
coercion is always a tricky task.  Ultimately, it is difficult to observe non-events associated with 
deterrence, or definitively elaborate on the decision-making process of a terrorist organization 
and its leadership.  Moreover, establishing a set of criteria to accurately measure ―success‖, 
―failure/backfire‖ and everything in between is a very subjective exercise couched within a 
(very) politically sensitive subject matter. 
 This dissertation attempts to surmount this considerable hurdle through assessing the 
tangible elements of any outcome.  The elements include levels of violence suffered by the state 
during its conflict with the terrorist organization, measurable progress towards a political 
resolution of the conflict, and/or the public renunciation by the NSTO of its campaign of 
violence.  In assessing levels of violence, the indicator drawn upon includes casualties resulting 
from NSTO violence and efforts by the democratic state to suppress it.  Accordingly, both 
civilian and military victims of terrorism are accounted for, as well as military personnel who 
have died during operations against the NSTO(s) in question.
44
  Where violence results in 
significant damage to the state‘s infrastructure, this too is accounted for. 
 Progress towards a political resolution is assessed either in terms of new 
political/constitutional arrangements enacted by the state in order address issues exacerbating the 
conflict, and/or the degree to which progress towards resolving the conflict is made—observable 
in attempts at negotiations, the establishment of negotiated settlements, public declarations 
regarding a change in strategy/approach by the NSTO, the implementation of any political 
                                                 
44
 This is not to say that a moral, ethical, and/or functional distinction cannot or should not be made when 
distinguishing between civilian casualties resulting from terrorist violence and the death of security forces while 
undertaking operations against these NSTOs.  For the purpose of this study, however, all three types of casualties—
civilian victims of terror, military victims of terror, and military deaths during operations conducted against the 
NSTO(s)—are accounted for due to the fact that they collectively help comprise important indicators in regards to 
accounting for the level of violence suffered by the state in its conflict with the NSTO(s).   
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settlement achieved, etc.  Further, renunciation of hostilities by the NSTO is measured in terms 
of enduring ceasefires, decommissioning/disarming of weapons stockpiles, and formal 
declaration of the cessation of the terrorist campaign by the NSTO(s) in question (and the actual 
extent to which the NSTO abides by such declarations). 
 Finally, in order to try and ensure that the key elements of strategic coercion are what 
accounted for the outcome of success or failure—that is that the correlation observed is causal 
and not spurious—every assessment is preceded by an examination to see if significant 
alternative factors may have influenced or accounted for the observed outcome.  Described in 
Chapter I as monitoring for equifinality, this includes checking for the influence of alternative 
coercive elements (i.e. decapitation, punishment, etc.), significant international events, and 
salient occurrences/circumstances considered as particularly influential in the histories of the 
within-case episodes studied. 
 
Standardized Questions for Focused, Structured Comparison: 
 In measuring the hypotheses here put forth—and applying the measurement scales 
depicted above—the following standardized questions will be asked of each case episode of 
strategic coercion during the course of the focused, structured comparison conducted in the 
following chapters: 
1. What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved? 
2. To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
3. What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?  
4. Did additional significant factors affect the outcome? (Control question for equifinality) 
5. How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the 
conclusion of the episode? 
Chapter IV: 
The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs, 1969-2007 
 Having asserted the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, this chapter will begin testing 
its hypotheses through providing a case-study analysis of the United Kingdom‘s efforts from 
1969 until 2007 to counter violence from Republican nationalistic substate terrorist organizations 
(NSTOs).  This historic case will furthermore be broken down into several within-case episodes 
as follows: 
1. 1969-1972: The ―Troubles‖ begin; from peacekeeping to countering a terrorist 
insurgency 
2. 1972-1975:  Direct Rule to Sunningdale, its collapse, and an uncertain ceasefire 
3. 1975-1982:  Ulsterisation, Criminalisation, Normalisation 
4.  1982-1989:  Moving to enhance involvement from the Republic of Ireland 
5. 1989-1997:  Aiming for a political settlement, ceasefire and breakdown 
6. 1997-2007:  Achieving a political settlement, seeing it implemented  
 
 However, prior to proceeding with this within-case analysis of British strategy against the 
Provisional IRA (hereto also referred to as just ―IRA‖), a background of the conflict will be 
provided, which gives an elaboration of: 1) the conflict‘s history in brief; and 2) the political 
context of this historic case. 
 
A Brief History of the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
 The conflict in Northern Ireland dates back to the sixteenth century.  It began following 
the decision by Queen Elizabeth I to begin the ―settlement of Ulster‖ with Protestant English, 
Welsh and Scottish settlers in northeastern regions of Ireland, so as to ensure the presence of a 
British stronghold on the island of Ireland to prevent a staging ground for attacks by Britain‘s 
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Catholic adversaries in mainland Europe.  Given its long and pronounced history, it would be 
well beyond the scope this paper to discuss the entirety of the history of this conflict, even in 
brief. Still, in needing to provide an adequate explanation for the roots of the current conflict, it 
is perhaps best to start in the early Twentieth Century.  After a hard fought guerrilla war led by 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) lasting from January 1919 until July 1921, Republican leader 
Michael Collins negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty with British Prime Minister Lloyd George.  
The result was the securing of dominion status for the new Irish Free State.  This treaty was far 
from perfect from a Republican standpoint, however, as it possessed a number of shortcomings, 
the most important of which was that it resulted in the partition of the six counties of Ulster.  
These counties would come to be known as ―Northern Ireland,‖ and with their Protestant 
Unionist majority, would remain a part of the United Kingdom.  
 The Irish, represented at the time through the Dáil Éireann, were never consulted about 
the partition of Northern Ireland, and regarded the 1920 Government of Ireland Act that enabled 
it to be illegitimate, not least since it broke up the province of Ulster by omitting the three 
counties with the largest Catholic majorities in order to ensure the maintenance of a Protestant 
majority.
1
  Meanwhile, for Catholics trapped in the new statelet, an equal future free from 
discrimination was not to be.  James Craig, the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, was 
determined to ensure one-party rule (that is by Protestant Unionists) indefinitely, and in so doing 
abolished proportional representation and gerrymandered the constituencies.  All judges were to 
be Unionists, appointed by the Northern Ireland Stormont government.  The heavily armed 
auxiliary police force, the Ulster Special Constabulary—known as the B Specials—were all 
Protestant, and the police force itself—the Royal Ulster Constabulary or RUC—was 90% 
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 Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, London: The Bodley Head, 2008, 
42. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
83 
Protestant.  Meanwhile the jobs in the civil service, engineering works and the shipyards were all 
overwhelmingly kept for Protestants, with Catholics being twice as likely to be unemployed.
 2
    
 For the next forty years, the IRA attempted in various instances to wage campaigns 
aimed at bringing down the Stormont government in Northern Ireland and expelling British 
control.  The attempts were largely unsuccessful, however.  Meanwhile the Protestant Unionists 
managed to maintain, unhindered, a religious and political one-party state up until the late 1960s.  
The source of change in the 1960s came from a civil rights movement, which campaigned for 
one man one vote, changes to electoral boundaries, anti-discrimination in the provision of social 
housing, the repeal of special powers and the disbanding of the B Specials.
3
 
 While the civil rights movement would help to bring about changes, in conjunction with a 
progressive Unionist Prime Minister in the form of Terence O‘Neill, it would also serve to stir up 
sectarian tensions through the bitterness of the reaction it provoked in Unionist circles.
4
  This 
tension gave way to Loyalist (militant Unionists) aggression and violence, which played a major 
part in creating the post-1960s ―Troubles‖.  As Richard English explains, ―Just as the IRA felt 
that the illegitimacy and injustice of the north legitimated their own military existence, so 
loyalists for their part considered the republican and nationalist threat to their state a sufficient 
justification for carrying out appalling actions.‖5 
 The situation finally came to a head in August 1969, when the Unionist Apprentice Boys 
staged their traditional march in Derry and triggered a flare up in violence as skirmishes between 
Catholics and Protestants escalated into something close to a full-scale uprising.
6
  In wake of the 
violence, the authorities lost control over a substantial part of Derry city, and rather than abating, 
                                                 
2
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 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA, London: Pan Books, 2004, 99. 
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6
 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 
Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002, 54.  
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violence then continued to spread to other parts of Northern Ireland.  Violence engulfed large 
numbers of Protestants and Catholics in the Falls and Ardoyne-Crulim Road areas of north 
Belfast.  As a result of the violence in Northern Ireland, 1,800 families fled their homes—with 
over 1,500 of them being Catholic. Moreover, over 80% of the premises damaged were occupied 
by Catholics, and six of eight people killed in August were Catholics.
7
   Since one of the primary 
roles of the IRA was supposed to be the defense of Catholic areas against the security forces and 
loyalists, the IRA came under heavy criticism for its evident ineffectiveness.
8
  The consensus 
that emerged in the back streets of the Catholic ghetto was that the current IRA had failed them, 
and that a new defense force was needed.  The result was the emergence of the Provisional IRA, 
which in separating from the Official IRA (then largely committed to nonviolent nationalism) 
returned to traditional physical force republicanism
9
, with terrorist violence soon coming to be 
their primary mode of attack. 
 
Political Context of the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
 The (violent) political context of the conflict of Northern Ireland can find its roots in the 
contentious perception of whether or not the country of Northern Ireland, a part of the United 
Kingdom occupying the Northeastern portion of the island of Ireland, constitutes a legitimate 
entity and territorial division.  From a Republican perspective—argued by various incarnations 
of the IRA (including the Provisionals)—Northern Ireland is not a recognized entity.   Nor for 
that matter is the Republic of Ireland (consisting of 26 of the 32 counties of all of Ireland) or its 
government legitimate.  All are illegitimate constructs.  From their perspective, the Irish 
Republic proclaimed in the Easter Rising in 1916 and established by the Dáil Éireann (the then 
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House of Representative for the Irish Republic) in 1919—which includes all 32 counties of the 
island of Ireland—constitutes the only legitimate entity, and they are committed to see its 
existence realized.  For Republicans, the position is further reinforced by the fact that the Dáil 
Éireann was composed of—and their decision was concluded by—a majority of the MPs then 
representing Ireland in British Parliament, thereby enshrining it with democratic legitimacy. 
 While established in 1919, this all-Ireland Republic was not long to last.  Following the 
conclusion of the Irish War of Independence and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922 
(which was not accepted by Republicans and prompted the Irish Civil War), Ireland was to 
become a self-governing British dominion.  However, the Protestant Unionists of the six counties 
of Northern Ireland, or ―Ulster‖ as it was referred to by them, opted out of this new arrangement, 
choosing to rejoin the UK instead.  While Irish Republicans refused to recognize this territorial 
division on the grounds elaborated above, Protestant Unionists considered the partition of 
Northern Ireland to be a direct reflection of their democratic will—that is the democratic will of 
the majority population in the six counties of Ulster.  For the Protestants, they highly valued their 
British heritage and ties to the United Kingdom, and feared persecution (or worse) by a Catholic 
majority controlled all-Ireland government—a fear that was informed by a long and often times 
bloody history.  Unfortunately, however, while the formation and maintenance of Northern 
Ireland helped to ensure that Protestant Unionists would not suffer such persecution, the new 
arrangement resulted in serious inequality and (sometimes violent) discrimination that helped 
directly lead to the conflict that would emerge in full force in the late 1960s. 
 
Primary Actors Involved in the Conflict and their Political Agenda 
 The conflict in Northern Ireland involves several main actors.  The first of these are 
constituted by Republican nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), bent on seeing 
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the establishment of an all-Ireland Republic through violence.  The main organization amongst 
these groups—of which this case-study is primarily focused on—is the Provisional IRA.10  In the 
mindset of the Provisional IRA, Unionists were not a major threat, as they were simply puppets 
of British imperialism.  In Republican theory it was Britain who comprised the real enemy, and 
once Britain had been defeated, Unionist resistance would simply collapse.
11
  Moreover, the 
Provisional IRA considered themselves to be the rightful successors of the Irish Republican 
Army of 1919.  Their goal, thus, was to pursue terrorist violence so as to make it too costly for 
the British to remain in Northern Ireland.
12
    
 The second actor, or rather set of actors, are Northern Ireland‘s Constitutional 
Nationalists, primarily embodied through the Social Democratic Labour Party or SDLP.  Being 
primarily Catholic themselves and sharing the aspiration of Republicans for a united Ireland, 
Constitutional Nationalists differed in a number of ways from their more extreme counterparts.  
As John Hume, former leader of the SDLP clearly stated: ―The difference between Republican 
and Nationalist was that Nationalists worked constitutionally through conventional politics and 
Republicans believed in physical force and giving their lives for Ireland.‖13  Constitutional 
Nationalist thus sought to achieve their objectives through peaceful means, and through gaining 
the consent of Northern Ireland‘s Unionist majority.  They also helped to play a key role in 
attaining political progress throughout the conflict. 
 Next are the Unionists, the majority population of Northern Ireland.  Though not a 
monolithic group, the perspective of the Unionists both before and during the Troubles is that of 
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a group considering itself to be perpetually under siege, rooted in the feeling that they themselves 
are a threatened minority on the Island of Ireland, and often very resistant to constitutional 
changes to the existing political system.  Since 1937, when Eamon de Valera amended the Irish 
constitution to claim that the territory of the Irish state included the entire island of Ireland (and 
thus all of Unionist Northern Ireland), Unionists have felt that they were facing a hostile 
Nationalist state to the south, a hostile Nationalist minority within, and a government in London 
they distrusted.
14
  As John Hume elucidates, ―This explains their stubborn refusal to share power 
with the minority in Northern Ireland, whom they feared as the Trojan horse of the ―real‖ 
majority in Ireland, the Catholics.‖15 
 The fourth group of importance are those who share the goal of Unionists to remain in the 
United Kingdom, but similar to Republicans are more extreme in pursuing these ends through 
violence.  Those that comprise this group are known as Loyalists, and while they do not 
comprise a nationalistic substate terrorist organization themselves—as defined in this 
dissertation
16—a clear argument can be made that they are a terrorist organization nonetheless 
with sectarian objectives.  Present in such organizations as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and Loyalist Volunteer 
Force (LVF), loyalists often engaged in terrorism themselves, launching attacks against innocent 
Catholic civilians in order to ensure ―good behavior‖ from Republicans elsewhere.   
 Finally, there is the government of the United Kingdom.  The position of the UK by the 
time of the Troubles is perhaps best summed up by Hugh Rossi, a former minister of the 
Northern Ireland Office who stated that: ―From the time of the Spanish Armada down to World 
War II, Great Britain had a great strategic interest in a strong military presence in Ireland.  By the 
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1960s, the geopolitics of the world had rendered this impractical and unnecessary.‖17  As a 
consequence, consideration of withdrawal from Northern Ireland was not a taboo subject—even 
Winston Churchill secretly explored the idea with the Republic of Ireland during the Second 
World War in exchange for their assistance again Nazi Germany.
18
   
 So what was Britain‘s motivation for remaining engaged in the conflict, and not 
complying with the demands of the NSTO known as the Provisional IRA?  The answer is that 
every British government during the Troubles came to the same conclusion that a withdrawal 
leading to a united Ireland would, in the words of Peter Neumann, ―lead to sectarian strife and 
civil war,‖ where London assumed that ―the withdrawal of British troops would be followed by a 
Protestant genocide of the Catholic minority, thus provoking a military intervention.‖19  This 
concern was exacerbated by Northern Ireland‘s close proximity to the United Kingdom.  
Moreover, the terrorist campaign of the Provisional IRA was also a direct challenge to the British 
democratic system and rule of law.  Consequently, while the British government would question 
the feasibility of remaining in Northern Ireland and countering the terrorist insurgency of the 
Provisional IRA from time to time, it would remain committed to seeing a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict. 
          
Within-Case Episode #1: 1969-1972—―The Troubles‖ Begin: from 
Peacekeeping to Countering a Terrorist Insurgency 
 Following the violence that proceeded in the wake of the crisis ignited by the march of 
the Apprentice Boys of Derry, and the chaos that spread throughout Northern Ireland, the police 
force of Northern Ireland, the RUC, soon found themselves exhausted and overwhelmed.  As a 
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consequence, James Chichester-Clark, the Stormont Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 
requested assistance from the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the form of a military 
deployment.  In doing so, rapid strategic changes came into place, with the British government 
agreeing to provide troops ―in aid of the civil power‖, while deciding that the aim of their 
strategy would be to re-insulate Northern Ireland from Great Britain.  Moreover, while the 
British government hoped that the Stormont regime in Belfast would be able to continue on, it 
also publicly placed it on ―probation‖, making it clear that its continued existence depended on it 
carrying out a program of reform that ensured ―British standards of citizenship.‖20 
 In the meantime, British troops were deployed to Northern Ireland on 14 August 1969, 
marking what one military commentator described as a ―watershed‖ where ―the Army became 
inextricably involved in Ulster.‖21 On their arrival to Northern Ireland, the troops were to act as 
peacekeepers whose purpose was to help calm down a situation that had exceeded the control of 
the local police authorities.  At first the British soldiers found themselves welcomed by the 
Catholic population as they arrived to separate and restore order between the two warring 
communities.  It was not long, however, before the British Army ended up alienating them as 
effectively as the RUC had, appearing to direct their attention exclusively to Catholic areas.
22
  
Matters were made worse as major curfews were placed on large parts of the Catholic 
community, with the indiscriminate ransacking of their homes, and fourteen people being shot 
dead by the Army in the process.
23
  The British Army thus came to be seen by the nationalist 
community as defenders of the Unionist state rather than serving a peace-keeping function.
24
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 In this environment, circumstances were most propitious for the rapid growth of the 
young and newly formed Provisional IRA.  Having only formed after a split from the ―Official‖ 
IRA in the end of 1969, the Provisionals would soon find themselves thriving in the wake of the 
ongoing sectarian chaos, and alienation from the British Army, with their terrorist violence 
coming into ever increasing effect.   
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 During the 1969-1972 episode of strategic coercion against the Provisional IRA, the 
British government found little success in efforts to stem the flow of external/international 
support.  Beginning in early 1970, a key gun-running network was re-established, run by George 
Harrison in New York, which helped to provide the IRA with a steady and plentiful supply of 
thousands of Armalites.  Moreover, through the establishment of the Irish Northern Aid 
Committee (Noraid), also based in New York, the Provisionals were able to raise funds for their 
movement, and for these arms.
25
 
 Nor was the United States the only source of support for the IRA.  In the Republic of 
Ireland money went from government sources to the Provisionals.
26
  And after the debacle that 
was created by the botched attempt at internment (discussed shortly), Anglo-Irish relations took a 
severe battering that resulted in an outpouring of support from the Republic.  In the Republic of 
Ireland, IRA fugitives could now find sanctuary, safe in the knowledge that the Garda—the Irish 
national police force—would not throw them behind bars.  Meanwhile the Irish Prime Minister 
Jack Lynch, who had initially considered introducing internment in tandem with the Stormont 
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government abandoned the idea after witnessing how it had been mismanaged in Ulster.
27
    Even 
Irish cabinet ministers such as Charles Haughey would come to be caught providing guns to the 
IRA.
28
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Though by late 1971, the British managed to mitigate some of the damage that had been 
done with relations vis-à-vis the Republic through the Anglo-Irish rapprochement, this episode 
of strategic coercion witnessed a ―backfire‖ as the outcome of its efforts to isolate the IRA from 
external and international support.  American guns began to flow-in unmitigated, and not only 
was support not gained from the Republic of Ireland to crack down on the IRA, but British 
policies in Northern Ireland resulted in an explosion of support from the Irish Republic.  External 
support for the IRA by the end of this episode of strategic coercion had thus increased 
dramatically. 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 British forces on the ground were instructed to employ minimum force in line with 
Arthur Young (head of the RUC)‘s ―softly softly‖ approach; however they followed this policy 
so firmly that it instead became more akin to minimum action.  This was especially the case 
when it was thought that force would make the British security forces unpopular with one of the 
communities.  Protestant marches, and paramilitary funerals were thus allowed to go ahead, 
helping to raise sectarian tensions, while the troops failed to eliminate safe-havens for the IRA in 
―no-go‖ areas within Derry-City and West-Belfast, allowing the IRA to freely plan and organize.  
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 As a consequence of this reluctance to take meaningful (or impartial) action, the IRA 
found itself rapidly gaining strength and enhanced capabilities.  Meanwhile, the continued 
presence of no-go areas constrained British forces from effectively mounting searches, 
screenings and various other surveillance and information gathering exercises.
29
  And to make 
matters worse, the intelligence position in Northern Ireland was chaotic.  There was no 
coordination amongst the various intelligence agencies—MI5, MI6, the Army and the police.30  
The result was that by Easter 1970, the Provisional IRA had grown so quickly that it was obliged 
to reorganize.
31
  Nor were British forces making any attempt to regain the initiative through 
reorganizing to meet the growing challenge posed by the Provisionals. It was not until November 
1970 that the Commander Land Forces recognized that the Army was ―now facing organized 
terrorism,‖ and that the IRA‘s campaign would necessitate a ―prolonged campaign of 
counterinsurgency.‖32   
 
Internment: 
 As a consequence of the lack of accurate intelligence that was further aggravating 
Britain‘s ability to effectively implement any form of denial against the Provisional IRA, a new 
policy was considered.  This policy was that of internment, which involved the ―preventive 
detention‖ of terrorist suspects.  As former Prime Minister Edward Heath later explained the 
rationale for this policy: ―Internment offered us a chance to bypass this wall of silence by 
swooping on terrorist suspects without warning.‖33 
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 So it was that on 9 August 1971 a large-scale arrest operation was launched, code-named 
Operation Demetrius, with thousands of police and troops dispatched to round up the Provisional 
IRA.  While the first swoops produced 340 arrests, it very quickly became clear that little was 
going to plan.  It soon emerged that the RUC Special Branch had not kept accurate intelligence 
on the rapidly expanding Provisional IRA.  And with most IRA men aware of the impending 
sweep, troops and police ended up largely arresting the wrong people based on poor intelligence, 
while most legitimate targets had already fled across the border into the Republic of Ireland.
34
  
Consequently, internment failed, a fact that was evident in the IRA‘s ability to escalate terrorist 
violence and urban guerrilla warfare in its wake.
35
  
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial  
 The outcome of denial by at the conclusion of this episode of British strategy against the 
Provisional IRA can be evaluated as that of ―backfire‖; the Provisional IRA‘s ability to launch 
major terrorist attacks increased, while both its access to vital resources for carrying out assaults 
and capacity to operate continued to enhance. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 In the beginning of the 1969-1972 episode of strategic coercion, the cabinet of Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson in London aimed to make a number of political reforms to help assuage 
anger in the Catholic community and bring an end to violence.  These reforms included the 
disbanding of the auxiliary police force, the B Specials (hated by the Catholic community), and 
its replacement with the Ulster Defense Regiment; the disarming of the RUC (similar to police 
forces in Britain) along with its reorganization to make it more attractive to Catholic recruits; the 
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removal of public housing allocation powers from Northern Ireland‘s Unionist dominated local 
councils; the establishment of plans to outlaw public expressions of sectarian hatred and to 
improve community relations; and in 1971, the implementation of the system of one man one 
vote in Northern Ireland local elections. 
 London also implemented a new economic strategy in the hopes of winning over 
members of both communities from violence.  This strategy was guided by the assumption that 
there was a link between internal peace and prosperity.
 36
  Accordingly, economic measures were 
implemented to bring down unemployment and raise living standards.  The British government 
increased the subvention to Northern Ireland, provided additional funds for training the 
workforce and housing subsidies, and provided generous financial incentives to attract further 
investment.
37
 
 
The Failure of British Strategy 
 Unfortunately, London‘s strategy to isolate popular support within both communities 
towards violence fell flat.  The decision to allow the Unionist government to implement reform 
turned out to be a failure.  Moreover, the continued existence of the one-party Stormont 
government, which remained the only source of political power in the province, created fertile 
ground for the existing system to been seen as unjust, illegitimate and discriminatory for the 
Catholic community, raising support for Republicanism and the IRA.  And while London 
instructed the British Army to act impartially, the fact that Westminster tied its political authority 
to the Unionist government resulted in the British government compromising its role as an 
―honest broker‖ between the two communities.38 
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 Meanwhile London‘s economic strategy was proving itself to be ineffective.  None of its 
measures contributed to breaking the existing patterns of recruitment and material distribution, 
and therefore maintained discrimination.  The problem lay in the assumption that simply raising 
the economic conditions in absolute terms would be sufficient to substantially resolve Northern 
Ireland‘s problems.  Relative deprivation would remain a major issue, however. 39    
 
British Army Failures Contribute to the Growth and Success of the IRA as a Popular Movement 
 A number of British Army failures served to help drive up popular support for the IRA.  
In June 1970, one of these prominent failures took place as the British Army simply stood by and 
made no effort at preventive action as a crowd of angry Loyalist mobs gathered in East Belfast 
and laid siege to St. Matthew‘s Church in the small Catholic ghetto of Short Strand.  The 
opportunity turned out to be a godsend for the Provisional IRA, which showed up and engaged in 
a full-scale battle with Loyalist forces.  In the end, the IRA managed to defend the church in 
what came to be known in Republican folklore as ―the siege of St. Matthew‘s‖, which 
established the Provisionals as the Catholics‘ only reliable defenders, while discrediting the 
British Army to the Catholic community.
40
   
 Meanwhile, in rural areas, the British Army attempted to reduce the IRA capacity for 
cross-border raids by crating border roads with explosives in order to make them unusable.  The 
result was that, while it did not hamper IRA access to the Republic, it produced angry members 
of the local farming communities—needing the road links to conduct day-to-day business—and 
served only to antagonize a broad swath of rural Catholics, thereby energizing the IRA outside of 
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Belfast in Counties Tyrone, Armagh, and Fermanagh, where new units, battalions and brigades 
of Provisionals were formed or expanded.
41
  
 By Christmas of 1970, the Provisional IRA found itself to be gaining even more popular 
support in wake of the Falls Road curfew (which predominantly targeted Catholics), and the 
Ballymurphy riots that had been met with a heavy handed response by security forces.  
Moreover, vague guidance for the Rules of Engagement to be applied by British soldiers on the 
ground often left it to troops on the ground to decide the appropriate level of force—which 
frequently turned out to be anything but the minimum.  And the presence of crack troops such as 
the Parachute Regiment and Marines who were sent in to fulfill common policing duties often 
had a very brutal impact.
42
 
  
Internment 
 One of the most costly British measures that both turned popular support away from their 
cause and into the hands of the IRA came in the form of internment.  As mentioned earlier, the 
sweeps used to apprehend terrorist suspects turned out to be highly ineffective.  This was 
compounded by a number of factors.  First of these was the casual brutality used by troops 
during arrest operations—largely against innocent persons.  Upon arrest, prisoners were then 
kept in poor conditions on either an ageing ship in Belfast Lough, or at Long Kesh near 
Belfast—a prison facility whose temporary structure resembled a World War II prison camp.43  
On top of the brutality associated with the arrests, experimental techniques of interrogation such 
as white noise, sensory deprivation and spread-eagling suspects for hours were applied, causing 
massive outrage.
44
  And to add insult to injury, internment was introduced in a completely one-
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sided manner, targeting only the Catholic Nationalist population, while completely excluding 
Protestant Loyalists. 
 The result of interment was the complete alienation of the Catholic community from the 
state and its security forces.
45
  As a consequence, scores of young men and women, eager to 
strike back, flocked to the IRA, while older and more moderate nationalists registered their 
disgust by resigning from public positions.
46
   
 
Bloody Sunday 
 During a peaceful civil rights march on Sunday, 30 January 1972, the British Army killed 
thirteen people in Derry, with another dying from his wounds.  As Jonathan Powell recalled, 
―Members of the Parachute Regiment appeared to have run amok, live on TV, and the pictures of 
a Catholic priest running, half crouched, through the Bogside waving a white handkerchief to try 
and help fatally wounded victims will haunt the British establishment forever.  Its effect was 
devastating.‖47  The deaths of Bloody Sunday completely outraged Nationalist Ireland, and a 
wave of anger swept through the country.  In Derry, even moderate SDLP leader John Hume said 
that the mood was now for ―a united Ireland or nothing.‖48   
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 The degree of isolation of popular support achieved by the end of this episode of strategy 
coercion can only be coded as a complete ―backfire‖, as despite efforts by the British 
government to address the grievances of the Catholic community, popular support instead 
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exploded against British and local (Protestant majority) forces and in favor of the IRA, and a 
campaign of violence.  Moreover, neither community felt that their security interests were being 
overseen by British forces (many in the Catholic community even perceived these forces to be a 
primary threat themselves), and thus both sides were motivated to turn towards armed substate 
groups to ensure their protection. 
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?  
 At the conclusion of this episode of British strategy against the Provisional IRA, only one 
additional factor may have played a role in effecting the outcome according to a review of the 
histories.    This factor came in the form of former Prime Minister Harold Wilson meeting with 
the IRA leadership in Dublin (without the permission of the sitting government, Prime Minister 
Heath or the Unionist majority population) and going over a ―Twelve Point Plan‖ that called for 
all parties to work actively toward the reunification of Ireland within a timescale of fifteen years.  
It is possible that the result of this action was that it may have contributed to the IRA stepping up 
their attacks, thinking that victory was near, while in turn encouraging further violence from 
outraged and fearful Protestant Loyalists.  
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 Besides the grim elaboration of this episode of strategic coercion, the following chart—
which illustrates casualty figures per year of victims in terms of those killed by Republican and 
Loyalist groups—helps to illustrate the degree of success (or rather lack thereof) achieved: 
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Figure 4.1: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1969-1972
49
 
 
 As is clear from this chart, violence and casualties were exploding (literally) by the end 
of this episode of strategic coercion.  Prime Minister Edward Heath was left with little other 
choice but to suspend the ruling Stormont government and institute Direct Rule in Northern 
Ireland, while frantically searching for a new strategy.  Thus, with violence-levels both high and 
increasing, little significant political resolution achieved, new substantial grievances emerging in 
the form of internment and Bloody Sunday, and a rapidly deteriorating security situation, the 
degree of success observed at the conclusion of this episode can thus be assessed as ―backfire.‖ 
 
Within-Case Episode #2: 1972-1975—Direct Rule to Sunningdale, Its Collapse 
and an Uncertain Ceasefire 
 Following Bloody Sunday in 1972, it became clear to Westminster that their current 
strategy needed to be altered.  As former Prime Minister Edward Heath reflected, ―I was 
resolved all along… that we should now devote all our energies towards working for a lasting 
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cross-community settlement – and only Direct Rule could offer us the breathing space necessary 
for building it.‖50  The one-party Protestant dominated Stormont government was thus 
suspended, with Direct Rule coming directly from London.  Meanwhile, Prime Minister Heath 
intended the following: 
I had come to the view years before that there was only one way of achieving any 
permanent solution for Northern Ireland: some form of power-sharing between the two 
communities.  If the Protestant, loyalist majority was to continue holding all levers of 
power at the provincial level, then the grievances of the Catholics would remain as 
deeply held as ever.  In order to give Catholics a real stake in society, it was not enough 
for them to be protected from discrimination.  They also had to be given a positive role in 
governing the country in which they lived, at both local and national level.  I also 
believed that the Republic of Ireland had to be brought into the relationship once more.
51
 
 
 The British government thus set about to create a power-sharing system, while also 
allowing for some sort of ―Irish dimension‖ that involved the government of the Republic of 
Ireland.  In doing so, they also acknowledged that political and military aims were 
interdependent.
52
 
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 Success in achieving isolation of external/international support was rather limited during 
this episode of strategic coercion.  Material support from elements within the United States 
continued to flow unmitigated.  Efforts were made during the negotiations for the Sunningdale 
Agreement to enhance security cooperation and provide for extradition from the Republic of 
Ireland, but these efforts fell flat.  Still, Anglo-Irish relations did improve some as a result of the 
discussions and the common effort to work towards a new power-sharing cross-community 
government for Northern Ireland. 
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 Meanwhile Colonel Qaddafi of Libya opened up a new front of support for the IRA.  
Finding a natural sympathy for the IRA in that both blamed colonialism for their country‘s 
struggles, and that through the IRA Libya could strike at one of their former rulers—Britain—
Qaddafi soon began to funnel guns, and explosives to the IRA.  Through the newly forged 
Libyan supply line, the IRA would also receive over $3.5 million (over $10 million in current 
prices)—a crucial supplement to the IRA‘s income at a time when its campaign was at its 
height.
53
  However the Libyan supply of arms and finance would weaken following a scandal 
with the IRA representative appointed to Libya, with the supply of guns and money being cut off 
until years later. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 As is clear from the above discussion, isolation of external/international support was 
rather limited.  Though Anglo-Irish relations did improve some, little tangible progress was 
apparent in the security realm.  American guns and money continued to flow in.  And Libya even 
managed to open up a supply line for further arms, explosives and finances for a time.  With 
nothing more than a negligible reduction of tangible support at best, and the continued presence 
of safe havens in the Republic of Ireland, isolation of external support for this episode can be 
scored as ―failure‖. 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 In the first few months following the suspension of the Stormont government, London 
ran into some difficulties attempting to balance its different imperatives regarding the use of 
force.  In the beginning, the British government attempted to regain the trust of the Catholic 
community, which, combined with their belief that they could persuade parts of the IRA to 
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abandon violence, led to the scaling down of the presence of security forces in Catholic areas.  
As a consequence, significant opportunities were missed to apply military pressure against the 
IRA, allowing the NSTO to regroup and extend their influence.  This issue was compounded, 
moreover, by the continued existence of ―no go‖ areas, which the British government remained 
reluctant address.  In the meantime, the IRA had become so increasingly bold in their attacks, 
that they came to proclaim 1972 as ―the year of victory‖, while unveiling their new weapon—the 
car bomb—which caused extraordinary damage.54   
 
Operation Motorman 
 On July 31, 1972—in response to the dramatic increase in violence—Operation 
Motorman would commence as British security forces finally moved to eliminate the 
problematic ―no go‖ areas.  The operation involved 31,000 troops, making it the largest military 
operation on Irish soil in the 20
th
 century.
55
  Centurion tanks fitted with bulldozer equipment 
rolled up barricades, while the IRA fled south across the border into the Republic.  Within 
weeks, military forts were constructed on the doorsteps of the areas the IRA had formerly 
controlled, and the NSTO‘s freedom of movement in the North was severely restricted.56 
 Operation Motorman was a complete success.  As William Whitelaw, Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, recalled: ―The Army was almost at once in full control of the area.‖57  
Moreover, the opening up of the ―no go‖ areas brought in a vastly increased flow of intelligence 
and returned control by the British authorities to these areas.  The result was that in the three 
weeks before Operation Motorman there were 2595 shooting incidents in Northern Ireland, and 
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in the following three weeks after there were only 380.
58
  As a consequence of the success of 
―Motorman‖, the IRA went from proclaiming imminent victory to preparing for a long and 
bloody war. 
 
UWC Strikes Following the Sunningdale Agreement 
 Following British efforts, led by William Whitelaw and Edward Heath, to create a new, 
power-sharing government that would empower the Catholic minority community of Northern 
Ireland, the Sunningdale Agreement was established.  However, almost as soon as the new 
government came into being, Loyalist elements sought about to bring the agreement that enabled 
it and its fledgling institutions downs.  Fashioning themselves the ―Ulster Workers Council‖ or 
UWC, this Unionist paramilitary group set about to bring life to a standstill in Northern Ireland.  
As Brian Faulkner recalls: 
Gangs of paramilitary supporters were out on the streets building barricades and openly 
intimidating those going to their work.  Men in para-military ‗uniform‘, sometimes 
wearing masks and carrying cudgels, walked into shops and simply ordered shopkeepers 
to close [sic].  A lunchtime meeting of several thousand workers at Harland and Wolff‘s 
shipyard was told that any cars left in the car park after lunchtime would be burned.
59
 
 
 Where the real problem came in, however, was in the reluctance of the British security 
forces to take any meaningful action to stop the UWC.  As SDLP leader John Hume later wrote: 
―in what was one of the most squalid examples of government irresponsibility, it surrendered its 
policy in the face of a political strike organized by a paramilitary minority on the Unionist 
side.‖60  The RUC thus received no clear instructions for proceeding, while the Army took the 
position that it was their job to combat terrorism and not ―curb street protests.‖61  
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 With both local and British national forces refusing to step in against the UWC, matters 
rapidly deteriorated.  Northern Ireland‘s power workers soon came under the influence of UWC 
intimidation, bringing over 70% of the province‘s power supply into question.  Yet the ruling 
Labour government remained reluctant to break the ―strike‖ imposed by the loyalist paramilitary.  
By the end of the week, with the UWC in full control of both work routes and Northern Ireland‘s 
power, the stage was set for the collapse of the recently achieve power-sharing government. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 The degree of success achieved through denial at the end of this episode of British 
strategy was mixed.  Initially, British attempts at denial were rather weak.  Following Operation 
Motorman though, denial against the Provisional IRA became greatly enhanced, with the 
elimination of safe havens in West Belfast and Derry.  However the British government soon 
dropped the ball when it failed to exercise denial against the extremists on the other side.  As a 
result, the major efforts made towards achieving a new political solution were dashed and 
violence continued at substantial levels.  Thus while the IRA‘s ability to launch terrorist attacks 
was significantly reduced, violence remained at unacceptably high levels while extremist 
Loyalists remained unrestrained. The degree of denial is thus scored as being that of ―limited‖. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?  
 At the beginning of this episode of British strategy, Northern Ireland Secretary William 
Whitelaw looked to take a number of measures to win over support from the Catholic 
community that could be used towards the establishment of the new power-sharing government.  
One of the most significant of these included the release of scores of Catholics who had been 
interned under Brian Faulkner‘s rule, gradually phasing out internment.  The second involved the 
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granting of ―special category status‖ to paramilitary prisoners—be they from the IRA or loyalist 
organizations—which allowed them to wear their own clothes, report to their own ―commanding 
officers‖ rather than prison guards, and control their own compounds (more akin to prisoners of 
war) within the prison facilities they were housed in. 
 
Outcome of Operation Motorman 
 As time progressed, a significant event occurred that helped to reduce popular support in 
both Protestant and Catholic communities for extremism.  This was the success of Operation 
Motorman.  On the one hand, it removed the major source of tension that was motivating 
Loyalist gunmen to launch gun battles against Catholic areas, thinking that Westminster did not 
possess the will to defeat the IRA or protect Unionist areas.
62
  On the other, it strengthened 
moderate Nationalists‘ resolve (in the form of the SDLP) to stand up to the terrorist methods 
employed by the IRA and commit themselves to constitutional politics.  As such, the success of 
Operation Motorman—in strengthening popular support for the position of moderates on both 
sides—made dialogue between Nationalist and Unionist possible.63 
 
The Sunningdale Agreement 
 By late 1973, following sustained efforts by William Whitelaw and leaders of moderate 
Unionism and Nationalism, an agreement was forged.  Known as the ―Sunningdale Agreement‖, 
it established a new power-sharing government.  William Whitelaw explains the details of the 
new government: 
The basis was to be a legislative assembly of eighty members to be elected by 
proportional representation.  …The new Assembly would have powers over a wide range 
of police matters.  However, electoral arrangements, the judiciary, prosecution and 
emergency powers would be permanently reserved to Westminster, while other powers 
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over the police, criminal law and prisoners would be temporarily reserved until the 
British Government was satisfied that they could be transferred.  It was proposed to set 
up a new Council of Ireland as a forum for discussion between North and South, but it 
was reaffirmed yet again that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom 
so long as that was the majority wish.
64
 
 
In it, the agreement held the potential to win over much popular support amongst the Catholic 
Nationalist community by empowering them in government institutions.  Meanwhile both sides 
could claim some victory in achieving this agreement: for Unionists, there was a declaration by 
the Irish Republic recognizing Northern Ireland‘s sovereign status, a law commission to tackle 
cross-border security problems and a Council of Ireland that they argued was largely lacked any 
effective power; and for moderate Nationalists their position was secured at the highest level of 
government, while with new all-Ireland institutions were established with the potential to 
evolve.
65
 
 Unfortunately however, the Sunningdale Agreement was not destined to last.  Following 
the unmitigated campaign of intimidation launched by the UWC, as well was the cutting of 
power to much of Northern Ireland, the new power-sharing Executive was brought to the edge.  
Nor was its position very strong from the start.  Controversial to many Unionists, especially after 
the Irish courts found the agreement by Irish Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave to acknowledge 
Northern Ireland as a sovereign territory to be unconstitutional (and thus null and void), the new 
government was established on uncertain legs to begin with.  Perhaps the final straw came 
following an antagonizing television broadcast by Prime Minister Wilson who—rather than give 
support to the moderate Unionist population, besieged by the extremist UWC paramilitary—
pinned the blame on common Unionists, referring to them as ―people who spend their lives 
sponging on Westminster and British democracy.‖66  In the days that followed, with the majority 
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of power remaining cut, intimidation rampant on the streets and in workplaces, and the Unionist 
population enraged with pro-Sunningdale Unionist parties pulling out of the new agreement, the 
new power-sharing government collapsed. 
 The result of the collapse of the power-sharing government and the consequences 
surrounding it was an angered Unionist community on the one hand, who found themselves 
increasingly indifferent to the will of Westminster.  On the other, the Catholic Nationalist 
community came to perceive violence as the best approach against the British, certain that any 
attempts at a political settlement would simply be thwarted.  Popular support was thus enhanced 
for extremists on both sides. 
 
Continued Failures to Implement Meaningful Economic Reform 
 During this episode of strategic coercion, the British government continued to attempt to 
implement economic policies to improve the quality of life, lower unemployment and give the 
youth of Northern Ireland future opportunities.  A committee was established to examine the 
problem of job discrimination in the private sector, the Standing Advisory Commission on 
Human Rights (SACHR) was created to monitor the economic situation in the province, 
discrimination on religious or sectarian grounds were outlawed in the Northern Ireland 
Constitution Act (1973), and job training centers sprang up in droves in the hopes that this would 
translate into greater job opportunities for unemployed Catholics.  Despite these efforts, 
however, London refused to enforce any sort of affirmative action program to bring about 
equality in unemployment, and failed to tackle any of the informal methods of job discrimination 
that continued to exist.  Little progress was thus made to assuage the relative deprivation levels 
in terms of economic circumstances between the two communities. 
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Diplock Courts 
 A final negative source that reduced attempts to isolate the Catholic community from the 
Provisional IRA came from the new ―Diplock courts‖ which were implemented following the 
Diplock report published in December 1972.  These courts, which were established to deal with 
the problem of jury intimidation, suspended jury trial and reduced criminal hearings to involving 
a single judge who would pass down decisions.  To further antagonize the local population, a 
relaxation of the law on the admissibility of confessions was also implemented in cases involving 
the activities of paramilitary organizations.  This translated into the allowance for statements or 
confessions to be accepted as evidence, as long as they were obtained by methods short of 
―torture‖ or ―inhuman or degrading treatment‖—the standard of measurement for which was left 
the observing judge himself.
67
  The result of this new procedure only served to anger the 
Catholic community, while creating further outrage in the Republic of Ireland. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 Despite the failing of Sunningdale, the shortcomings of British economic policies, and 
the anger caused by the introduction of the Diplock courts, both major occurrences of excessive 
violence by the security forces and seismic grievance causing events (such as Bloody Sunday 
and internment) were avoided.  Moreover internment was phased out, and important gains were 
made in winning over the populace through the success of Operation Motorman which made 
great strides in assuring members of both communities that the government could exert its 
authority and provide for their safety.  In light of this, the degree of isolation of popular support 
for this episode is thus observed as being ―limited‖.   
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Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome? 
 A number of additional factors did play a role in influencing the outcome of this episode 
of strategic coercion.  Britain‘s economic policies, for instance, were undermined as a result of 
the international oil crisis and the ensuing recession that saw further declines in manufacturing 
and agriculture.  Indeed, unemployment levels reached 11%, the highest on post-World War II 
record, by 1976.  Another external factor that had an impact on the outcome of this episode came 
in the form of IRA overkill during a massive bombing operation on ―Bloody Friday‖ in July 
1973.  Following it, even many of the IRA‘s supporters accused them of using sheer terror 
tactics.  The result was a swift political impact, with moderate Nationalists putting even more 
distance between themselves and the IRA, and the emergence of a community consensus that 
allowed Operation Motorman to successfully go ahead.
68
 
 A further issue that may have significantly impacted the outcome of this episode of 
strategic coercion came in the form of the reassignment of William Whitelaw as Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland immediately following the achievement of the Sunningdale 
Agreement.  He was succeeded by Francis Pym who was immediately thrown into deep waters, 
and was soon over his head as the UWC strike began within days.  As former Stormont Prime 
Minister Brian Faulkner recalls, ―The removal of Whitelaw was, in my opinion, overhasty and 
ill-timed and showed an inadequate appreciation of the importance to the whole United Kingdom 
of the successful conclusion of his efforts in Northern Ireland.‖69 
 Finally, a further additional factor was implementation of another facet of strategic 
coercion—being that of decapitation.  This came on 18 July 1973, as British army patrols 
conducted an important arrest operation.  In doing so, they seized a number of the IRA‘s so-
called ―Young Turks‖—hardliners opposed to negotiations and any form of peace settlement—
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including Gerry Adams and other significant members of the IRA‘s Brigade Staff.  
Simultaneously, the British government also released more ―pragmatic‖ members of the IRA 
from internment, and began to open up secret contacts with them behind the backs of the ―Young 
Turks‖.  This may have directly contributed to the achievement of the 1974 cease-fire, discussed 
in greater detail shortly.
70
 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 At the end of this episode of strategic coercion, some dramatic gains had been made.  In 
the beginning of 1972, following Bloody Sunday and the suspension of the Stormont 
government, the IRA had predicted imminent victory; by 1976 they were geared up for a long 
and bloody war.  Moreover, the death toll dropped in 1973, never again to approach the levels 
witnessed in 1972.  The following chart depicts this: 
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Figure 4.2: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1972-75
71
 
 
 Still, as can also be observed in figure 5.2, despite the relative drop in violence, levels of 
violence overall still remained high.  In terms of progress towards any political resolution of the 
situation, two instances initially possessing promise took place.  One of these involved an 
attempt to change the political status quo through the Sunningdale Agreement in order to ensure 
proportional political representation of the Catholic (Nationalist) community in Northern 
Ireland‘s devolved government.  However, as discussed above, the precarious agreement soon 
fell through in the face of Loyalist pressure, lack of resolve on the part of the Northern Ireland 
Office and security forces, and the British governments poor handling of the situation. 
 The other instance occurred following the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement when 
the new Labour government took over, returning Harold Wilson to power as Prime Minister.  
Following secret overtures by Wilson, the IRA leadership agreed to a ceasefire around Christmas 
1974.
72
  This ceasefire was extended until February, before being declared indefinite, and was 
reciprocated by the British government which responded by releasing detainees, scaling down 
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operations in nationalist areas, and setting up ―incident centers‖ from which the IRA could report 
on events in particular districts.
73
 
 However the rational for this ceasefire was not to conduct negotiations so much as to lure 
in Republican ―doves‖ by creating conditions in which the IRA would find it more difficult to re-
start their campaign of violence.
74
  In fact, as Jonathan Powell elaborates, ―From a British 
government point of view there were no negotiations… James Allan, the political adviser on 
Merlyn Rees‘s [Secretary of State for Northern Ireland] staff was not to negotiate, but to advise 
the IRA of what action the British government and security forces might take if there were a 
cessation of violence on the part of the IRA.‖75  Little progress towards any political resolution 
was thus made, and by early November, the ceasefire existed only in name and the incident 
centers closed.  Soon after—and less than a year into its announcement—the ceasefire was ended 
by an outraged IRA which considered it to be nothing more than a diversion to reduce 
Republican morale and energy while the British security forces regrouped.  
 Thus, by the end of this episode, only a fleeting and oft-breached ceasefire was achieved, 
while any real political settlement proved elusive, and the IRA—continuing to enjoy popular 
support—remained strongly committed to its campaign of terrorist violence.  Considering this, 
and the levels of violence present at the conclusion of this episode, the outcome of strategic 
coercion is assessed as one of ―limited success‖. 
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Within-Case Episode #3: 1975-1982—Ulserisation, Criminalisation, 
Normalisation 
 Following the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement, the British government decided 
that its new strategy should be to move away from pursuing a political agreement, and instead 
concentrate on providing stability in the security and economic fields.  To achieve this, Direct 
Rule from Westminster on a semi-permanent basis was embraced, while London used the 
ceasefire in 1975 to develop its new strategy and implement the necessary changes associated 
with it.
76
  This new strategy was laid out in an unpublished British strategy paper entitled ―The 
Way Ahead‖, and was broken down into three components, being: Ulsterisation, Normalisation 
and Criminalisation. 
 Ulsterisation, which was a play on the word ―Vietnamization‖—involved planning a 
gradual decrease in the number of regular British troops and their replacement by the local RUC 
and UDR.  Further, it entailed ―police primacy‖ in giving the RUC the lead in security matters 
and placed the army under its direction.
77
   Normalisation, meanwhile, was meant to assist 
Ulsterisation.  It entailed phasing out of emergency arrangements and ending the primary role of 
the British regular forces in maintaining order, thereby ―normalizing‖ the security situation for 
the police to take control of law enforcement.
78
  This was implemented in conjunction with 
Criminalisation, whereby the IRA and other paramilitary/terrorist organizations were to be 
denied any acknowledgement of political motivation and were to be treated in exactly the same 
manner as those sardonically referred to by the authorities as ―ordinary decent criminals.‖79  
Criminalisation was largely intended to serve as a propaganda instrument in the British 
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government‘s attempt to change the perceptions of the conflict as one of a colonial war (as 
depicted in Republican propaganda) to that of a simple campaign against criminal gangs. 
 Finally, in order to effectively implement this new strategy, the British government 
would appoint Roy Mason as the Northern Ireland Secretary in 1976.  Mason took a 
comparatively hard-line approach, bluntly stating that he was going to squeeze and rollup the 
terrorists ―like a tube of toothpaste.‖80 
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 The British government‘s attempts at isolation of external/international support enjoyed 
more success for the 1975-1982 period than in previous episodes.  Most of this success came as a 
result of successful lobbying from the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that 
succeeded in persuading the White House to direct the FBI against the IRA.  As a consequence, 
the Harrison network was destroyed, and the IRA‘s supply of weaponry would become erratic as 
the NSTO was forced to turn to unreliable sources.
81
 
 However, sources of external/international support remained available to the IRA.  In the 
Republic of Ireland the IRA maintained stockpiles of arms, ―factories‖ for churning out 
homemade explosives, and training camps.  Moreover the will of the Irish Republic to 
crackdown on this was undermined by several major sources of conflict.  The first two of these 
involved London‘s adoption of Direct Rule on a quasi-permanent basis (while abandoning efforts 
to develop a new power-sharing arrangement), and the maintenance of the single-judge Diplock 
court system.  The third came as a result of the outrage stirred up by the 1981 Hunger Strikes, 
which resulted in the death of 10 Republican hunger strikers, including MP Bobby Sands.  Thus, 
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while no direct support would be delivered to Republican groups from the Irish Republic, 
crackdowns were limited and passive support endured. 
 Finally, Libya once again started to provide the IRA with active support.  Impressed by 
the massive international publicity generated by the hunger strikes, Libya once again began 
channeling money to the IRA (though still refrained from delivering weapons), resulting in the 
provision of $1.5 million over the next three years. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Progress was made during this episode of British strategy on the front of isolation of 
external/international support with the destruction of the Harrison Network in the USA.  
However passive support and sanctuaries remained in the Irish Republic, and financial support 
continued to flow from Libya.  Isolation of External/International Support was thus ―limited.‖ 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 In this episode, large gains were made in implementing denial.  The key to much of this 
success began with the reorganization of the RUC with the aid of Kenneth Newman, Deputy and 
then Chief Constable of Northern Ireland.  In reorganization, Newman‘s first aim was to deal 
with the problems caused by the division of Northern Ireland into three operational regions—
North, South and Belfast—each with of which were subdivided into 16 divisions.  To the IRA, 
each Regional and Divisional boundary represented an invisible border across which they could 
escape, with an IRA Active Service Unit (ASU) from one Divisional area being able to carry out 
an operation in another area, while escaping to a third.  As Peter Taylor describes it, the old 
system was ―like a dinosaur chasing a ferret.‖82   Several changes were thus instituted.  First, 
intelligence would be centralized, with a computer-assisted Criminal Intelligence Section being 
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established in Belfast.  Second, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was reorganized, 
bringing in four additional Regional Crime Squads to assist the Divisional CIDs.  These 
Regional Crime Squads, which were similarly organized to the IRA‘s ASUs, possessed the 
freedom to move across divisional boundaries and would be set to the task of smashing the 
Provisional IRA by targeting the most active members of the terrorist organization.  Finally, the 
Chief Constable‘s third change was to make Castlereagh a fulltime, centralized, specialist 
Interrogation Center.
83
 
 An advanced system was thus set up, which in functioning much like a conveyor belt, 
found the Criminal Intelligence Section uncovering and collating information on terrorist 
suspects, which was then sent to the Regional Crime Squad that would use this intelligence to 
track down and detain paramilitary suspects, with the suspects then sent to Castlereagh for 
intensive interrogation.
84
  Here confessions made and elicited signed statement would then be 
used as evidence—and accepted under the relaxed admissibility tests—of the Diplock court 
system, following which convicted detainees would be shipped out to the Long Kesh Prison 
camp. 
 As this advanced police system was put into place, the army lent active support to 
security operations, providing bomb disposal units, manning vehicle checkpoints, ensuring route 
patrolling along the border and in Republican strongholds, and conducting undercover 
surveillance and intelligence operations.
85
  The result was that by 1977, security forces had 
greatly undercut the IRA‘s capacity for conducting its campaign of terrorist violence. 
 Meanwhile the new Northern Ireland Secretary Roy Mason also demonstrated a 
willingness to firmly crackdown on Loyalist extremists in a manner hitherto not seen.  Not only 
were security measures equally applied to these groups, but Mason also reacted firmly against 
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any disruptive attempts by paramilitary ―strikers‖.  Thus when Loyalist paramilitary groups 
reorganized themselves into a new organization—the United Unionist Action Council or 
(UUAC)—pushing for a return to majority rule and a tougher security policy, the security forces 
rapidly moved to break up paramilitary intimidation gangs, tear down barricades and open the 
roads.  Thus, unlike in 1974 following the Sunningdale Agreement, a strong message was sent to 
Loyalists that their strikes and disruptions would be swiftly halted.
86
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 By only the early mid-point (1977) of this episode of British strategy, the capacity of the 
IRA to wage an armed campaign was greatly reduced—so much so that it had to completely 
restructure itself and its objectives.  Even Loyalist extremist groups were largely brought into 
line.  The IRA would maintain the capacity to launch significant, well-planned terrorist attacks, 
but from here on out it would never again be able to do so on levels previously experienced.  
Thus, with the IRA‘s capacity to launch terrorist attacks significantly reduced, its ability to 
operate continuously hemmed in, and the hostilities of additional substate groups (Loyalists) also 
reined, the degree of denial in this episode is assessed as ―significant‖. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 The result of attempts at enacting an isolation of popular support during this episode of 
British strategy was mixed.  Many negative effects occurred as a result of the implementation of 
Britain‘s new strategy.  To begin with, Direct Rule—now instituted on a quasi-permanent 
basis—was starting to become an irritant with the Catholic community.  The reason is that it 
proved to many Catholics that Constitutional Nationalism was not the way forward (with the 
clear alternative being violent Republicanism), and it forced the moderate SDLP to adopt a more 
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intransigent attitude towards the British government.  Direct Rule was thus coming to have a 
destabilizing and polarizing effect.
87
 
 Meanwhile, the policies of Ulsterisation, Normalisation and Criminalisation—while 
enjoying some success in the realm of denial—were causing a number of problems in terms of 
isolation of popular support.  Ulsterisation, which placed the locally recruited security forces on 
the front-line, underscored the sectarian dimension of the conflict, as it pitted the almost entirely 
Protestant/Unionist RUC and UDR against the entirely Catholic/Nationalist IRA.
88
  Thus ―police 
primacy‖ through Ulsterisation and Normalisation also produced a situation where one 
community was policing the other, which created the perception that security forces were not 
there to impartially counter violence—but rather were a biased tool in an inter-communal power 
struggle.
89
 
 Another negative issue related to ―police primacy‖ was that in the local security force‘s 
efforts to acquire workable intelligence, they often resorted to excessive brutality.  Both 
Republican and Loyalists came to believe that such brutality was routine within Castlereagh, and 
that convictions were being secured ―through the systematic application of torture techniques.‖90  
This caused stirrings within the local communities, as well as within civil liberty groups.  
 Criminalisation also provided a series of problems.  The first was simply that its intended 
effect—to change the popular perception of the IRA being engaged in a colonial struggle against 
an oppressive imperial power, to one where the Provisionals were simply common criminals—
did not transpire.  The message of Criminalisation was both too incredible and inconsistent.  That 
the government continued to rely on emergency powers authorizing the use of uncorroborated 
evidence (often acquired through means approaching torture), extended holding powers and the 
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use of non-jury courts undercut the message that the IRA were simply common criminals—
regardless of the status they were given in prison.
91
 
 The worst result of Criminalisation, however, would come in the form of the 1981 
Hunger Strikes.  Occurring as a result of the deprivation of privileges granted to paramilitary 
prisoners with the 1972 Special Category status, the prisoners began staging a number of 
protests, which culminated in the 1981 Hunger Strikes.  During this event, 10 prisoners died 
while on hunger strike.  Most dramatically among these hunger strikers was a young man named 
Bobby Sands—who during the hunger strike became the Nationalist candidate in the by-election 
in Fermanagh-South Tyrone, and then won.  Following Sands‘ death, and that of the other 
hunger strikers, enormous revulsion spread within the Nationalist communities of Ireland, as 
well as around the world.
92
  Nor was this event (or at least its conclusion) unavoidable.  Then-
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could have stepped in and provided ―involuntary feeding‖ to 
the prisoners to avert their deaths.  However as Thatcher recounts, ―In striving to end the crisis, I 
had stopped short of force-feeding, a degrading and itself dangerous practice which I could not 
support.‖93 The situation thus ended in outrage, which greatly bolstered popular support for the 
IRA. 
 
Fall Out from New Shoot-to-Kill Punishment Strikes 
 Another problem in restricting popular support for the IRA came as a result of new shoot-
to-kill punishment strikes.  Conceived of by the Security Coordinator for Northern Ireland, Sir 
Maurice Oldfield, the new policy involved ―taking out‖ the ―middle management‖ of the 
Republican NSTOs through selective assassination.
94
  The policy would soon draw criticism, 
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however, as apparent shoot-to-kill policies took place, often against unarmed members of the 
IRA who could have been arrested instead.  Combined with a series of accidental civilian deaths 
as a result of such lethal stings, the policy would draw criticism and bolster popular support for 
Republican NSTOs in the Catholic community and abroad. 
 
Only Very Limited Gains in Economic Policy 
 Despite the emergence of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative government (which 
saw marked reductions in government spending), the British government‘s economic policy of 
generous government investment in the province remained unchanged.  However, as in previous 
periods, this investment was not matched by an enthusiasm for eradicating relative deprivation.  
Gains through such policies in terms of reducing unemployment amongst and discrimination 
against members of the Catholic community remained quite limited. 
 
Despite Setbacks, Some Impressive Gains Emerge 
 During the 1975-1982, the British government did make some impressive gain in the 
realm of isolation of popular support—despite its many setbacks.  Support was won from the 
SDLP and many moderate Nationalists (including the Dublin government) following Mason‘s 
firm handling of the UUAC strike—in stark contrast to the failing against the UWC in 1974.  
And of major significance, many of those involved in Loyalist paramilitaries—witnessing the 
successes the government‘s new denial strategy—came to conclude that violence on their parts 
and further involvement in the extremist paramilitaries was no longer necessary.  As a 
consequence of this—in conjunction with the defeat of the UUAC—loyalist violence decreased 
from 127 killings in 1976 to just 28 in 1977.  Further, in the following years, Loyalist 
Michael Andrew Berger 
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paramilitary operations would remarkably drop by approximately 90%
95
, thereby greatly serving 
to ease violent sectarian tensions (one of the greatest sources of popular support for the IRA and 
Republicanism). 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 Objectively assessing the degree of isolation of popular support for this episode of 
strategic coercion is somewhat difficult regarding the mixed nature of the outcome.  On the one 
hand, the British government significantly increased popular support for the IRA through laying 
the foundation for (and not preventing) a new source of significant grievance in the 1981 Hunger 
Strikes; instituting brutality in interrogation measures; developing a situation of ―us versus them‖ 
by deploying an almost exclusively Protestant police force (the RUC) to ensure security in the 
Catholic community; discrediting Constitutional Nationalism as an effective means of change 
through a seemingly unending maintenance of Direct Rule; and pursuing controversial shoot-to-
kill strikes.  On the other, respect was won within the Nationalist community for the 
government‘s newfound courage in dealing with Loyalist extremists; and popular support for 
violent Loyalist paramilitaries was highly reduced, witnessing a 90% reduction in violence—a 
major component in the generation of popular support for the IRA.  Given these achievements, it 
would be difficult to assess isolation of popular support to be either ―backfire‖ or ―failure‖, even 
in light of the many setbacks that occurred during this episode.  Isolation of popular support is 
thus assessed as being ―limited‖. 
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?  
 Several additional factors may have played a role in the outcome of strategic coercion 
during this episode of British strategy.  The first came from the shoot-to-kill punishment strikes 
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against the middle management of Republican NSTOs.  While it is true that such assaults stirred 
up public and international criticism, the reality cannot be discounted that they also may have 
had an important impact in disrupting and denying the IRA‘s capacity to carry out violent 
attacks; moreover they may also have provided a deterrent function as well. 
 The second additional factor that may have had some impact came in the form of the 
1976 Peace People movement.  Championed by two Belfast women, Mairead Corrigan and Betty 
Williams, the Peace People movement sprang up protesting civilian deaths at the hands of both 
substate groups and security forces.  While the movement was only to last for several months, it 
did manage to attract the support of tens of thousands of people, as well as tremendous 
international publicity and the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to the two women who led it.
96
 
 The third factor involved a condition that was also present in the previous episode of 
British strategy.  This was the continued global economic recession that certainly played some 
role in undermining British efforts in raising the fiscal prosperity of Northern Ireland.  And 
finally the fourth factor involved a significant occurrence of IRA overkill in the instance of the 
bombing of the La Mon House in February 1978.  The event, which resulted in the death of 
twelve Protestants (seven of them women) and the injury of thirty others, had a tremendous 
negative effect on the IRA, costing it considerable popular and international support. 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 At the conclusion of the 1975-1982 episode of strategic coercion, the British government 
had made some important gains.  With much more effective efforts at denial put in place, 
security greatly improved, Loyalist paramilitary groups which were taking security into their 
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own hands greatly declined, and violence levels plummeted.  The following chart illustrates the 
degree to which violence was brought under control:   
Figure 4.3: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1975-1982
97
 
 
 
 Still, a number of challenges and setbacks remained.  Even with violence greatly reduced 
and brought to something approaching ―acceptable levels‖, the IRA retained the capacity for 
launching spectacular strikes, as was illustrated by the August 1979 Mountbatten assassination 
and a deadly two stage-assault on the Parachute Regiment on the same day, as well as a 
coordinated attack in 1982 on British soldiers in two London parks.    
 Further, despite the significant reduction of violence levels, little if any political 
resolution was achieved.  This situation was due in part to: 1) Roy Mason making it an explicit 
policy that no negotiations towards a new political/constitutional arrangement would be 
undertaken during this period; and 2) a reluctance of the part of the IRA, now under the control 
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of new leadership from members such as Gerry Adams who perceived ceasefire and negotiations 
as dead-ends routes meant only to weaken the IRA and give British and local security forces the 
chance to consolidate their position. Considering this, the situation at the end of this episode was 
one of ―moderate success‖ (stalemate).  The British government had reasserted its authority and 
could now demonstrate to the IRA that it could not force a political change through terrorist 
violence; but by 1982 the British were also coming to acknowledge that security measures alone 
could not resolve the conflict.   
 
Within-Case Episode #4: 1982-1989—Moving to Enhance Involvement from 
the Republic of Ireland 
 By the early 1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear to both sides that a stalemate had 
emerged.  Moreover, the British government began to arrive at the conclusion that undiminished 
Direct Rule from London was not a viable framework for containing the conflict.  With little real 
prospect of establishing a new, devolved power-sharing government, the British concluded that 
handling the province could be improved by enhancing joint action with the Irish government.
98
  
As a consequence, the British government worked to establish the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) 
in 1985 with the Republic of Ireland.  Specifically, the government of Margaret Thatcher sought 
a number of outcomes through such enhanced cooperation, including: greater deployment of 
resources by Irish security forces along the border and increased crackdowns within the Republic 
on sanctuaries, weapons stockpiles and training camps; assistance from Dublin in ending the 
Catholic minority‘s reluctance to support the security forces and political system in Northern 
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Ireland; and the emergence of the Irish government as a responsible stakeholder in the 
management of Northern Ireland.
99
 
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 In their efforts to make a significant impact on isolating external and international 
support, the British focused much of their efforts during this episode on enhancing cooperation 
with the Republic of Ireland in the field of security through the AIA.  The AIA gave the Irish 
government a consultative role in Northern Ireland through a ministerial Inter Governmental 
Conference (IGC) and a small permanent joint secretariat.  In exchange for granting this new 
consultative role to the Irish, the British expected an enhancement of security cooperation, 
including crackdowns on IRA training camps, sources of money and supplies of arms within the 
Republic, as well as increased patrolling of the border and sharing of intelligence.
100
 
 In terms of enhancing security cooperation, however, the agreement turned out to be a 
disappointment.  A new string of watchtowers were erected along the border, aimed at curbing 
IRA activity across it.  However serious enhancements in patrolling the border were left wanting, 
and the Irish government proved resistant to enhancing counter-terrorism operations and 
intelligence-sharing.  This led Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to bitterly conclude that ―in 
fighting terror we would have to stand almost alone, while the Irish indulged in gesture 
politics.‖101 
 Still, the AIA did provide some important outcomes that would translate into enhanced 
isolation of external support for the IRA.  First among these is that the AIA marked a substantial 
shift in Anglo-Irish relations, with both sides coming to adopt the perspective that they had to 
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work together.  This new perspective blunted much of the critical stance adopted by Ireland in 
previous episodes of British strategy, while it also helped rein in some of the ―megaphone 
diplomacy‖ that certainly did not help the UK in generating popular support for their own 
position amongst the Catholic community.  Moreover, as the years of violence continued, this 
new arrangement helped provide for a convergence of positions between London and Dublin. 
The Republic subsequently would no longer see itself as warring with Britain over the fate of the 
north, and both governments came to view it as a difficult, dangerous problem to both.
102
   
 
The Libyan Connection 
 A significant challenge to isolation of external support came as a result of stepped up 
support from Colonel Qaddafi‘s Libya.  Through four separate shipments beginning in 1984, 
Qaddafi provided the IRA with large stocks of modern military hardware, including thousands of 
rifles with armor-piercing rounds capable cutting through protected police vehicles, flame-
throwers, Semtex and SAM-7 missiles and anti-aircraft guns capable of downing British aircraft.  
Qaddafi also began to funnel $10 million to the IRA, with the promise of more to come and the 
facilitation of introductions with other sympathetic governments.  Following such generous 
support, British security estimated that the IRA had received a total of $40 million in weaponry.  
Most importantly for the IRA, they now had the wherewithal to fight a truly long war, with the 
necessary supplies to carry out violence for another twenty years.
103
 
 Neither the IRA nor Libya was content to stop there, however.  Through the arrival of a 
further shipment—one that would equal the amount of arms received from the four previous 
shipments put together—the IRA intended to bring about a major escalation of violence.  The 
plan was to initiate an IRA-style ―Tet Offensive‖ that would cause so much damage in the first 
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two weeks of the assault that the momentum would keep the IRA going for another 18 months.  
During this time, the IRA planned to hold the areas of Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh, while 
striking British targets abroad, with the hope of triggering a disproportionate British response.
104
  
The hope was that the surge of popular support caused by this, combined with an erosion of 
British will as result of such lethal setbacks, would trigger a British withdrawal. 
 Fortunately for the British government, this was not to come to pass.  An informer 
(suspected to be an agent of the British intelligence services) on board the Eksund—the vessel 
sent to deliver this massive shipment of arms—tipped off authorities.  The French customs police 
subsequently intercepted the vessel, denying the IRA of the capacity to launch their hoped for 
―Tet Offensive‖.  Meanwhile the surprise factor needed to implement the ―Tet Offensive‖ with 
Libya‘s weapons was lost, and British security forces immediately moved to put in place 
countermeasures that would greatly mitigate much of the effectiveness of these new weapons.  
Colonel Qaddafi, who was outraged by the public revelation of his support, immediately 
cancelled his cash payments to the IRA (including half of the promised $10 million).  The IRA‘s 
coffers were thus suddenly left empty, and their ability to intensify their campaign was severely 
curtailed.
105
  
 
Irish Support Post-Eksund 
 Following the interception of the Eksund, the Irish government, which now saw itself as 
working together with British—and fearful of the IRA‘s new military capacity—quickly moved 
to disrupt IRA structures within its borders, conducting a massive 26 county-wide search for 
Libyan weaponry received from earlier shipments.  And supporting operations from the Irish 
government would continue: in January 1988, they would make a massive preventive find, 
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seizing five machine guns, 100 rifles, 100 pounds of explosives and 50,000 rounds of 
ammunition at the Five Finger Strand in Malin in County Donegal.
106
  
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Isolation of external and international support during this episode of strategic coercion 
turned out to be something of mixed bag.  On the one hand, the successfully received Libyan 
shipments made the IRA a more dangerous enemy that it had been in years, with the capacity of 
continuing armed hostilities for twenty years.  On the other, the worst possible outcome was 
prevented, further supplies of weaponry and finances from Libya were cut off for good, and 
weaponry stockpiled in the Republic of Ireland were being seized.  A new string of watchtowers 
oversaw the border area, and the Irish government was beginning to demonstrate increasing 
resolve to cooperate with the British on security matters.  Moreover, of the weapons that had 
been obtained from Libya, many of them proved to be worthless, often being either too old to 
use, too impractical for implementation by guerrilla fighters, missing necessary components, 
etc.
107
 Considering these factors, the level of external isolation is thus assessed as ―limited.‖       
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 Implementation of denial remained largely successful during this episode, and even 
improved.  This improvement occurred as a result of several factors.  The first of these was the 
implementation of the supergrass system between late 1981 and 1986, which by 1983 had 
succeeded in further reducing terrorist violence, and had even broken up the command structure 
of the Loyalist UVF.
108
  The system worked through using former members of Northern 
Ireland‘s terrorist organizations as police informants—known as supergrasses—who would 
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testify against their alleged former associates.  In exchange, supergrasses were often provided a 
new life outside of Northern Ireland, reduction of prison sentences if not complete immunity 
from prosecution, and sometimes the payment of substantial sums of money.
109
  The supergrass 
system enabled the authorities to surmount the problem of converting intelligence into evidence 
that would stand up in a court of law, thereby providing for the conviction of the so-called 
―godfathers‖ or leaders of terrorist organizations. 
 Denial—in particular of capable fighting men and operators—also improved as it was 
aided through increasingly enhanced intelligence that enabled the successful enactment of 
interdiction operations.  The East Tyrone IRA learned this first-hand as they were interdicted in 
the middle of a terrorist operation, by members of the SAS and the RUC‘s elite Mobile Support 
Unit, resulting in the elimination of a number of key members who were known to be amongst 
the IRA‘s most proficient and dangerous operators.  These denial operations continued with such 
success that the East Tyrone IRA, which carried out 21% of all IRA operations in Northern 
Ireland in 1986, would be reduced to accounting for no more than 11% per year by 1993.
110
 
 
Libyan Challenges and Successes 
 Towards the mid 1980s, progress in the realm of denial—both through the maintenance 
of the 1975-1982 denial strategy, as well as improvements in intelligence collection and the use 
of accomplice based evidence to put members of the terrorist leadership behind bars—began to 
be undermined by considerable supplies of Libyan arms flowing into Northern Ireland.  These 
new weapons enabled the IRA to step up their dwindling levels of violence.  The IRA‘s killing 
rate thus rose from 37 in 1986 to 58 in 1987 and 66 in 1988. 
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 British security forces, however, reacted effectively, investing in anti-terrorist security 
measures that would prevent further terrorist assaults against military installations in Britain and 
Europe (particularly West Germany).  Meanwhile the British also effectively implemented 
countermeasures to nullify the IRA‘s new Libyan granted arsenal, equipping their helicopters 
with electronic countermeasures that rendered the IRA‘s SAM-7s useless, changing helicopter 
formations so that they operated in groups of fives (so that if one was attacked, the others could 
respond), and reinforcing the armor of British vehicles to withstand the IRA‘s new 
capabilities.
111
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial  
 At the conclusion of the 1982-1989 episode of strategic coercion, the capacity of 
Republican NSTOs to launch major terrorist attacks continued to be kept at low levels.  Still, a 
level of ―high‖ denial was prevented through the arrival of support from Colonel Qaddafi and the 
Libyan arsenal.  The degree of denial is thus assessed as ―significant‖ for this episode of British 
strategy. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 Isolation of popular support during this episode continued to suffer from several ongoing 
issues, present in previous episodes of strategic coercion.  The first of these was the maintenance 
of Britain‘s apparent to shoot-to-kill policy by its security forces.  The result was that following a 
number of incidents, when it was clearly apparent that the security forces had exceeded the level 
of force necessary to make arrests, Britain came under criticism, and Catholic communities 
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witnessed increased alienation vis-à-vis the security forces.
112
  This issue was further 
exacerbated both by the RUC‘s engagement‘s in such activities (mimicking the SAS) with their 
new E4A unit, as well as a controversial incident in Gibraltar which left three members of the 
IRA dead, despite claims by witnesses that they were shot while unarmed, lying on the 
ground.
113
 
 The second issue that continued to contribute little to the British government‘s attempts 
to isolate popular support for the IRA came from their insufficient economic reform policies, 
which did little to reduce discrimination or relative deprivation in Northern Ireland.  By 1989, 
through the Fair Employment Act, a significant change occurred in that London, for the first 
time, acknowledged that the material inequality between the two communities needed to be 
addressed if political stability was to emerge.
114
  Even so, however, the new Act was insufficient 
to address the problem.  As Peter Neumann explains:  
…whilst the 1989 Act compelled employers to consider affirmative action in order to 
redress existing imbalances, it explicitly prohibited them from taking measures that were 
exclusive to one particular community.  This apparent contradiction illustrated London‘s 
difficulties in acting upon the logic of communal rights whilst maintaining the principle 
of individual merit and trying to avoid adverse reaction by the majority community.
115
 
 
 Finally, the third adverse issue simply had to do with the continued presence of Margaret 
Thatcher as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.  As the leader who had been blamed and 
villainized in Ireland‘s Nationalist communities for the death of the Bobby Sands and the other 
hunger strikers, Thatcher‘s continued position as head of the British government restricted 
efforts at winning over popular support for the UK‘s position—and thus away from the IRA. 
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Some Important Gains 
  Despite these continuing setbacks, the British government did make a number of 
important gains as a result of the establishment of the AIA.  The agreement was so embraced by 
moderate Nationalists, in fact, that Sinn Fein publicly acknowledged this outcome—while 
witnessing a significant drop in electoral support for the Republican political organization at the 
ballot box.  Additionally, the involvement of Ireland for consultation in British security decisions 
in Northern Ireland went a long way towards reducing grievances in the Catholic community 
which nourished support for the IRA.
116
   
 Another outcome also took place as a result of the AIA.  Importantly, members of both 
the Republican-leaning Nationalist community, as well as within the IRA and its leadership, 
witnessed London‘s willingness to implement a policy that was considered unpopular with the 
Unionist population—and indeed even face down the resistance that had emerged in opposition 
to it.  This led many in Republicanism to believe that a political solution might indeed be 
possible, believing that the British government was now willing to ―stand up to the Unionists.‖117  
The result of this was the emergence of a growing isolation of support against a campaign of 
violence. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 The 1982-1989 period witnessed some reduction in popular support for the IRA, the 
avoidance of major new grievances, a continued drop in civilian deaths caused by the British 
security forces, and some important gains through the establishment of the AIA.  Continued 
cross-community grievances from discrimination, controversial shoot-to-kill strikes by British 
security forces, and the continued presence of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, restricted 
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greater levels of popular isolation.  Isolation of popular support for this episode of strategic 
coercion is thus assessed as being ―limited.‖    
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome? 
 Several additional factors may have played a role in influencing the outcome of this 
episode of strategic coercion.  One of these involved the deterrence effect of the denial strikes 
carried out by the SAS and RUC‘s Headquarters Mobile Support Unit mentioned earlier.  These 
denial strikes were also shoot-to-kill in nature, and through eliminating experienced IRA units, 
were meant to serve as a deterrent against would-be terrorists.  Sir John Wheeler, former 
Security Minister of Northern Ireland, explained the rationale: ―If you really want to bring about 
a change in terrorist behavior, you have to create a climate whereby they are frightened to 
commit crime because they fear either apprehension… or being caught in a cross-fire situation 
whereby they get killed.‖118  
 Another factor that may have influenced the outcome of strategic coercion came from an 
instance of IRA overkill in November 1987 as a result of the Enniskillen bombing, which left 11 
Protestants dead, 60 injured on the morning of Remembrance Day in memorial for the dead.  
Support within Nationalist communities across Ireland for the IRA—as well as internationally—
contracted following the incident, with many safe houses shut to the IRA south of the border.
119
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Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 During this episode of strategic coercion, violence was kept low at ―acceptable levels,‖120 
with a stalemate continuing between British security forces and the IRA.  This situation is 
illustrated in figure 4.4: 
Figure 4.4: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1982-1989
121
 
 
 However, other than perhaps the Anglo-Irish Agreement (which helped ease tension 
regarding the Irish Republic‘s role in the conflict), little political resolution capable of ending the 
conflict was achieved, and the IRA continued to enjoy sufficient popular support for continued 
hostilities.  This was due in part to a complete aversion both on the part of Republican NSTOs—
the Provisional IRA in particular—and the Catholic Nationalist community to countenance any 
form of negotiations, or embrace moves towards political resolution while Margaret Thatcher, a 
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woman they blamed for the death of the Hunger strikers in 1981, remained at the helm (not to 
mention Thatcher‘s own aversion to negotiations).  Furthermore, the IRA remained committed to 
a campaign of terrorist violence, and thanks to support from Colonel Qaddafi, had the 
wherewithal to oblige this desire for some time to come.  The level of success for this episode of 
strategic coercion is thus assessed as ―moderate‖.  
 
Within-Case Episode #5: 1989-1997—Aiming for a Political Settlement, 
Ceasefire and Failure 
 Following the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), two important 
developments emerged.  The first was that London realized that pursuing enhanced cooperation 
with the Republic of Ireland alone would not be sufficient to resolve the conflict.  The second 
was that on the Republican side, elements of the IRA‘s leadership—in experiencing increased 
political marginalization in addition to ongoing military stalemate—were increasingly beginning 
to consider possibilities for a political settlement that would lead to an end of violence. 
 With the exit of Margaret Thatcher and the entrance of John Major as the new British 
Prime Minister, London began to shift its strategy, declaring its objective to be one of seeking 
out a comprehensive and agreed political solution to the conflict.  This solution—which would 
be produced through gaining the agreed consent of both Nationalist and Unionist communities, 
rather than simply being imposed—would involve a form of devolution122 and power-sharing, 
including some element of North-South Cooperation with the Republic of Ireland over matters 
concerning the province.
123
  Overtime, these efforts would meet some success, with a ceasefire 
achieved in late August 1994.  However the government of John Major, which was constrained 
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in the political and strategic choices it could make through its reliance on the support of Ulster 
Unionists for their narrow majority in Parliament, lacked both the capacity to sufficiently take on 
the Unionist part of the conflict equation in pursuit of such a political settlement.
124
   
  
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 Throughout the 1989-1997 period, isolation of external/international support for the IRA 
continued to improve.  A large contribution to these efforts came in the form of the joint Anglo-
Irish Downing Street Declaration (DSD) that elevated the principle of consent
125
, while publicly 
setting out the conditions in which the IRA‘s political wing, Sinn Fein, could be admitted to a 
talks process regarding a potential political settlement.  The proclamation of the DSD had the 
impact of greatly aligning the position of Dublin behind the British agenda for limited 
constitutional change.   
 Moreover, British and Irish perspectives would continue to coalesce, as in February 1995 
the two governments jointly published a ―framework document.‖  The document envisaged 
Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom, while simultaneously stressing the 
importance of Unionist consent and that the ―Irishness‖ of Nationalists should be formally 
expressed, namely through a progressive increase in cross-border institutions with Dublin.
126
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Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Isolation of external and international support continued to improve during this episode 
of strategic coercion.  The Irish and British came even further together in their positions and 
cooperation on the issue of Northern Ireland, while in the meantime, sources of external arms 
supplies and finances such as those in the US remained minimal.  Nor did any major supplier re-
emerge, as Colonel Qaddafi‘s regime had in the last episode.  Thus, even though the IRA 
continued to enjoy some popular sympathy in the Republic—with a porous border that helped 
them enjoy it (often in the form of safe havens, and locations for weapons‘ factories and 
storage)—the degree of external/international support enjoyed by the IRA was at its lowest 
levels since the 1960s.  The degree of isolation of external/international support is thus assessed 
as being ―significant‖. 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 The 1989-1997 episode of strategic coercion continued to witness improvements in 
British efforts at implementing denial.  Following ever improving access to intelligence—much 
of it gained through IRA infiltration—the British were able to prevent with ease a massive IRA 
escape plan from the Crumlin Road Jail.   And when the IRA decided to try implementing a new 
strategy involving sending over flying columns along the border area and in Belfast and Derry, 
this aspiration quickly came to an end when the first of such columns (composed of around 20 of 
the IRA‘s most experienced and trusted operators) was intercepted by heavy British gunfire and 
helicopters.  Denial operations were becoming so successful that IRA operatives were becoming 
―afraid to go on column operations.‖127  Meanwhile, MI5 was making deep inroads into the 
IRA‘s English department to the extent that the IRA was forced to largely abandon the use of its 
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―sleeper units‖ (groups that were sent in to merge with the local populace and become activated 
for terrorist operations when commanded).
128
 
 The British were making technical adjustments as well that limited the capacity of the 
IRA to successfully assault them.  Patrolling soldiers now wore flak jackets that could not be 
penetrated by any bullet in the IRA‘s armory.  Radio signals used by the IRA to trigger remote-
controlled bombs could now be blocked by the British; bombs triggered by landmines could now 
be detected due to the implementation of infrared sensors fitted to British helicopters; and the 
effectiveness of culvert bombs (stuffed into drains beneath rural roads)—that had terrorized 
military patrols in rural areas to the point where South Armagh had once been made too 
dangerous for road patrols—was now greatly reduced through the placement of wire mesh, 
which made it impossible to IRA engineers to set such booby-traps.
129
  
 
The IRA Still Manages to Carry out Some Successful Operations 
 Throughout this episode, the IRA still managed to carry out some important operations 
against the British.  In April 1992, an IRA bombing operation was carried out with extraordinary 
effect in the City of London, targeted at Britain‘s financial center.  The attack, which struck 
London‘s Baltic Exchange, inflicted serious damage to Britain‘s economy, causing £800 million 
of damage.
130
   In late 1992, the IRA repeated their assault on London‘s financial district, setting 
off a large bomb at Bishopgate.  The damage was once again extraordinary, and the British 
government was left desperate to prevent any subsequent recurrence, worried that any further 
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successful strikes in London‘s financial district might cause major financial institutions to 
relocate to other countries not subject to such dangers.
131
 
 
Such IRA Success was only Fleeting 
 Despite the success of the IRA‘s bombing operations in London, these assaults were 
interpreted as a sign of weakness in Westminster.
132
  Firstly, the operation revealed that the IRA 
was finding it difficult to successfully carry out further meaningful attacks in Northern Ireland.  
Secondly, the attack demonstrated an over-reliance by the IRA on their South Armagh 
battalions—the last Republican stronghold that the IRA considered safe from infiltration.  The 
knowledge that financial district bombs had originated from South Armagh made it a prime 
target for British security forces, leading to a successful undercover operation by the British in 
April 1994 arresting seven of the South Armagh battalion‘s key operators.  According to Ed 
Moloney, the operations sent a clear message to Republicans: ―If the British could hit the South 
Armagh IRA, then the war was as good as over.‖133 
 And indeed, the statistics on the effectiveness of IRA operations bore this message out.  
By this timeframe, only 6% of IRA operations actually went ahead, with the RUC estimating that 
by the early 1990s, 70% of all planned IRA operations in Northern Ireland had to be aborted for 
fear of detection, while amongst the remaining 30%
134
 of operations that went ahead, another 
80% were prevented or interdicted by the security forces.
135
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Denial After Breakdown of Ceasefire 
 Even after the breakdown of the ceasefire in February 1996, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the IRA was being rendered ineffective.   The IRA Northern Command‘s special unit 
that had been used to successfully restart the campaign in the North with the bombing of the 
Thiepval barracks was soon rolled up by the RUC.  The IRA then turned to their standard Active 
Service Units (ASUs) to carry out operations, but their attempts were largely interdicted—or 
bungled for fear of being so.  Thus, despite the fact that the IRA mounted dozens of attacks in 
Northern Ireland following the collapse of the ceasefire, few such attacks ever came close to 
hitting their target, and the IRA‘s killing rate continued to drop significantly.  By mid-1997—a 
year after the ceasefire had ended—the IRA had only succeeded in killing just two soldiers and 
two civilians.
136
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial  
 By 1997—even in light of the breakdown of the 1994 ceasefire—British security forces 
had managed to greatly reduce the IRA‘s ability to carry out successful operation, nearly 
eliminating their capacity to conduct (at least in a sustained fashion) major terrorist attacks.  
Moreover, the IRA was finding its ability to operate, plan, and enjoy any degree of freedom of 
movement to be greatly impaired.  Consequently casualty levels remained low during this 
timeframe.  The degree of denial against the IRA for this episode is thus assessed as being 
―high‖. 
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Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 Efforts at isolation of popular support continued to be enhanced during this episode.  This 
improvement began with the replacement of Tom King by Peter Brooke as Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, who breached new ground with both the Catholic community and members of 
the IRA.  In November 1990, Brooke stated that the British government had ―no selfish strategic 
or economic interest in Northern Ireland‖—a crucial step urged by John Hume for encouraging 
the IRA to lay down their weapons and consider a ceasefire en route to a political solution.
137
 
 Even further progress was made under Prime Minister John Major through the Downing 
Street Declaration (DSD).  Based off of a secret dialogue between John Hume and Gerry Adams, 
the DSD held two very important points for both the Nationalist community and the IRA‘s 
grassroots.  The first was that Prime Minister John Major clearly stated (repeating Brooke‘s 
declaration) that the British government had no selfish economic or strategic interest in Northern 
Ireland.  Rather their primary interest was to ―see peace, stability and reconciliation established 
by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island.‖138  Secondly, the issue of self-
determination was also addressed in the DSD, with Major stating that ―[t]he British government 
agrees that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone by agreement between the two 
parties respectively, to exercise their right to self-determination on the basis of consent, freely 
and concurrently given, north and south, to bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish.‖139  
Meanwhile the DSD even managed to appease moderate Unionists, with a declaration from the 
Irish Prime Minister that ―it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence 
of the freely given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.‖140  Accordingly, the 
Irish government also firmly pledged to change Article 2 and 3 of its Constitution (dealing with 
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the recognition of Northern Ireland‘s sovereign existence) in the event of a ―balanced 
constitutional accommodation.‖141 
 The result of the DSD was that it managed to unite the entire spectrum of Constitutional 
Nationalism, as well as the UUP (the main party for moderate Unionists), behind the British 
position; it therefore achieved the feat of producing a declaration that placed the maximum 
possible pressure on Republicans, while giving them an out in the form of a ceasefire and a 
political process towards a settlement.
142
   
 
Other Important Moves for Isolating Popular Support Prior to a Ceasefire 
 The British government under John Major also made other moves to continue to isolate 
popular support.  One of these involved the fusion of the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) with 
the Royal Irish Rangers in 1992, and the gradually phasing out of UDR activities—an important 
move for winning support from the Catholic community, which considered the organization an 
offensive symbol.
143
  Another saw important changes in Britain‘s economic policy.  Changing 
their position from early periods that absolute poverty was the sole economic ―cause‖ of the 
conflict, the British government now argued that community differentials in terms of relative 
deprivation were equally significant.
144
  The government thus launched the ―Targeting Social 
Need‖ initiative, which was meant to alleviate poverty in the province‘s worst affected areas.145  
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Moves Taken During the Ceasefire to Encourage Progress 
 Further moves were also made following the ceasefire, which was declared in late August 
1994, in order to encourage popular support within the Catholic community in favor of achieving 
a political settlement.   One such move involved the transfer of terrorist prisoners in the United 
Kingdom to holding facilities in Northern Ireland (so that they could be closer to their families), 
as well as the increase of remission for these prisoners.
146
  The British government also moved to 
reduce security levels in Northern Ireland, reducing military patrols, helicopter activity, vehicle 
checkpoints and making symbolic changes in weapons and headgear, as well as re-opening 
border roads.
147
   
 Moreover, throughout the ceasefire period, the British government attempted to enhance 
the ―feel good factor‖ through transferring savings in security spending to social programs, 
housing, education, and so forth, while maintaining high levels of public spending through a 
―peace dividend to address the province‘s ―special needs‖.148  This translated into an additional 
investment subsidy of £73 million from the British Exchequer, which was further complemented 
by £230 million in aid from the European Union, and further significant contributions from 
Commonwealth countries and the United States.  At the same time, however, the government 
also made it clear that if the ceasefire were to end, and security measures reintroduced, then 
economic subsidies would come back down as ―everyone must share the pain.‖149 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 With popular support for continued terrorist violence and the IRA greatly reduced, 
existing grievances (such as the perception that the British government remained involved in 
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Northern Ireland affairs due to selfish strategic and economic interests, and that London was 
attempting to suppress Irish self-determination) being addressed at Britain‘s highest levels, the 
emergence of any new significant grievances avoided, excessive violence almost completely 
eliminated and the continued provision of security for the province‘s population provided by the 
British government, this level of Isolation of popular support is assessed as ―significant‖.  
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?  
 A number of additional significant factors played a role in influencing the outcome of this 
episode of British strategy.  The first, simply put, was the departure of Margaret Thatcher as 
Britain‘s Prime Minister, and her replacement by John Major.  Major, who was something of an 
unknown in Northern Ireland, carried none of the political baggage possessed by his predecessor, 
and thus had the opportunity to be both more flexible and imaginative in his approach towards 
Northern Ireland.
150
 
 Another factor influencing the outcome of this episode of British strategy came in the 
form of secret talks between the IRA‘s Gerry Adams and various representatives (be they John 
Hume, the Catholic Church, the Irish Government and various elements within the British 
Government) over the last decade.  These talks assisted the government in both its efforts 
towards addressing existing grievances/issues of concern through the DSD, and its moves 
towards bringing about a ceasefire with the possibility of a resultant peace process. 
 A third factor was present—once again—in bungled IRA operations that produced 
overkill and disgust throughout the late 1980s until 1992.  With each disastrous operation that 
claimed the lives of more and more civilians, support for the IRA continued to shrink, which was 
tangibly registered in a consistent drop in the ballot box for Sinn Fein.  With the implementation 
of the ―human bomb‖—whereby the IRA would force an uninvolved outsider to essentially carry 
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out a suicide car-bombing while his family was kept hostage—and the Teebane Crossroads 
massacre that resulted in the death of eight Protestant civilians—support for the IRA shrank to an 
all time low, with Sinn Fein suffering tremendous setbacks in capturing a share of the vote, and 
even Gerry Adams losing his West Belfast seat in Parliament to the SDLP. 
 A fourth factor affecting the outcome of this episode came from abroad, as the Bill 
Clinton Administration granted Gerry Adams a visa to come to the USA.  Despite strong 
resistance from John Major, Clinton believed that granting such a visa would help to make it 
easier for the IRA to call a ceasefire—which it did in late August 1994—by demonstrating the 
potential political gains that could be made should the organization choose to give up violence as 
a way forward.  Indeed, massive media attention was poured on Gerry Adams, and financial 
support flooded into Sinn Fein‘s coffers (restricted through US Government monitoring to ensure 
political use only).
151
 
 The final factor came from the limitations of John Major‘s government.  While he was 
freer and more empowered to take political action than Margaret Thatcher had been, his 
government still found its hand tied to a large extent.  The reason for this was that Major‘s 
Conservative government increasingly found itself dependent on the Unionist vote.  Depending 
on them to maintain his party‘s slim majority in Westminster, Major was always constrained in 
his actions—especially regarding moves in relation to Sinn Fein and the IRA—for fear of 
alienating the Unionists and potentially bringing down his government.  This limitation would 
prove to be a particularly troublesome issue in achieving any negotiated progress with the 
Provisional IRA, discussed in the following assessment. 
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Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 Despite the failure of the British government to achieve or implement a successful 
political settlement that would have brought an end to the violence in Northern Ireland, the 
British government‘s campaign of strategic coercion enjoyed some gains during this period. As 
illustrated by figure 4.5, violence-levels were kept low: 
Figure 4.5: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1989-1997
152
 
 
 
Moreover, some important political resolution was achieved.  This was particularly the case with 
establishment of the Downing Street Declaration, which formally witnessed Britain addressing 
the issue that it had no selfish strategic or economic reason for retaining Northern Ireland, while 
fairly addressing the issue of self-determination and the conditions under which Northern 
Ireland‘s constitutional/political status might change (namely that consent, freely given, of the 
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majority of Northern Ireland‘s population would be required).  This progress helped lead the IRA 
to declare a ―complete cessation of military operations‖ by the IRA on August 31, 1994.  Serious 
negotiations, however, never had much of a chance to commence, as the issue of 
decommissioning (the destruction or surrender of IRA weapons), would soon pose an 
insurmountable hurdle. 
 Decommissioning would soon become an obstacle following the proclamation by Prime 
Minister John Major that ―huge progress‖ would have to be made in this regard before any 
exploratory talks could become formal, leading to negotiations and a peace process.  This 
demand was met with fierce resistance from Sinn Fein and the IRA.  Decommissioning 
essentially required the IRA to surrender its military capability before negotiations for peace 
even commenced.
 153
  Sinn Fein predictably announced that the IRA would not surrender its 
weapons before a political settlement, demanding that this issue be dealt with in talks. 
 Realizing that its position on decommissioning was serving to hold up any progress 
towards negotiations, the British government attempted to soften its position.  In publicly laying 
out what would come to be known as the ―Washington Three‖ conditions for peace talks154, 
Patrick Mayhew (then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) reduced John Major‘s initial 
demand of ―huge progress‖ in decommissioning to just the ―actual decommissioning of some 
arms.‖155  However, this still would not prove to be enough to get the IRA moving on their end.  
John Major thus moved to create the independent International Commission on Disarmament, 
bringing in American former-Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Canadian General John 
de Chastelain, and former Finnish Prime Minister Hari Halkiri.  In George Mitchell‘s owns 
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words, ―The British government had gotten itself on the hook of prior decommissioning… and 
we had been brought in to get them off.‖156 
 The recommendation of the international commission led by George Mitchell was that 
decommissioning should take place in parallel with negotiations.  At the same time, six ―Mitchell 
Principles‖ were also established as a precondition for negotiations to guarantee the IRA (and all 
other paramilitary groups) commitment to peace
157
.  John Major was reluctant, however, to 
endorse the position of the international body, and decided to come up with his own alternative 
route to overcoming the hurdle that the issue of decommissioning had become.  John Major‘s 
alternative was to give the IRA (and all other paramilitary groups) the choice of either enacting 
some decommissioning prior to negotiations or moving to secure a democratic mandate (through 
elections) for engaging in all-party talks towards a peace settlement.
158
 
 Unfortunately, John Major‘s new proposal came too late.  After 18 months of inaction 
caused by the issue of decommissioning—and only three weeks after Major‘s new proposal—the 
ceasefire would end as a large bomb was detonated on February 9, 1996 in Canary Wharf, killing 
two people and causing millions of pounds worth of damage.
159
  In the end, then, what was 
achieved during this episode of negotiations was a negotiated ceasefire, but that was effectively 
it.  Negotiations/talks towards a peaceful settlement never really got off the ground with Sinn 
Fein perpetually banned from the negotiating table over the issue of decommissioning, and 
eventually even the ceasefire collapsed in February 1996. 
 Thus, despite some important progress towards political resolution and the maintenance 
of (increasingly) low levels of terrorist violence, full—or ―high‖—success was not achieved by 
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the conclusion of this episode of strategic coercion.  The outcome observed is thus assessed as 
being one of ―significant success.‖ 
 
Within-Case Episode #6: 1997-2007—Achieving a Political Settlement, Seeing 
it Implemented 
 The 1997-2007 episode of British strategy was similar to that of the 1989-1997 episode in 
terms of strategic coercion measures such as denial, and isolation of external and popular 
support.  However it significantly differed in its approach to conducting negotiations.  This new 
episode commenced following the landslide victory of the Labour party, with Tony Blair 
replacing John Major as Prime Minister.  Upon assuming his position as Prime Minister, Blair 
possessed a crucial advantage that Major did not: a substantial majority in Parliament, which 
gave him a degree of freedom in formulating his Northern Ireland policies.   
 Tony Blair made it a top priority to bring resolution to the conflict.  Blair soon reversed 
the policy of the Major government, which made decommissioning a precondition for engaging 
in all-party talks.  The only concession demanded was the implementation—and maintenance 
of—a true ceasefire, which Sinn Fein readily accepted within two months.   Sinn Fein obliged, 
and the IRA committed itself to a new ceasefire in July 1997.  This time all-party talks—
involving direct negotiations with Sinn Fein—would commence shortly thereafter. Further, 
meaningful negotiations were assisted through Tony Blair and the Labour Government‘s 
decision to include all groups party to the conflict in the negotiations process.  Thus, moderate 
Nationalists and Unionists, as well as Loyalist groups with ties to the paramilitary UDA and 
UVF, were brought onboard for the talks process.  As this episode of strategic coercion played 
out, it would thus become the objective of the Blair government to negotiate a political 
settlement that would provide a viable resolution to the conflict, thereby ending the hostilities of 
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extremist substate groups on both sides.  The result was the achievement of the Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement, discussed in further detail later, and ensuing efforts by the British 
government to ensure its implementation.  
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 During this episode of British strategy, isolation of external/international support for the 
IRA continued to improve.  With a renewed ceasefire, and the achievement of the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998, both Washington and Dublin had become firm supporters of the British 
agenda.
160
  Thus in 1998, following the Omagh Bombing, Britain and Ireland worked closely 
together to enact legal reforms to tackle terrorism on both sides of the border. Meanwhile support 
from sources originating in the US continued to be thwarted—in 1999 the FBI uncovered a 
large-scale gunrunning plot in Florida organized by the IRA.
161
 
 Furthermore, the British government was successful in proactively preventing support 
from emerging elsewhere for the IRA, as it had once done from Libya.  The proof of this came 
when British intelligence helped to tip off a liaison between the IRA and Colombia‘s FARC in 
August 2001.  According to Irish Justice Minister Michael McDowell, had the deal not been 
intercepted, the IRA would have received $35 million from the narcotics-rich FARC in exchange 
for training in explosives and mortar production for their guerillas.
162
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Further Isolation Post-9/11 
 Following the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda in New York and Washington 
D.C., external support was even further squashed for the IRA.  The Administration of George W. 
Bush—which had already demonstrated that it would not lend the same degree of political 
support or involvement as had been enjoyed by Sinn Fein under Bill Clinton—along with 
previously supportive members of corporate and congressional Irish-America, halted all public 
support for Sinn Fein, and demanded to see ―action now‖ regarding IRA decommissioning and a 
formal renunciation of violence.
163
      
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 By the end of the 1997-2007 episode of strategic coercion, the IRA had now found itself 
near completely isolated from external and international support.  With Dublin and Washington 
in lockstep over support for British efforts leading up to and following the Good Friday 
Agreement, serious anti-terrorism legislation being passed on both sides of the border in Ireland, 
the near-complete elimination of support from groups in the US, and any further potential 
sources of support being interdicted before they could become manifest, the level of isolation of 
external/popular support reached the status of ―high.‖ 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 During the 1997-2007 period, the capacity of Republican NSTOs for terrorist violence 
continued to be greatly mitigated due to successful denial efforts by the British government.  The 
British even began to branch out and address a recurring potential powder-keg for sectarian 
tensions—the Unionist Drumcree marches.  At Mo Mowlam‘s (then Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland) behest, laws were implemented, granting new powers for a Parades 
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Commission in February 1998 to oversee the physical direction through which parades could 
march, effectively blocking them from marching down the primarily Catholic Garvaghy Road.  
To enforce this, the British security forces mobilized prior to the large marches, erecting large 
containers of concrete and razor wire across cordoned off roads—surrounded by a moat—which 
was armed by troops and mobile water cannons.
164
  While the marches remained disruptive, loss 
of life was largely prevented, as was a potential mechanism for re-igniting the conflict. 
 
IRA Splinter Groups 
 Following the establishment of a new ceasefire in 1997, and Sinn Fein‘s commencement 
in all-party talks, a new splinter group split off from the Provisional IRA, fashioning themselves 
the Real IRA (RIRA).  The RIRA soon attempted to merge their efforts with other existing 
Republican splinter groups—the Continuity IRA (which had split from the Provisionals in the 
1980s) and the INLA (an offshoot of the Official IRA in the 1970s)—pooling resources for a 
bombing campaign, which began with a van-bomb on the RUC station at Markethill, County 
Armagh.  This campaign, which began in September 1997, was marked by a deadly series of car 
bomb and mortar attacks, primarily in County Armagh, and would carry into 1998. 
 This new alliance of Republican splinter groups was not long to last, however.  The three 
groups soon experienced tensions as they were unable to develop a common political manifesto 
that would surmount their ideological differences.  And following a major bombing in the market 
town of Omagh in August 1998 that killed 29 people, the INLA and the Continuity IRA let the 
RIRA take the fall for the catastrophic operation.  The result was a complete souring of relations, 
with the Continuity IRA and the INLA calling ceasefires three weeks after the attack.  Dissident 
unity was thus smashed, and none of the three groups would thereafter be able to mount any 
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serious challenge to either the British government or the Provisional IRA, which took to calling 
them ―micro groups.‖165 
 Moreover, the RIRA was to continue to suffer significant setbacks.  The largest of these 
perhaps came in March 2001, when their leader—Micky McKevitt—was arrested and convicted 
on the basis of evidence supplied by a US sympathizer who had infiltrated the group at the 
behest of the FBI and MI5.  The combination of this catastrophe, and the organization‘s 
ineffectiveness at carrying forth any further armed struggle, deterred any potential disgruntled 
Provisional Republicans from jumping ship and lending support to the RIRA‘s cause.  Thus, by 
the time the Provisionals decommissioned in late 2001, the threat from splinter groups had been 
reduced to a minor concern.
166
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 Similar to the previous episode, by the end of the 1997-2007 episode of strategic coercion 
British intelligence and security forces were able to all but eliminate Republican NSTO capacity 
for carrying out major terrorist attacks, with their ability to operate greatly reduced and kept at 
very low levels.  In addition, the threat from splinter groups was significantly mitigated to levels 
of low concern, and even the threat of sectarian tensions that could re-ignite IRA activities from 
the Drumcree marches was adequately addressed.  The degree of denial is thus assessed as being 
―high‖ for this episode. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 Isolation of popular support continued to improve during this episode of strategic 
coercion.  With levels of popular support already reduced for the IRA following the previous 
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episode, the British government under Tony Blair set itself almost immediately to further 
eliminate popular support for a campaign of violence.  This was most notably demonstrated a 
month after Blair came to office, as the British government formally apologized for the 1845-49 
potato famine, which was a recurring theme in the Nationalist narrative of British cruelty in 
Ireland.
167
  In 1998, the government of Tony Blair followed this move by appealing to 
Nationalists through opening up an independent inquiry to investigate the events of the 1972 
Bloody Sunday massacre—still ongoing, it marks the largest investigation in British history. 
 
Further Moves to Isolate Popular Support Prior to Good Friday Agreement 
 The British government continued in its attempt to win over popular support by putting 
into action commitments for improvements in human rights, changes in policing structures, 
tackling discrimination in employment, and—as was discussed earlier—reducing the (often 
lethal) disruptiveness of parades.
168
 Meanwhile, the process of relocating prisoners to Northern 
Ireland was sped up—a move that crucially appealed to both Nationalists and Loyalists as it 
meant easing the strain on families in enabling visitation. 
 Tony Blair also reached out to Unionists to support a political settlement, making a 
number of public pledges, including: 
[N]o change in the status of N. Ireland without the express consent of the people of N. 
Ireland; power to take decisions returned to a N. Ireland assembly, with accountable 
north-south cooperation; fairness and equality guaranteed for all; those who use or 
threaten violence excluded from the government of N. Ireland; and prisoners kept in 
unless violence is given up for good.
169
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Post-Good Friday Agreement Action 
 Several very significant actions also took place following the Good Friday Agreement.  
The first of these was the release of political prisoners two years after the Agreement.  Moreover, 
to assuage the fears of Unionists and to provide a popular disincentive against supporting a 
return to violence, these prisoners were released on license, which could be immediately revoked 
if either they or their organizations engaged in acts of violence.
170
  The second was the 
implementation of the reforms of the RUC, which saw the RUC renamed the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland or PSNI (to make it less antagonizing to the Catholic community), and the 
eventual creation in 2005 of the Historical Enquiries Team that continues to investigate the 3,269 
unsolved murders committed during ―the Troubles‖ (a move that appealed to both communities, 
the Unionists in particular).  Lastly, devolved government would finally return to Northern 
Ireland in 2007—this time empowering the Catholic minority under an acceptable agreement to 
the Unionists. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 This episode of British strategy marked a clear success for British efforts at isolating any 
further popular support for the IRA and all terrorist groups committed to violence.  Popular 
support was nearly completely denied for the IRA; grievances—both contemporary and 
historic—were well-addressed; new grievances were avoided; excessive violence was prevented; 
and security was well provided for by the local security force (the new PSNI).  Isolation of 
popular support is thus assessed as ―high.‖ 
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Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?
 Additional significant factors did indeed play a role in influencing the observed outcome.  
One of these factors was, importantly, the presence of the right leaders at the right time.  Tony 
Blair was vital to this end, proving to possess a high-level of commitment to Northern Ireland 
and the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement; that he possessed a large majority in 
Parliament also crucially assisted his position in that it freed his hand to be more flexible in 
terms of conducting negotiations with the Provisional IRA.  Bertie Ahern, the Fianna Fail Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Ireland, was both more than willing to work with the British, as well 
as exercise the political courage necessary to deliver on the Irish end in coming up with any 
settlement.  Amongst Sinn Fein, much credit must also be given to Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness for their commitment to seeing an end to violence and having the will face down 
intransigent members of the IRA who preferred not to return to a ceasefire at all.  In the Unionist 
party, former UUP leader David Trimble must be given much credit for bravery and commitment 
towards progress, and, in the end, DUP leader Ian Paisley who agreed to the implementation of a 
power-sharing government.  Other important actors—who were also invaluable to the peace-
process, and the implementation of the subsequent agreement—include Mo Mowlam, SDLP 
leader John Hume, American envoy and former Senator George Mitchell, and President Bill 
Clinton.   
 A second major factor involved the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks, and a shift in 
international policy vis-à-vis terrorist organizations—especially from the United States.  This 
event, and the new perspective of a post-9/11 world, brought much pressure on the IRA from 
what were once key sources of support—the White House and congressional and corporate Irish-
America.  Within weeks of the attack, substantial pressure from the US helped force the IRA‘s 
hand in finally decommissioning.   
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 Finally, the IRA was suffering its own popularity problems.  Discontent at their mafia-
style enforcement of order in local communities came to a head with the murder of Robert 
McCartney (a Republican himself) on February 14
th
 at the order of a local IRA captain.  The 
episode created a major crisis for the IRA in their remaining base of support, and in international 
public opinion.
171
  Not surprisingly, within months the IRA formally announced the end to its 
armed campaign of terrorist violence. 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 The campaign of strategic coercion conducted by the British proved to be a highly 
successful one by the conclusion of this episode.  Much political progress was achieved through 
negotiations following the 1997 ceasefire, particularly in the attainment of the Good Friday 
Agreement (or ―Belfast Agreement‖ as it is referred to by Unionists).  This agreement provided 
for recognition of the Republican preoccupation for self-determination, but made consent a 
crucial component of this—where consent was defined as requiring the majority of people of 
Northern Ireland to decide whether or not the province stayed in Britain or joined a united 
Ireland.  It enacted a rewriting of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution—which prevented 
recognition of the entity of Northern Ireland, and left open a claim by the Republic to the 
territory of the North—much to the consternation of Unionists.  And the Good Friday Agreement 
also provided for a new 108-member Belfast Assembly, to which Westminster would devolve 
full power over health, education and agriculture, as well as the right to make new laws, with 
London retaining control over issues of defense and law and order (with a promise to consider 
devolving security powers at a later stage).  Finally, the new devolved government would consist 
                                                 
171
 Jim Cusack, ―IRA Savages Murder Bert McCartney – and Taint Sinn Fein with His Blood,‖ The Independent, 20 
February 2005. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
158 
of a First Minister (who would be a Unionist), a Deputy First Minister (who would be a 
Nationalist), and ten departmental ministers beneath them (of which posts would be allocated in 
proportion to party strengths on an agreed mathematical formula).
172
   
 The Good Friday Agreement was not perfect; issues regarding decommissioning, reforms 
to the RUC, and compelling the Unionists to implement the new power-sharing government still 
had to be resolved—and these issues would cause the suspension for a time of the 
implementation of a new devolved Executive.  However, the result was an equitable agreement, 
which was approved by a wide majority in referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic
173
, 
produced a commitment to non-violence in pursuance of their aspirations for all-parties 
concerned, and would be implemented overtime.  George Mitchell perhaps best sums up what 
was achieved: 
It is based on the principle that the future of Northern Ireland should be decided by the 
people of Northern Ireland, and it seeks to promote tolerance and mutual respect.  It 
includes constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom.  It 
creates new democratic institutions to provide self-governance in the north and to 
encourage cooperation between the north and south for their mutual benefit.  It explicitly 
repudiates the use or threat of violence for any political purpose and commits signatories 
and supporters to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations.
174
  
 
 Furthermore, the British government moved to promptly implement the Good Friday 
Agreement.  While this task took nearly nine years, and faced significant hurdles on the issues of 
decommissioning, implementing reforms to the local police service (the RUC), and the formation 
and maintenance of a new devolved Executive, the British government kept up solid efforts to 
see these hurdles overcome.  As Mo Mowlam, then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
perhaps best described the government‘s mood following the settlement: ―It was a big, big 
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programme of work, and I worried from the outset that people would not have the energy to keep 
it up… But I knew it was crucial that we didn‘t ease up and lose the tide of local and 
international goodwill that was surging with us after the Agreement.‖175 
 Despite its painstaking implementation though, the British government ensured that the 
Good Friday Agreement was carried to its successful conclusion.  Accordingly, this episode was 
marked by a number of important milestones following the Good Friday Agreement, including 
the decommissioning (or disarming) of IRA weapon stockpiles, verified by an independent 
commission in October 2001; the announcement of a formal and permanent end to the 
Provisional IRA‘s armed campaign in July 2005; and finally the full implementation of reforms 
and constitutional change promised by the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of which 
was the new devolved power-sharing government of Northern Ireland that came to power in 
March 2007. 
 Further, at the end of this episode, a lasting resolution to the conflict with the Provisional 
IRA—as well as with major Loyalist terrorist organizations—was brought forth with a formal 
announcement regarding the cessation of their campaign.  Violence from the Provisional IRA 
was thus halted, with violence from splinter groups kept at very low levels from 1999 onwards, 
as is illustrated in figure 4.6: 
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Figure 4.6: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1997-2007
176
 
 
 Thus, this episode witnessed a satisfactory and enduring political resolution achieved for all 
major issues (and parties), culminating in the renunciation of violence by the chief Republican 
NSTO—the Provisional IRA—while splinter ―micro‖ groups such as the Continuity and Real 
IRA remained weak, unsupported, and largely ineffectual.  This episode of strategic coercion is 
thus assessed as being a ―high success‖. 
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Chapter V: Israel versus Palestinian Terrorist NSTOs, 1967-Present 
 This chapter will now examine the attempts by Israel to strategically coerce Palestinian 
terrorist insurgent organizations between 1967 and the present (2009).  Similar to the Northern 
Ireland case study, this historic case is broken down into several within-case episodes: 
1. 1967-1977: Post-1967 War, a strategy of deterrence and punishment 
2. 1977-1987: Likud comes to power, full-scale military interventions in Lebanon 
3. 1987-1991: The first Intifada 
4. 1991-2000: The Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords, Peace Process and its Collapse 
5. 2001-2004: The Al-Aqsa Intifada and Israeli military coercion 
6. 2004-Present (2009):  Unilateral disengagement, Hamas comes to power, entrenched 
stalemate 
 
Prior to proceeding with this analysis, a background of the conflict will be provided, which gives 
an elaboration of: 1) the conflict‘s history in brief; and 2) the political context of this case and the 
main actors involved. 
 
A Brief History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 To discuss the entirety of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
1
  would be well 
beyond the scope of this paper.  The brief history to be discussed will thus begin with Israel‘s 
declaration of independence, and the ensuing situation for Jews and Arabs in the land of 
Israel/Palestine.  On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 181 (II), which in recommending the partition of the Western portion of the Palestine 
Mandate into two different (provisional) states—one Jewish and one Arab—laid the framework 
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for the emergence of the State of Israel.
2
  The partition plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency.  
Problematically, the plan was also swiftly rejected by Arab leadership.
3
   
 Following the resolution, a number of irregular Arab attacks took place against the 
Jewish community of Palestine.  On May 14, 1948 following the expiration of the British 
Mandate, the Jewish community of Palestine formally declared their independence and the 
establishment of the State of Israel.
4
  Almost immediately thereafter, the Arab states declared 
war on Israel.  Israel emerged victorious from the confrontation, which came to an end following 
armistice agreements in March 1949.
5
  The armistices did not, however, mark an end to the 
conflict. 
  
Consequences of the Israeli Declaration of Independence for Palestine’s Arab Population 
 While Israel‘s War of Independence was a defensive one, it entailed a number of grave 
consequences for the Arab population of Palestine.  Following the war, over half the number of 
Arabs living in the Palestine Mandate either fled or were expelled, and came to know generations 
of occupation
6—both from Israel and neighboring Arab states. Here, in the words of Rashid 
Kalidi, the Palestinians would be fated to become ―prey to profound, justified, and realistic fears 
of being destroyed and dispersed as a people.‖7  Further, the land that would have been 
partitioned off to the Palestine mandate‘s non-Jewish population was gobbled up by Israel, 
Jordan and Egypt.  In the words of Benny Morris, the Israeli War of Independence ended up as a 
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―multinational land grab focusing on the Arab areas of the country.‖8  Meanwhile, the plight of 
displaced Palestinian Arabs was set aside—considered as a humanitarian issue to be addressed 
amongst Israel and the existing Arab states.   
 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War/Six Day War and its Consequences 
 Following the armistices of 1949, a fragile peace settled on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
marked by intermittent violence, including cross-border Fedayeen attacks from Arab irregulars 
and the Suez Canal Crisis.
9
  A defining moment came in Israel‘s post-independence period in 
1967 with the outbreak of the Six Day War, which ended with a resounding victory for Israel.  
As a result of its victory, a new map of the Middle East came into being, with Israel coming into 
possession of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem.  Along with the acquisition of this new territory, Israel also came to occupy land 
inhabited by 1.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
10
   
 Meanwhile, a change was brewing within the Palestinian communities scattered 
throughout the region.  Until June 1967, Palestinians relied for the most part on Arab 
governments for their salvation.  However, following the stunning defeat of the Arab states, new 
movements such as Fatah lead by Yasser Arafat would emerge, looking to take the struggle into 
their own hands.
11
  Arab states, bitter and recovering from the calamitous events of the 1967 war, 
eagerly began to support them in this.  Palestinians groups would soon conduct frequent acts of 
guerrilla warfare and terrorism, seeking to place pressure on Israel and seize the world‘s 
attention to their cause.  Israel, in turn, was swift with its retaliation.
12
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Political Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 The political context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dominated by a number of 
issues.  The primary issues involved in any resolution of the conflict include: possession of East 
Jerusalem; Palestinian refugees and how to accommodate them; and Israeli settlements in land 
occupied after 1967.  This section will discuss these issues, as well as present a breakdown of the 
major actors involved. 
 
The Issue of East Jerusalem 
 From a Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, retaining possession of East Jerusalem—in 
particular the Old City—is a fundamental must.  Originally intended in the UN Partition Plan for 
Palestine to be made into a special international regime administered by the United Nations,
13
 the 
Old City of East Jerusalem was seized and annexed by Jordan in the 1948-9 Israeli War of 
Independence.  In June 1967, following the Six Day War, Israel reclaimed East Jerusalem.  
Exuberant, Israel annexed the city and declared Jerusalem to be once again unified for all time.  
To confirm this new reality, the Israeli government quickly moved to sever the political 
connection between Jerusalem and the West Bank, and began to encircle Jerusalem with 
neighborhoods/settlements inhabited by Israelis.
14
 
 From a Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, retention of East Jerusalem is of very high 
importance.  Historically, Jerusalem is of central value to the Jewish people, having served as the 
capitol for David and Solomon‘s kingdoms.  It provides a reminder of the golden age of the 
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ancient Israeli kingdom.
15
  Perhaps most importantly, it houses the most important religious site 
in the Judaic world, the Western Wall (also referred to as the Wailing Wall or Kotel), which 
stands on the Western flank of the Temple Mount, and symbolizes the sole remnant of Judaism‘s 
Holy Temple.  Retaining possession of East Jerusalem, is further reinforced by the perspective 
that it comprises territory won through a defensive war.
16
  The final status of East Jerusalem has 
thus remained a major obstacle in negotiations over peace with the Palestinian people. 
 From a Pro-Palestinian/Arab perspective, there can be no basis for surrendering East 
Jerusalem, based on several considerations.  First, regardless of any history, the majority 
population today in East Jerusalem is exceedingly non-Jewish.  Further, Jerusalem from their 
perspective was illegally obtained through military conquest in the 1967 war, and its annexation 
is in contravention to their interpretation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
17
  
Furthermore, Palestinians regard possession of East Jerusalem to be of fundamental importance 
considering its own religious and historical importance in the Islamic world.  In the Islamic 
world, East Jerusalem—or Al-Quds (―the Holy‖)—represents the third most important religious 
site on the globe.  The city contains the Al-Haram ash-Sharif (―the Noble Sanctuary‖), a complex 
(built on the Jewish Temple Mount mentioned above), that includes the Dome of the Rock and 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque (or ―the Farthest Mosque‖), where it is believed that the Prophet 
Mohammed ascended to Heaven in 621.
18
  Indeed, given (East) Jerusalem‘s importance, the 
Palestinian position has frequently expressed the intention of claiming it as the capitol of any 
Palestinian state. 
 
                                                 
15
 Gelvin. 
16
 Michael Dumper, The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 163. 
17
 Edward Said and David Barsamian, Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward W. Said, New York: 
Pluto Press, 2003, 42. 
18
 Rivka Gonen, Contested Holiness: Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Perspectives on the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem, Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2003, 126. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
166 
Refugees 
 With the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, and the war of independence that 
followed it, a major refugee crisis was ignited, with hundreds of thousands of people—both Jews 
and Arabs/non-Jews becoming displaced.  Regarding Arab/non-Jewish refugees, a major 
political crisis would emerge.  While estimates vary widely, 711,000 Arab Palestinian refugees 
were displaced during the Israeli war of independence according to the final estimate of the 
United Nations.
19
  The matter of their fate and who deserves blame for it, as well as what will 
become of them following any sort of enduring peace settlement between Israel and the 
Palestinians has since become a highly contentious political issue. 
 From a Pro-Palestinian/Arab perspective, the matter is relatively straightforward: in a war 
launched by foreign settlers against the wishes of the majority of Palestine‘s population, the 
security forces of what would come to be Israel set to ethnically cleanse the land of its 
indigenous population.  Since then, millions of Palestinians have come to languish in harsh, 
impoverished and humiliating circumstances amongst a plethora of refugee camps spread 
throughout the region.
20
  The obvious solution is that in any settlement, all refugees (including 
all of their offspring and subsequent generations) must be allowed to return to the land of 
Palestine—which of course includes Israel as it is currently constituted. 
 The Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, not surprisingly, markedly differs on the situation.  To 
begin, this perspective completely disagrees that Israel is to blame for the refugee crisis caused 
by the 1948-49 War of Independence.  From their perspective, the refugee crisis was begun by 
the pillaging of Arab irregulars, general instability caused by the war, and the encouragement of 
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Arab armies/the personal decision of Arab inhabitants to evacuate and wait out the conflict in the 
surrounding region whilst expecting a quick finish of the Jewish state.
21
  Even for those in the 
Pro-Israel camp who accept some degree of Israeli culpability, their conclusion is that the 
refugee crisis was a result of the instability caused by war—a war initiated by the Arab states.22   
 Moreover, the Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective contends that the return of Palestinian 
refugees (at least beyond symbolic numbers) would be impossible.  Their rationale for this is that 
if Israel were to accept the return of all Palestinian refugees and their subsequent generations—
some 4.6 million people as of 2008
23–then Israel would lose its Jewish majority and (in a 
democratic country) cease to exist as a Jewish state.  Ultimately, the Pro-Israel position holds the 
Arab states responsible for the ongoing refugee crises, contending that Arab states have 
deliberately avoided integrating Palestinian refugees in efforts to turn them into a political and 
propaganda tool. 
 
Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories  
 Following Israel‘s occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza as a result of 
the 1967 war, settlements have sprung up in increasing numbers.  The Israeli settlement program 
initially began as early 1967, though it began to greatly pickup speed following the seizure of 
power by Likud in the late 1970s.  These settlements were initially built on the fringes of the 
Occupied Territories.
24
  They have since branched out to encircle East Jerusalem, take up 
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significant (high quality) portions of land in the West Bank, and to provide access to holy sites 
for religious settlers.
25
 
 From a Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, these settlements fulfill an important purpose in 
serving as an effective buffer against external invasion from Israel‘s neighbors.26  From a more 
conservative, religious Israeli position, such settlements also help to create ―facts on the ground‖ 
for maintaining possession of the land falling within Eretz Yisrael Ha-Shlema (the complete land 
of Israel), thereby making it more difficult to negotiate it away under any settlement.  In such a 
case, these settlements help Israel to maintain a permanent foothold of the Territories, and at the 
very least an expensive bargaining chip to be traded away in any settlement negotiations.
27
 
 From a Pro-Palestinian perspective, such settlements are clearly provocative.  These 
settlements serve to continually confiscate high quality Palestinian land, while increasingly 
reducing the possibility of a Palestinian state from emerging in the Occupied Territories.  These 
settlements represent a flagrant violation of international law under UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which forbids the transfer of a 
state‘s civilian population.28  Furthermore, these settlements stand in the way of the emergence 
of any Palestinian state as provided for by UN Resolution 181. 
 
Main Actors Involved in the Conflict 
 In contending these issues a number of major actors, endogenous to the conflict, can be 
identified.  Not counting numerous external supporters—whose role will be discussed in the 
case-episodes—these actors include the State of Israel (including the differing political wings 
                                                 
25
 Josie Sandercock, Peace Under Fire: Israel/Palestine and the International Solidarity Movement, London: Verso, 
2004, 10. 
26
 Gelvin. 
27
 Aharon Kellerman, Society and Settlement: Jewish Land of Israel in the Twentieth Century, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1993, 101. 
28
 For the full text of the Fourth Geneva Convention, see online at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5 
(provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross [Online]) 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
169 
within the country), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) lead by Fatah, the early 
rejectionist groups, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad.   
 
The State of Israel 
 In regards to both the Israeli-Palestinian and broader Arab-Israeli conflicts, the primary 
objective of the State of Israel is to survive, and remain a Jewish state capable of providing a safe 
haven and global representation to its co-religionists.  Israel takes issues of security very 
seriously, and is reluctant to take a progressive stance that might leave it too vulnerable.
29
  In 
particular, Israel seeks to bring an end to terrorist violence suffered at the hands of Palestinian 
NSTOs.  However, there is some disparity of views between Israeli moderates and hawks 
regarding what will accomplish this. 
 Regarding the disposition of occupied land after 1967, moderates—such as Israel‘s 
Labour party—considered the acquisition of this new territory to hold the potential to be a 
bargaining chip towards peace with neighboring Arab states, and later on, with the Palestinians 
themselves.  Hawks—such as the Likud—however, contended that the (permanent) acquisition 
of such vast new amounts of land would actually remove the threat of war by providing Israel 
with the needed strategic depth that it had thus far lacked.  Both moderates and hawks alike 
recognized Israel‘s main geo-strategic weakness to be its ―soft underbelly‖—consisting of Judea 
and Samaria (the West Bank).
30
  For moderates, the demilitarization of the West Bank, with the 
removal of weaponry and significant hostile forces, was deemed essential to maintaining Israel‘s 
security.  Hawks, however, took this a step further and believed that the best way to ensure 
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Israel‘s security was to retain military control indefinitely over the whole of the West Bank.31   
Moreover, hawks have been motivated to support the growth of settlements that not only 
enhanced strategic control of the Territories, but also help to create ―facts on the ground‖ in a de 
facto process of annexation.
32
 
 Hawks and moderates also differ regarding engagement and negotiations with the 
Palestinians.  Moderates, while not swift to directly engage with the Palestinian people or the 
PLO, were certainly quicker to do so than their hawkish counterparts.  Hawks doubt the sincerity 
of Palestinian pledges towards peace and their word in negotiations.  In contrast, moderates have 
been much more willing to take risks en route to a political settlement.  However, even in the 
case of moderates, their own reluctance to freeze and remove settlements while in a position of 
power has often called into question their commitment to realize this goal. 
 
The PLO and Fatah 
 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was organized following the first Arab 
summit meeting held by the Arab League in January 1964.
33
  Unwilling at that point to challenge 
Israel in a direct military confrontation, and wanting to place some control over any Palestinian 
national movements, the PLO would soon come into existence at the behest of the Arab League 
and the design of Gamal Abdul Nasser.
34
  The PLO was to serve as an umbrella organization to 
guerrilla groups whose objective was to ―liberate Palestine from its colonialist oppressors, the 
Zionists,‖ with ―armed struggle‖ as the method adopted to achieve this end.35  However, while 
the PLO may have ostensibly been committed to representing Palestinian national interests, it 
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was in truth designed to ―mollify and rein in those interests.‖36  This would soon change 
following the emergence of Fatah and the 1967 war. 
 Fatah was initially founded in the late 1950s by a group of Palestinian students in Cairo, 
of which Yasser Arafat was a part.  Meaning ―conquest‖, Fatah is an acronym whose letters in 
reverse stand for Harakat al-Tahir al-Falastini, or ―Movement for the Liberation of Palestine.‖37   
Following the 1967 war, Fatah experienced a meteoric rise as a result of two factors.  The first 
involved a recognition by many Palestinians that the Arab states were incapable of defeating 
Israel.
38
  The second factor, which helped reinforce the first, came as a result of the battle that 
took place in the Jordanian town of Karameh, in which Palestinian forces managed to inflict 
more than a hundred casualties on Israeli forces, forcing their eventual withdraw.  The event 
would take on mythic status amongst Palestinians as the ―Battle of Karameh,‖ and following it 
Fatah‘s popularity would explode. 39  Thousands of recruits would soon poor into its ranks, and it 
was not long before Fatah would join the PLO.
40
  As the largest and most popular Palestinian 
organization, Fatah would come to play a leadership role.  In 1969, Fatah leader Yasser Arafat 
would be elected the chairman of the Palestine National Council (PNC), becoming the new 
leader of the PLO.   
  
Rejectionist Groups 
 While Fatah comprised the largest and most powerful organization within the PLO, it still 
could not manage any form of direct control.  Fatah was a primes inter pares among a number 
other influential groups within the PLO, including: the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
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Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian People‘s Party (PPP), the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), 
the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), As-Sa‘eqa, the Palestine Democratic Union (Fida), the 
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF).   Further, 
following a split in the PFLP, the PLO would also come to comprise the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP/PDFLP), the Organization of Arab Palestine (OAP), and the 
PFLP General Command (PFLP-GC).
41
 
 Moreover, a number of these groups rallied to form what came to be known as a 
―Rejectionist Front‖ that rejected any compromise with Israel (meaning, any solution that 
stopped short of Israel‘s destruction).  The Rejectionist Front formed as a political coalition by 
radical Palestinian groups in 1974, rejecting the Ten Point Program adopted by the PLO that 
called for the establishment of a national authority on any piece of liberated Palestinian 
territory
42
 (which set the initial foundation for some form of compromise).   Important 
Rejectionist organizations included the PFLP, DFLP, As-Sa‘eqa, the Arab Liberation Front, and 
the Abu Nidal Organization. 
  
Contemporary Rejectionists:  Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
 As time progressed and the initial Rejectionist Front lost steam, two new groups of 
significance would emerge to fill the role of rejectionists and major competitors to Fatah‘s reign.  
The first and most significant is that of Hamas.  Meaning ―courage‖ or ―bravery‖, Hamas 
emerged in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada as the armed wing of the Sunni Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Palestinian Territories.  Hamas wed a Salvationist Islamist platform to the 
national struggle for Palestine, and rejected as un-Islamic any dealings with Israel and with 
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Jews.
43
  In time, Hamas would establish itself as the foremost competitor to the PLO.  Indeed, 
Hamas would eventually come to politically challenge Fatah and the PLO under their own 
institutions
44—the Palestinian Authority—creating what many now consider to be a ponderous 
obstacle to peace.  Hamas is well-armed, disciplined and organized.  They receive considerable 
popular backing and are generously funded, receiving an annual budget of tens of millions of 
dollars through Saudi Arabian channels, the Gulf States and the Iranian government.
45
 
 Additionally, Islamic Jihad provides another contemporary rejectionist group.  
Beginning as a radical, ideological offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad was 
founded by Dr. Fathi Shqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda, and advocates violence to end the Israeli 
occupation and bring forth the establishment of an Islamic state in place of Israel.  Unlike 
Hamas, though, Islamic Jihad is not simply a Palestinian group—elements of the Islamic Jihad 
have appeared in most Arab states, as well as some parts of the non-Arab Islamic world.  
However, both Islamic Jihad and Hamas share a similar position in their adversarial relationship 
with Fatah and the PLO.
46
  While not as large or well-funded as Hamas, Islamic Jihad still 
comprises a considerable threat to Israeli interests and an obstacle to the efforts of Palestinian 
moderates towards peace. 
 
Within-Case Episode #1: 1967-1977—Post-1967 War, a Strategy of 
Deterrence, ―Active Self Defense‖ and Punishment 
 Following the 1967 Six Day War, Israel found itself in possession of a number of new 
territories, amongst which included the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip—upon 
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which over one million Palestinians came under Israeli control.  Initially, few in Israel thought 
that this occupation of land would be permanent.
47
 For the Israelis, acquisition of such 
territory—with the exception of East Jerusalem—was initially seen as a bargaining chip for 
peace and recognition with neighboring Arab states.  The Arab states, however, were interested 
in no such peace.  In late August/early September 1967 at the Arab Summit in Khartoum, the 
Arab states declared the famous ―Three NOs‖ to Israel—no peace, no recognition, no 
negotiations, and that action should be taken to safeguard the right of the Palestinian people to 
their homeland.
48
  
 For the Palestinians, meanwhile, the outcome of the June 1967 war was a tragedy—it was 
now apparent that Arab states were not capable of liberating Palestinians or their land.  Emerging 
Palestinian NSTOs took charge of the situation and began to step-up acts of violence against 
Israel and Israeli targets abroad in order to inspire a ―popular revolution‖ that was hoped to bring 
an end to the ―Zionist regime‖.49  Further, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon moved to align with Syria 
to support the Palestinian ―war of liberation‖. Thus, Palestinian NSTOs would find following the 
1967 war new sources of arms acquisition, bases, platforms for penetration into Israel, direct 
operational support and funds.
 50
 
 A dramatic increase in Palestinian terrorism and guerilla warfare would thus begin.  
These acts of violence involved terrorism and guerrilla strikes against military and civilian 
targets within the Occupied Territories and Israel proper.  However, they would also include high 
profile acts of international terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets, such a plane hijackings, 
the hostage-taking and murder of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich, assaults/bombings upon 
Israeli embassies and tourists abroad, etc.   
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 Israel‘s response to increased violence and terror executed by Palestinian NSTOs was an 
enhancement of reprisal operations and the enactment of deterrent and preventative measures 
along its porous borders.  A strategy of deterrence plus punishment would thus come into play, 
whereby patrols and passive defense measures were hoped to deter attacks and reduce chances 
for violent success, meanwhile punitive retaliatory strikes and raids would be undertaken against 
Palestinian targets and Arab states providing sanctuary and serving as launching pads for 
terrorist attacks into Israel.  Israel would also move to erect a military government (MG) in the 
newly Occupied Territories, tasked with the responsibility of putting down any popular 
insurgencies.
51
 
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
    In the early stages of this episode, Jordan provided the primary staging ground for 
terrorist infiltrations into Israel and the Occupied Territories.  This made Jordan a primary target 
for isolating external support to Palestinian NSTOs.  Thus, Israel would target regular Jordanian 
Army units and Jordanian military/government structures, making it clear to Amman that a high 
price would be paid for continuing such support.  Eventually these retaliations lead to heavy 
exchanges of artillery fire, which became so serious that King Hussein demanded the cessation 
of terrorist activities in Jordan.
52
  Following the refusal of Palestinian NSTOs to do so, King 
Hussein launched a war against them, culminating in September 1970.  Israel‘s symmetric 
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reprisal actions against Jordan would thus contribute in a major way to the expulsion of terrorists 
from that country, and a subsequent near complete cessation of terrorist activity.
53
 
 Following the Jordanian war against Palestinian NSTOs—known as ―Black 
September‖—the PLO and associated organizations were forced to relocate to Lebanon.  There, 
under the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the PLO insurgents already freely occupied a portion of 
southern Lebanon; following their exodus from Jordan, some 15,000 Palestinian guerrillas would 
join their ranks in ―Fatahland‖.54  Terrorist incursions and rocket attacks from across the 
Lebanese border were soon thereafter stepped up against Israel.
55
   
 In attempting to stop assaults from Lebanon, Israel launched retaliatory strikes and raids.  
Israel also facilitated of the transfer of Lebanese Christian Maronite militiamen into the south of 
Lebanon to make penetration and assaults across the border more difficult.  In doing so, the 
Israelis linked their efforts with the dissident Lebanese army officer, Saad Haddad (a Greek 
Catholic).
56
  Saad‘s efforts to expand the range of his territory led to increased tensions with 
Palestinian forces, however, who were now returning to the south (from northern Lebanon) in 
accordance with the Cairo Agreement.  Clashes soon erupted, with Israel and Syria intervening 
to define unofficial spheres of influence in the country.
57
  In these circumstances, both Syria and 
Israel attempted to restrict the activities of Palestinian NSTOs (Syria‘s motivation was to 
preserve its control over Lebanon).  However, increasing tension and conflict would help create a 
situation where the PLO could build itself up and plan/launch attacks against Israel. 
 Israel‘s strategy regarding Lebanon—whereby it would place pressure on the state itself 
to crack down on Palestinian NSTOs through raids and incursions did not realize the same 
success as had transpired in Jordan.   Instead, Lebanon, a fractured state too weak to enforce law 
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and order in its own land, and riddled with ethnic/religious tensions, soon began a descent into 
turmoil, while Palestinian terrorist insurgents were free to train, organize and launch attacks into 
Israel.
58
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Overall, Israeli efforts at isolation of external/international support enjoyed some success.  
Through pressure from Israeli military coercion, Jordan—the primary base for terrorist attacks 
into Israel—was rendered inhospitable for Palestinian NSTOs.  However, any success that might 
have been enjoyed as a consequence of this was soon mitigated by sanctuary in an increasingly 
chaotic Lebanon, combined with ongoing extensive external/international support from Arab 
states, the USSR and China.  Palestinian NSTOs thus would soon enjoy all the safe haven and 
basing they would need, which combined with continued extensive external support allowed 
them to evade Israeli denial efforts and continue to launch attacks against the Jewish state.  Thus, 
despite some important gains, the level of isolation of external support for this episode is 
assessed as being ―Limited.‖ 
   
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 Following the June 1967 War, the PLO undertook a massive effort, involving training 
men and sending them back into the occupied West Bank to setup networks among the civilian 
population, and establish insurgent bands and bases.
59
  During this period, over 1,000 Palestinian 
insurgents were funneled into the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan.
60
  Israel worked quickly to 
smash such efforts, launching patrols and erecting anti-infiltration barriers, as well as utilizing 
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intelligence and mass arrests to uncover and imprison local networks.  These efforts, combined 
with an inability of Palestinian NSTOs to initially raise the necessary local popular support, 
made the conduct of insurgency dangerous and difficult.  As such, the Palestinian NSTOs would 
soon resort to basing and planning their operations beyond the 1967-ceasefire lines.  As 
mentioned in the section above, Jordan served as their initial substitute for conducting these 
operations, followed by Lebanon. 
 
Passive Defense 
 As time progressed, Israel moved to implement considerable countermeasures aimed at 
passive defense against assault from Palestinian NSTOs.  The first of these measures included 
the construction of a major border security system, eventually erected along all 531 kilometers 
(330 miles) of Israel‘s land borders.61  This border security system utilized a combination of 
physical obstacles and mobile military units, while implementing parallel barbed-wire fences, 
enclosed by minefields.
 62
  Another measure included the construction of public and residential 
shelters—in response to the firing of Katyusha Rockets across the borders of Jordan and 
Lebanon—with the goal of achieving 100% sheltering by 1975.  Further, around all border 
settlements and essential installations fences were erected and guarded by military reservists.  
Moreover, by 1970, civil defense reserve personnel were assigned guard detail of all public 
gathering sites and entertainment facilities.  Finally, in response to the frequent planting of 
improvised explosive devises (IEDs) by Palestinian militants, a national bomb disposal system 
was established by the police to assist in countering the threat, and was accompanied by a major 
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advertising campaign launched to increase public awareness about how to deal with such a 
threat.
63
 
 
Human Intelligence Provisions 
 In order to ensure a smooth flow of valuable human intelligence (HUMINT), the Israeli 
General Security Service (GSS) established in the Occupied Territories ―a sophisticated and 
efficient intelligence network, tightly connected to the operational arms‖ of the IDF/police.64  
The effectiveness of this intelligence network for providing actionable HUMINT was evidenced 
in a large number of terrorist cells exposed between 1967 and 1970, and the numerous arrests 
that followed.
65
  Indeed, this success at acquiring actionable HUMINT—enacted through Israeli 
agents and Palestinian collaborators—was even further aided by the Shin Bet, whose presence 
and efficacy was so great that its interrogators managed to achieve an 80% confession rate, 
thereby providing the necessary information to successfully prevent 90% of attempted terrorist 
actions.
66
 
 
―Active Self Defense‖ 
 In response to growing shellings/rocket attacks and incursions launched from neighboring 
Arab territory, Israel adopted a policy of ―active self defense‖.  This policy entailed large-scale 
joint operations across Israel‘s borders into Jordan and Lebanon in order to disrupt militant 
strongholds and conventional Arab state support structures.  Such operations also served as direct 
reprisals intended to deter continued support from neighboring Arab states, and to carry out 
―knock on door‖ operations, particularly in Lebanon, where Israeli forces sought out terrorist 
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hiding in southern Lebanese villages.
67
 Success, though, was somewhat limited in that few PLO 
men were killed, and most of their bases were soon re-established following the conduct of these 
operations.
68
  Perhaps even more problematically, these operations served to stir up internal 
tensions in Lebanon, thereby leading to a ―rehearsal‖ civil war in 1973.69 
 
Deterrence by Denial: Preventative Measures Against Acts of International Terrorism 
 With the growth of acts of international terrorism, Israel took a number of steps to 
implement passive security measures, including: security agents assigned to all El Al aircraft and 
to all official Israeli offices abroad; electronic detection devices installed in Lod Airport and 
Israeli buildings abroad; and the accompaniment by bodyguards of all Israeli official delegations 
going abroad for an international event.
70
  These Israeli countermeasures were largely 
preventative, however an exception entailed a long-range airborne raid on Entebbe, Uganda (July 
4, 1976) to rescue the hostages of a hijacked Air France plane.
71
 
 Regarding hostage taking situations, Israel generally adhered to a policy of not yielding 
to terrorist demands.  For incidents within Israel, Israel employed special military commando 
units to respond to terrorist strikes-in-process.  This procedure lead to a successful rescue of 
hostages hijacked in a Sabena airplane that was forced to land in Lod on May 9, 1972—though 
many of these operations ended in casualties among the hostages, inflicted by terrorists facing 
storming Israeli forces.
72
  Still, Israel‘s resolve to fight and try to rescue hostages taken, made 
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hostage-taking for Palestinian terrorists a difficult, suicide operation—a fact that saw Palestinian 
hostage-taking operations decrease dramatically after 1974.‖73 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 Overall, Israeli efforts at implementing denial enjoyed some important success in this 
episode.  Israeli countermeasures managed to reduce Palestinian raids into Israel proper, as well 
as reduce the number of successful attacks carried out against Israeli targets overseas.  Israel also 
successfully managed to prevent attempts by the PLO to start a popular insurgency in the 
Territories in the late 1960s, while employing effective HUMINT capabilities to root out 
Palestinian militants.  Still, Israel‘s ability to deny Palestinian NSTO‘s the ability to operate, 
accrue vital resources and evade Israeli security forces remained limited, especially given the 
ongoing presence of Lebanon as a major nearby sanctuary.  As a consequence, Israeli civilian 
casualties from acts of terrorism were soon back on the rise.  Thus, even despite effective Israel 
efforts, Israel‘s success at implementing denial is assessed as being ―Limited‖. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 Initially, Israel made attempts to isolate the emergence of popular support for insurgency 
within the Occupied Territories.  This began with the implementation of Defense Minister Moshe 
Dayan‘s ―open bridges policy‖.  From Dayan‘s perspective, instability in the West Bank would 
frustrate Israeli control, fuel Palestinian nationalism, and help swell the ranks of Palestinian 
NSTOs.  To help mitigate such circumstances, Dayan‘s policy would allow for West Bankers to 
continue crossing back and forth to Jordan to work, engage in commerce and visit relatives.  
Moreover, Israel would soon supplement the connection with Jordan, to one with Israel proper, 
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thereby allowing Palestinians to travel and take up work in all of historic Palestine.
74
  This 
opening of the Israeli labor market to Arab labor soon reduced unemployment in the Occupied 
Territories to nearly zero (98% employment)
75
; the objective being to decrease as much as 
possible the incentives of the local Palestinian population to take part in any insurgency.
76
  As 
Nadav Safran explains, the employment of Palestinians in Israel ―did not make the Israeli 
occupation acceptable, but it did give the majority of the population a vested interest in the 
avoidance of seemingly pointless trouble.
77
   
 In further keeping with these efforts to provide a less ―irksome‖ occupation unlikely to 
spurn on popular support for Palestinian NSTOs, Dayan looked to ensure adherence to a 
principle of minimal contact.  According to this principal, too much exposure to Israeli security 
forces would be abrasive for the population.  Dayan thus sought to co-opt Palestinian community 
leaders for running day-to-day activities in the Occupied Territories, so as to keep direct contact 
with the Israeli occupation to a minimum.
78
 
 
Shortcomings of Israeli Strategy to Isolate Popular Support 
 Despite working to co-opt communal leaders and various Palestinian collaborators, the 
Israeli government failed to foster any indigenous leadership acceptable to the Palestinians.  To 
make matters worse, Israel believed it to be possible to stamp out any sign of ―native‖ resistance 
to the occupation; thus any potential leader of Palestinian nationalism (regardless of how 
moderate) was deported or jailed, while ―restlessness‖ or collaboration with any nationalistic 
organization was punishable by administrative detention.
79
  Such actions served only to assist the 
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growing influence and success of the PLO in the Occupied Territories.
80
   Further, Israel‘s 
decision to implement an ―occupation tax‖ upon the population in the Territories, strictly 
enforced by threat and punishment did little to win support. 
 
Civilian Casualties and Collective/Administrative Punishment 
 Whatever its shortcomings, Israel‘s efforts at isolating popular support for Palestinian 
NSTOs was further undermined by several factors.  The first of these involved high civilian 
casualties following retaliatory strikes and operations launched under ―active self defense.‖  
While this occurred partially as a result of terrorist installations being nested within densely 
populated areas
81
, Israel was not overly concerned with minimizing the impact of such collateral 
damage—a point that directly fed into fueling hostile support against Israel. 
 In addition to civilian casualties, various forms of administrative (often interpreted as 
―collective‖) punishments were implemented against the Palestinian population.82  These 
included razing villages and population transfers, curfews, the defoliation of fields, and mass 
arrests followed by detention and interrogations.   Moreover, any Palestinian even suspected of 
nationalistic offenses against the Israeli occupation could be deported
83
, while any citizenship 
rights to the land resided on were denied apart from work and travel visas.   
 One of the most controversial forms of Israeli administrative punishment involved the 
demolition of homes of captured terrorists and collaborators (not to mention their families 
residing there), often referred to as ―neighborhood punishment.‖  As General Shlomo Gazit, 
tasked with heading the ―Unit for the Coordination of Operations in the Territories‖, explained: 
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The great advantage of administrative punishment is the rapidity of its implementation.  
In combating terrorism, a government cannot allow itself to wait...  In order to deter, a 
sanction must be visible immediately.  Blowing up terrorist homes is intended to achieve 
this purpose.  …blowing up his home the day after he was caught and obtained his 
confession—this is ―the pillar of fire‖ which everybody sees, listens to, and 
understands.
84
 
 
Unfortunately, while such strikes indeed served as a ―pillar of fire‖ that everyone saw and heard, 
the reaction tended to be less one of deterring acts of terrorism, and more that of raised public 
furor against the occupation and in support of Palestinian NSTOs. 
 
Settlements 
 Another issue that served to increasingly undermine Israeli attempts at isolating popular 
support for Palestinian NSTOs came in the form of its settlement policies.  Shortly after the 1967 
war, Israel soon began to establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the 
Golan Heights.  Initially, these were military settlements erected for security reasons.
85
  However 
it was not long before religious political parties like Gush Emunim and others began evoking 
religious and historical sentiments that involved a call for the absorption of the West Bank—or 
Judea and Samaria—as part of Eretz Yisrael.  Along these lines, official and unofficial civilian 
settlements began to spring up amongst existing Arab towns.  By 1977, approximately 85 such 
settlements had been established.  In addition to being in contravention of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention that prohibits the transfer of a civilian population into occupied territory
86
, the 
construction of these settlements served to raise the ire of Palestinians in the Territories, as well 
as question whether or not Israel‘s intention was to ever leave at all or was rather to annex and 
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colonize them (most tended to believe the latter).  Such sentiments obviously helped drive 
further support for Palestinian NSTOs. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 Israeli efforts at isolating Palestinian NSTOs from popular support enjoyed rather limited 
success.  Shortcomings of the Israeli strategy, combined with high civilian casualties, 
administrative and collective punishment, civilian transfers, mass arrests and interrogations, and 
the erection of settlements (in increasing numbers) undermined the Israeli position, and fueled 
popular support for Palestinian NSTOs.  However, Israel‘s attempts were not met with complete 
failure; its policies of ―open bridges‖ and ―minimal contact‖ kept tensions from sparking too 
high—thereby avoiding most open insurrection in the Occupied Territories during this episode.  
Isolation of popular support for this episode of strategic coercion is thus scored as ―limited‖. 
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome? 
 Additional significant factors did influence the outcome of this episode.  The first of 
these involved the crackdown in Jordan against Palestinian NSTOs.  While it is true that Israeli 
retaliatory strikes put pressure on the government in Amman, the ultimate reason for King 
Hussein‘s decision to oust Palestinian militants boiled down to the direct challenge such groups 
posed to his kingdom‘s very survival (and his own life).  Along these lines, King Hussein was 
driven to launch a major operation in September 1970 against Palestinian NSTOs operating in 
the Hashemite Kingdom.  During the course of this conflict, 3,000 Palestinian insurgents were 
killed and Palestinian NSTOs were expelled from the country.
87
  While a new sanctuary and 
primary headquarters for NSTO operations was quickly established in Lebanon, the Jordanian 
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war took a major toll on the manpower and morale of Palestinian NSTOs. It is thus not surprising 
that following this action taken by Amman, casualties from Palestinian acts of terrorism dropped 
dramatically in 1971.
88
   
 Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Iraq, a number 
of important events influenced Israel‘s efforts at strategic coercion against Palestinian NSTOs.  
The first involved the recognition of the PLO at the 1974 Arab League meeting as the ―sole, 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people‖89 thereby enhancing the legitimacy of NSTOs 
working under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization.  The second involved the 
global oil embargo implemented by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) to varying degrees against countries perceived as biased towards Israel.  These actions 
had a significant effect in shaping the positions of many states previously more supportive of 
Israel.
90
  The European Economic Community (EEC) for instance, soon thereafter publicly called 
at the UN General Assembly in 1974 for the recognition of the ―right‖ of the Palestinian People 
to express their national identity.  Indeed, by 1976 the EEC had come to endorse the French 
opinion that Palestinians had a right to their own homeland.
91
   
 The ultimate impact of such international recognition was a boom in legitimacy for the 
recognition of the Palestinian people, their right to self-determination, and the provision of a 
homeland, all of which bolstered the cause of Palestinian NSTOs, and the PLO in particular.  
This position, combined with a vastly growing membership in the UN General Assembly of 
post-colonial developing countries, lead to the UN General Assembly holding a full debate on 
the ―Question of Palestine‖ whereby Yasser Arafat was invited on November 13, 1974 to speak 
before the General Assembly—the first representative of a nonstate ever invited to do so.  These 
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actions paved the way for an opening of popular support and international legitimacy for 
Palestinian NSTOs. 
 
Additional Coercive Elements Employed: Punishment and Decapitation 
 As noted earlier, Israel employed a system of administrative punishment when support 
for nationalistic organizations was suspected.  This often involved destruction of homes for 
entire families, as well as the temporary closure or restrictions on Israel‘s ―open bridges‖ policy.  
Israel‘s top ministers such as Moshe Dayan were convinced that such punishment provided a 
deterrent effect
92
, however this is difficult to assess.  What is clear is that it certainly did not cur 
favor for the Israeli occupation, nor reduce popular support for Palestinian NSTOs. 
 Also mentioned earlier, Israel employed a strategy of punishment-based retaliation—
often targeted against neighboring states.  While this had a positive outcome in leading to the 
reining in of terrorist violence in Jordan, significantly less success was enjoyed in Lebanon, 
where the state simply did not have the strength or power do as Israeli punitive action demanded.  
Instead, Israeli punitive action helped to stir up conflict and chaos in the country, helping to pave 
the foundation for a civil war that would have negative ramifications for Israel.
93
  Additionally, 
following provocative retaliatory strikes, Israel tended to promote at least as much support 
(popular and international) as resentment for Palestinian NSTOs.   
 Israel also attempted to enact decapitation strikes against PLO leaders and operatives 
responsible for planning and carrying out terrorist acts.  Perhaps most famously conveyed in the 
2005 film Munich, these assaults were typically waged by Mossad agents in Europe and 
Lebanon.
94
   The ultimate effectiveness of such operations in disrupting the capacity for 
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Palestinian NSTOs to carry-out further attacks, however, is unclear.  What is clear is that any 
deterrent effect that was hoped for through such action was minimal, as acts of (and attempts at) 
international terrorism against Israeli targets continued regardless. 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 At the conclusion of this episode of strategic coercion, Israel found itself still confronted 
by a well-organized and dangerous terrorist organization.   Israel did enjoy some success in 
reining in violence through a combination of denial successes and the isolation of Jordan as a 
launching pad for Palestinian attacks.  As stated by Alon: ―Altogether, the Palestinian 
organizations carried out over 6839 operations from June 1967 to December 1978.  However, 
72.2 percent (4991) of the operations were carried out during the first three years.‖95  Despite this 
success, however, Palestinian NSTOs were able to maintain a high level of operations against 
Israeli targets.  And even after managing to eliminate Jordan as a safe haven for Palestinian 
NSTOs, Lebanon was quickly established as a replacement.   
 Violence thus continued at levels higher than might be regarded as ―acceptable‖ to the 
Israeli public, as is illustrated in figure 5.1: 
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Figure 5.1: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1967-1977
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Further, no headway was made toward achieving any sort of political resolution with the 
Palestinians.  Moreover, little isolation of popular support for Palestinian NSTOs was achieved, 
and Palestinian NSTOs remained unquestioningly committed to violence.  Some progress was 
made in that Israeli efforts at denial helped to force mainstream PLO groups (Fatah in particular) 
in 1974 to scale down their demands for a single ―secular, democratic‖ (read Palestinian) state in 
place of Israel, to consider a more realistic objective being the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank and Gaza.  However many Palestinian NSTOs rejected this position 
(forming a ―Rejectionist Front‖), and even the ones who accepted it were ambiguous about 
whether such a state would be their end goal, or merely a stepping stone along the path toward 
the creation of a single Palestinian state by force. Considering this, this episode of strategic 
coercion is assessed as one of ―limited success.‖    
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Within-Case Episode #2: 1977-1987—Likud Comes to Power, Full-scale 
Military Interventions in Lebanon 
 May 1977 saw the victory of Menachem Begin and his right-wing Likud coalition in the 
Israeli national elections.  Prime Minister Begin had no intention of relinquishing the West Bank 
(Judea and Samaria), and especially not East Jerusalem.  Begin‘s position was bolstered by ultra-
nationalists and ultra-religious parties, who similarly opposed trading ―land for peace‖.  This 
position would see a great expansion of Israeli settlement efforts.  By 1981, Begin oversaw the 
expansion of settlers to number some 110,000
97—and the expansion would steadily continue. 
 During this time period, Egypt and the United States would press Begin‘s government 
into peace accords at Camp David.  Begin and the Likud eventually played along, seeing a peace 
treaty with Egypt as enabling Israel to consolidate its control over the West Bank. Still, Israel 
would remain obstinate in the face of calls from both of these countries to seek a political 
resolution recognizing the ―legitimate rights‖ of the Palestinians. 
 Meanwhile in southern Lebanon, the PLO continued to build itself up, securing its 
position in the country while developing formidable military capabilities.  The PLO arsenal came 
to include heavy weapons and large formations of PLO forces (Israeli estimates placed the 
number of PLO fighters at 12,000 to 18,000).
98
  Using this new found military strength, the PLO 
consolidated their position in Lebanon, while launching dramatic raids into Israel along the 
Lebanese border and supporting ever-increasing clandestine militant operations within the West 
Bank.
99
  In doing so, the PLO had even reached a point of strength where threatened artillery 
assault upon Northern Israel had come to increasingly tie Israel‘s hands in launching retaliatory 
strikes or raids. 
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 This situation, combined with the arrival of the hawkish Begin, would soon witness a 
dramatic escalation in Israeli military operations.  Prior to 1977, most Israeli operations were 
limited in scale or confined to retaliatory raids.  However, Israel would soon engage in its first 
―war of choice‖ (at least since 1956), and for the first time initiate a war specifically targeted 
against Palestinian NSTOs, as opposed to neighboring Arab states.
100
     
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 During this episode, Israeli efforts at isolation of external/international support and denial 
closely overlapped.  Israel attempted to both isolate Palestinian access to Lebanon, while 
simultaneously attempting to deny the PLO the ability to operate, maintain vital resources and 
continue to evade Israeli security forces.  Both were achieved through increasing military 
interventions into southern Lebanon.  Considering this, actions aimed at providing for isolation 
of external/international support and denial are largely considered together during this episode. 
 By 1978, with Israeli civilian casualties rising, and the Israeli government now lead by 
the Begin, the comparative calm that had fallen over the Israel-Lebanese border since 1973 fell 
apart.  Accordingly, Israel would soon initiate an invasion into southern Lebanon in March 1978, 
code-named Operation Litani.  This Israeli incursion was the largest of its kind against 
Palestinian NSTOs, and was initiated with the objective of creating a buffer zone from its border 
up to the Lebanese Litani River.
101
  The operation was carried out primarily through the advance 
of Israeli infantry, however they met fierce resistance from entrenched PLO units that had been 
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building up strength
102—foreshadowing an increasing difficulty presented to Israel in 
undertaking limited operations aimed at dislodging and disrupting PLO positions. 
 Still, Israel managed to achieve some success through a combination of two outcomes.  
The first was cooperation with Lebanese Christian Maronite militias under command of Major 
Saad Haddad to carve out a buffer zone in the south.  The second was the arrival of UNIFIL 
(United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) to occupy additional territory north of Haddad‘s 
position.  The result was the creation of a buffer zone were all contiguity between the IDF and 
PLO was eliminated except for an eight-kilometer-wide section facing Beaufort Castle.  Further, 
through use of Israeli gunboats, the PLO could frequently be subjected to blockade.
103
 
 With loss of direct contact between the PLO and Israeli forces, clashes between Israel 
and the PLO would take on a new manifestation.  Israel‘s action took two main forms: 1) 
continuous artillery shelling of the Tyre and Nabatieh regions, combined with frequent air raids 
against Lebanon‘s coast strip; and 2) attacks by units advancing on foot, transported in by 
helicopters or boats.
104
  Both forms of Israeli action would soon be impaired by Palestinian 
resistance.  Regarding the first method, the PLO would retaliate in kind with their own artillery 
shelling, creating a war of attrition that displaced tens of thousands of Israelis in northern Israel.  
This counter-shelling and the disastrous consequences for Israel‘s northern civilian population 
led to an artillery ceasefire; however the PLO continued to organize terrorist and guerrilla 
assaults in the Territories, and slip terrorist guerrillas through the Lebanese border.
105
  
Meanwhile the PLO managed to continue to smuggle in arms—despite the efforts of the Israeli 
navy—and Israeli raids became largely ineffective due to the ever-strengthening position of the 
PLO. 
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Operation Peace for Galilee 
 By spring 1982, Israel moved to counter the situation with a full-scale assault, with plans 
laid for the invasion of Lebanon.  The rationale behind these plans was to: A) destroy the PLO 
and its infrastructure; B) secure the area up to 25 miles (40 km) north of Israel‘s border; and C) 
restore control of the ―legitimate‖ government over the country, preferably in the person of 
Bashir Gemayel, an ally of Israel.
106
  Israel put its plan to action, invading Lebanon on June 6, 
1982, following the shooting of Shlomo Argov, Israel‘s ambassador to London.  Operation 
Peace for Galilee was implemented in full-effect and marked the largest Israeli military 
operation ever targeted against Palestinian NSTOs.  Indeed, Israel‘s invasion force amounted to a 
total size of 120,000 men, 1,600 tanks, and 1,600 armored personnel carriers, combined with 
massive air and naval support.
107
   
 
Consequences for the PLO following Operation Peace for Galilee 
 The result of Israel‘s massive intervention was that evacuation of the PLO from Beirut on 
August 21, 1982.  This evacuation included the exodus of 10-12,000 members of the PLO, many 
of which would be dispersed to eight different countries.
108
  Meanwhile, a multinational 
peacekeeping force arrived in Beirut at the heels of the Palestinian NSTO evacuation.  Further, 
the PLO split badly, faced with mutual recriminations following the siege of Beirut, as many of 
Arafat‘s opponents blamed him for the defeat of Palestinian fighters and their withdrawal.  Syria 
and Amal (a loyal-Syrian Shi‘a insurgent organization) used the opportunity to thrust a 
weakened Arafat for good from Lebanon to Tunisia
109
; from there Arafat was forced to re-
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establish PLO headquarters 4800 kilometers away from Israel and the Occupied Territories, 
while the Lebanese parliament scrapped the Cairo Agreement.
110
 
 Moreover, along with Lebanon, the PLO lost two major assets.  These included a quasi-
autonomous political power base in Beirut and south Lebanon, and an integrated military 
complex maintained directly by the PLO.  As Yezid Sayigh states, ―The PLO enjoyed not only 
combat presence and administrative/logistical infrastructure but also geographical continuity 
internally, proximity to Israel externally, and the political and practical option of undertaking 
military action.‖111  By August 1982, this was now all lost to the PLO.   
 
Israel‘s Success in Lebanon Frustrated 
 The success of Israel‘s intervention in Lebanon, however, was not complete and would 
soon be frustrated.  Shortly following his election and victory, Bashir Gemayel—the loyal 
politician Israel hoped to ―help‖ place in office—was assassinated.  Further, the multinational 
force that had arrived to secure Beirut was soon forced to withdraw by acts of Lebanese suicide 
terror against a US Marine barracks and French contingent‘s compound.112  Meanwhile, as Amin 
Gemayel arrived on the scene to replace his father as president, he moved quickly to cancel the 
Lebanese accord with Israel, and mended fences with Syria, allowing for its continued military 
occupation in Lebanon.  In this environment, Israel‘s Christian allies in the Maronites and the 
Phalange were unable to re-establish their former control over the country, and began distancing 
themselves from the Jewish state.
113
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 Furthermore, Israel would find itself confronted with a new threat arising from its 
attempts to impose control over a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.  This would come from 
NSTOs organized by Lebanon‘s southern Shi‘a population.  Ironically, the Shiites and southern 
Lebanese initially welcomed Israeli troops, hoping for them to dislodge the PLO.
114
  However, 
following IDF disregard for their property, traditional economic patterns, and policies that 
seemed designed to incorporate them into the Israeli economy, combined with high civilian 
casualties for Israeli operations in southern Lebanon, these Shi‘a began organizing into 
resistance movements targeted at Israeli forces and their allies.  Amongst these were the Shi‘a 
NSTOs Hezbollah (―Party of God‖) and the Amal (―Hope‖) Movement, which were supported 
and funded by Syria and Iran.
115
 
 Faced with fierce assaults, aided by suicide bombings in Lebanon, the IDF soon 
redeployed to a smaller security zone south of the Awali River to reduce insurgent infiltration.  
However even this position proved tenuous to defend; by June 1985, Israeli troops would 
withdraw from Lebanon to a small border zone.  From here, Israel would manage to create 
enough depth to successfully reduce artillery and rocket attacks on Northern Israel—though this 
would come at the cost of the death of numerous IDF servicemen.   
 
PLO Reorients and Rebuilds 
 Denied considerable military, political and logistical capacity, dispersed across the region 
and left to the mercy of Syria and hostile dissident factions such as Abu Nidal, the surviving 
PLO under Yasser Arafat began to reorient itself.   Despite its losses and the severe 
disadvantages of operating in exile, Fatah retained its majority following amongst 
                                                 
114
 David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of 
Martyrdom Operations, London: Praeger, 2007, 22. 
115
 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 2
nd
 Ed., New York: 
Routledge, 2008, 44-45. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
196 
Palestinians.
116
    In Lebanon, meanwhile, it managed to send back in a steady flow of guerrillas, 
leadership cadres and military supplies by sea (despite the Israeli naval blockade), rebuilding the 
strength of the PLO in the Sidon region to an estimated 10,000.   By the late 1980s, Arafat was 
able to reassert his control over the PLO, and enjoyed tremendous support among Palestinians in 
Lebanon; indeed, fully 90% of Fatah‘s fighters were born and bred in Palestinian refugee camps 
in Lebanon.
117
   
 With this re-established strength, Arafat looked to resume PLO terrorist strikes against 
Israel.    While no longer able to field heavy weaponry or plan and launch operations on the same 
scale, the PLO now began to launch terrorist raids into Israel and supported clandestine military 
activity in the Occupied Territories, all the while continuing to reconstruct a modest military 
capability in Lebanon.
118
   
 
Assessment Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 By the mid-point of this episode, Israel managed to greatly isolate external/international 
support for Palestinian NSTOs in displacing them from their sanctuary in Lebanon.  However, 
Israeli efforts to install a friendly government, and a buffer-zone enforced by a multinational 
taskforce were for naught, while Israel itself was pushed back by emerging Shi‘a NSTOs.  
Moreover, by the end of this episode, the PLO was able to rebuild itself in Lebanon to a 
respectable degree.  Still, even considering these facts, Israel managed to greatly weaken the 
PLO and its ability to base itself in important external sanctuaries.  Isolation of 
external/international support is thus assessed as ―limited‖. 
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Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 As noted earlier, actions aimed at denial and isolation of external/international support 
overlapped.  Information in the previous section can thus be used to form an assessment of the 
degree of denial achieved.  That being said, at the conclusion of the 1977-1987 episode of 
strategic coercion, Israel had made some important gains in implementing denial against 
Palestinian NSTOs in general, and the PLO in particular.  Despite initial setbacks, Israel was able 
to significantly dislodge and weaken the PLO‘s capacity to conduct violent operations against 
Israel following Operation Peace for Galilee, and subsequent efforts while maintaining a 
security zone in Lebanon.  However, the PLO—even with its primary leadership in exile in 
Tunis—would still manage to gradually return and resume terrorist strikes.  Still, the PLO‘s 
capacity to assault Israel remained greatly diminished.  Considering this, combined with ongoing 
deterrent measures that continued to effectively make Israeli targets more difficult to strike, a 
major reduction in the PLO‘s access to vital resources and ability to operate, denial for this 
episode is assessed as ―significant‖. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of Isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 Pressured by the Jimmy Carter Administration and President Sadat of Egypt under to the 
context of the Camp David Accords, Menachem Begin‘s Likud government was forced into the 
position to make some concessions regarding the question of Palestinian rights.  The result was 
that for the first time during the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an Israeli government agreed 
within the Camp David meetings that any solution to the conflict must acknowledge the 
―legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.‖119  Begin, furthermore, 
agreed to negotiate with Palestinian representatives over the future of the Occupied Territories; 
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though this position was greatly hedged in that he specified that he would only be willing to 
consider a limited five-year period of autonomy. 
 Begin was unable, however, to gain Egyptian agreement to any autonomy scheme—
especially following Sadat‘s assassination.  The Likud government thus decided to implement its 
own version of Palestinian autonomy.  On November 8, 1981, Begin‘s government announced 
the creation of a separate civilian administration designed to handle all local concerns in the 
West Bank, while the military government in operation since 1967 was abolished.  In truth, 
though, this move was effectively an act of thinly veiled subterfuge, as the Israeli government 
remained in control in the West Bank, with civilian officials subordinate to them.  In the words 
of Charles Smith, ―The only difference was that the military authority was now situated in Israel 
rather than centered in the West Bank.‖120  Meanwhile, Israel staffed the supposed Palestinian 
self-governing authority with collaborators.  The result was the construction of local village 
leagues that were given legislative powers, excluding the election of mayors and village officials.  
Israel hoped that in controlling patronage and the power to issue permits that these leagues 
would be able to win support.
121
  The result instead was a strong arousal of Palestinian resistance 
to these actions.  Israel‘s response was to respond with an ―iron fist‖. 
 
Excessive Palestinian Civilian Casualties 
 Excessive civilian casualties of Palestinians in Operation Peace for Galilee and after did 
little to help Israel isolate Palestinian NSTOs from popular support.  During its bombardment of 
Beirut, Israel caused thousands of civilian casualties in Lebanon, and the situation did not 
improve in the land invasion that followed.  The end result was a flood of support for Palestinian 
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militant activities launched by NSTOs—indeed, as mentioned earlier, fully 90% of Fatah‘s 
militants were born and bred in these affected areas.
122
   
 
Problematic Aspects of the Israeli Occupation in the Territories 
 As time progressed, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza yielded a number 
of detrimental results.  While the occupation may have initially begun with an economic boom, 
by the end of this episode circumstances had seriously worsened.  Extensive social and economic 
dislocation had resulted largely as a consequence of Israeli policy, stemming from over 1,300 
military regulations governing most aspects of Palestinian life.
123
  Meanwhile land 
expropriations by the Israeli government placed 53% of the West Bank and 35-42% of the 
crowded Gaza Strip under Israeli ownership.  Israeli water policies reduced resources for Arab 
agriculture, with 431 of 720 Arab wells closed in the West Bank, and the area under Arab 
cultivation declining from 260,000 hectares (in 1967) to 160,000 hectares (in 1987).  
Correspondingly, the same period witnessed a drop in the number of industrial establishments in 
the West Bank from 7,300 to 2,991.
124
  And under-financed public investment policies in the 
Territories wreaked havoc on Palestinian infrastructure.
125
  The Israeli ―iron fist‖ policy further 
exacerbated matters by brutally cracking down with punishments—including administrative 
detentions, house demolitions, deportation and school closings—for any unrest demonstrated. 
 
Settlement Expansion 
 Following the arrival of Menachem Begin, Israeli settlement expansion began in earnest.  
The new Likud government provided for this by working in lock-step with newly formed settler 
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organizations to cultivate willing individuals to partake in such settlement.  The Israeli 
government helped provide encouragement for settlement, moreover, through offering an array 
of incentives, including tax breaks, grants and low-interest loans.
126
  To provide land for these 
settlements, Israeli authorities designated over two million dunams (500,000 acres) to be 
acquired in the Territories—roughly 40% of the total land area.  Appropriations were enacted by 
the Israeli government through arbitrary declarations of ―state land‖ over large tracts (regardless 
of existing title), with the stipulation that the land could be turned over to Israeli settlers in three 
weeks if Arab claimants could not prove ownership in the allotted time (a prospect that was 
highly unlikely).  Judgment over the status of ownership, furthermore, was made by military 
tribunals within the Territories, with no further recourse to a plaintiff.
127
   
 Settlements were often established, moreover, in a very abrasive fashion.  These 
settlements were not built to fit in, but to stand out, in the words of James Gelvin, ―like the 
Crusader fortresses of old.‖128  Settlers would often act with little respect for local inhabitants, 
often enjoying impunity behind the guard of the IDF.  Suffice it to say, not only did these 
settlements arouse furor among the Palestinian population, they also made any hope of realizing 
a Palestinian state seem increasingly less likely. 
 
Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camp Massacres 
 One of the most egregious acts undermining isolation of popular support transpired 
between September 15 and 18, 1982.  During this period, shortly following the assassination of 
Bashir Gemayel, Israel had re-entered West Beirut to ―keep the peace.‖  However, in an area 
then-controlled by the Israelis, Christian Phalangists bent on avenging the death of their leader 
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(Bashir) were permitted to enter the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.
129
  What ensured was a 
fearful massacre of hundreds of Palestinians—the majority of which were women and 
children.
130
 
 The Israeli military did not make matters any better when the IDF rejected claims that the 
Phalange entered the camps without the assistance or even knowledge of the Israeli command.  
This position was not tenable, however, and the Kahan Commission found Israeli officials—in 
particular Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan—indirectly responsible for the massacre.131  Still the 
damage had been, and Israel was in a position where little more could have vilified it to 
Palestinians.  
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support  
 By the end of this episode of strategic coercion, not only had Israel failed to achieve any 
isolation of popular support for Palestinian NSTOs, it had helped fuel it onward.  Along with 
primary political grievances remaining poorly addressed, excessive violence and 
collective/administrative punishment in full effect, and new significant grievances emerging, the 
degree of isolation of popular support in this episode of Israeli strategy is assessed as ―backfire.‖ 
 
Assessment Question 5: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?  
 Several additional factors did have some influence on the outcome of this episode.  First, 
pro-Syrian PLO factions were keen to undermine the influence of Arafat and Fatah in Lebanon.  
Following the Israeli invasion, these factions launched a civil war within the organization, 
greatly weakening the PLO and factions loyal to Fatah.  In so doing, these Syrian-backed rebel 
groups played a major role in ensuring that not only was the PLO expelled from Beirut, but 
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Lebanon all together.
132
  Thus, while the Israeli military intervention forced the PLO to evacuate 
from Beirut, the Syrian backed Palestinian civil war saw the PLO forced into exile across a broad 
geographic region thousands of miles away, while losing physical contact with Palestinian 
communities in Lebanon and Syria.
133
 
 While these actions initially helped to weaken the PLO and Fatah, they would—
ironically—help strengthen Fatah‘s position in the PLO in the end.  Six years following their 
expulsion, Fatah remained the central force within the PLO.  Indeed, as Syrian-backed 
opposition groups came to be discredited as puppet organizations, Arafat and Fatah‘s position 
had been strengthened to the point where they (and Arafat in particular) became the sole leader 
and ultimate decision-maker of the PLO.  This outcome would play a significant role in allowing 
Arafat to begin to moderate the PLO‘s policy, and begin undertaking a more serious 
investigation of diplomatic options leading to a settlement with Israel.
134
 
 
Shi‘a NSTOs – Amal and Hezbollah 
 During Operation Peace for Galilee, Israeli heavy-handedness in absence of any sort of 
―hearts and minds‖ strategy helped serve as the catalyst for the emergence of Hezbollah—a 
radical Islamic umbrella organization—and the strengthening of Amal, which were bent on 
driving the IDF out of Lebanon through the use of terrorism and guerrilla tactics.  Supported by 
Iran and Syria, these organizations would put up fearsome resistance against Israeli efforts to 
secure Lebanon from NSTOs targeting Israel.  Terrorist acts by these groups proved formidable, 
as they would be the first to employ a strategy of suicide bombing against the IDF, resulting in 
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Israel‘s retreat to the South Lebanese Security Zone (leaving Lebanon free once again for 
terrorist organizations to operate).
135
 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 Despite setbacks, Operation Peace for Galilee and subsequent Israeli denial efforts in 
Lebanon did significantly weaken the PLO‘s operational capacity.  The PLO were driven from 
Beirut, and Israeli action served as the catalyst that saw PLO forces driven from Lebanon.  
Accordingly, violence levels were reduced to relatively ―acceptable‖ levels as demonstrated in 
the figure 5.2: 
Figure 5.2: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1977-1987
136
 
 
  In wake of this weakened position (as well as with his hands freed from more radical 
dissident factions that had now been discredited), Arafat was both compelled and placed in the 
position to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 343—which entailed the acceptance 
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of the ―sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence‖ of Israel—as well as UN 
General Assembly Resolution 181 accepting a two-state solution to the conflict, and he began 
pursuing diplomatic options towards the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state in the 
Occupied Territories in joint efforts with Jordan.
137
 
 Still terrorist assaults on Israel would continue, whether at the hands of dissident factions, 
or PLO raids.  The PLO—and Fatah in particular—enjoyed continual and increasing popular 
support, and managed to regroup and rebuild itself to an extent, including the re-establishment of 
a presence in Lebanon.  Meanwhile, under the Premiership of Shimon Peres (who had succeeded 
Yitzhak Shamir following the departure of Begin), Israel considered negotiations with a Joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (excluding PLO elements).  Even this, however, was dismissed 
out of hand by the Likud.   Thus despite some political movement on the part of Arafat, no 
ground providing for real political resolution was gained.  This episode is thus assessed as being 
one of ―moderate success‖ or stalemate.  However, with Palestinian tension in the Occupied 
Territories reaching a boiling point, it would not be long before even this degree of Israeli 
success was soon undermined.   
 
Within-Case Episode #3: 1987-1991— The First Intifada 
 Despite the ―moderate success‖ level enjoyed in the previous episode of strategic 
coercion, tensions were left ready to burst, given the complete backfire in flawed Israeli attempts 
to isolate popular support.  By 1987, an entire generation of Palestinian youth had grown up 
under an increasingly oppressive occupation, and they had lost faith that either the Arab 
governments (defeated in 1967 and 1973) or the PLO (which had been weakened following its 
exile from Lebanon) could succeed in securing Palestinian self-determination.  For Palestinians 
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in the Occupied Territories, moreover, no sector of the Palestinian economy or part of the 
Palestinian landscape remained untouched by the ongoing occupation, and Israel continued to 
expropriate land in the Territories for ―military training,‖ ―public needs,‖ and even nature 
preserves.
138
  The economic benefits that the Palestinians had initially benefited from under the 
occupation had all but disappeared, leaving the Palestinians with structural underdevelopment, 
and unemployment running at 50-60%.
139
  Unrest was rising and fast. 
 The spark that ignited the Intifada took place in December 1987, following the accidental 
death of four Palestinians caused by an IDF tank-transport collision with a truck bringing back 
Palestinian workers from Israel.
140
   The eruption of the Intifada caught the Israeli government 
by surprise.  Israeli authorities had not predicted a looming civilian revolt, and considered cases 
of nationalist defiance to be individual undertakings.
141
  Even after the initial outbreak of the 
Intifada, Israeli leaders were slow to recognize the challenge posed by it, and slower still to 
respond accordingly.  However, the Intifada soon became organized under the United National 
Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU)—swiftly co-opted by Yasser Arafat and the PLO—and 
Palestinians began engaging in various forms of civil disobedience and organized boycotts 
against Israeli products and employers.
142
  Their efforts at organized civil disobedience began to 
win tremendous support in the Territories, the region and internationally—while Israeli 
responses were met with international outrage.    Arafat would use this political outcome to help 
leverage his position of pursuing a political settlement.  
 In the backdrop of this, terrorist assaults against Israeli civilians would continue.  
Meanwhile, the PLO were able to exploit both Israel‘s preoccupation with the Intifada in the 
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Occupied Territories, as well as Israel‘s struggle to maintain a foothold in southern Lebanon in 
the face of suicide terror and guerrilla assaults perpetrated Lebanese Shi‘a NSTOs (particularly 
Hezbollah), in order to fully replenish its military strength in Lebanon by 1990.
143
 
 
Emergence of Palestinian Radical Islamic NSTOs 
 To exacerbate matters, radical Islamic NSTOs were now emerging within the Occupied 
Territories as well, inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 and the successes of Hezbollah 
against the IDF.  These two groups involved the arrival of two highly radical organizations, 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas.  For both, the objective was to not only to end Israeli occupation, but 
to establish an Islamic Arab state in place of Israel.
144
  In working towards this goal, Hamas was 
the recipient of exceedingly hefty sums of international financial support particularly from the 
Gulf states, the Saudi royal family, and Iran.
145
  Indeed, Hamas would emerge during this time 
period as a competitor to the PLO and PLO-dominated UNLU. 
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 During this episode of strategic coercion, Israel‘s ability to affect any substantial isolation 
of external and international support was significantly constrained on two ends: 1) Israel‘s 
ongoing efforts to maintain its thin security zone in southern Lebanon in the face of considerable 
pressure from Shi‘a NSTOs; and 2) Israel‘s efforts to pacify the Intifada which had exploded in 
the Occupied Territories.  The Intifada, moreover, had some important consequences for 
international support for the political cause championed by the Palestinians and the PLO. 
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 Prior to the outbreak of the Intifada, the Palestinian cause had found itself increasingly 
slipping into decline in attention—both regionally and internationally.  Indeed, following the 
1988 Amman summit, the Palestinian issue had been relegated to its lowest point in the annals of 
the Arab League.
146
  However the eruption of the Intifada swiftly changed this situation, with the 
Palestinian issue quickly returning to the forefront of Arab concerns.  Following the subsequent 
meetings of the Arab League, the PLO was promised an immediate boost of $128 million, with 
an additional $43 million a month for the remainder of the year (1988).
147
  Iraq too would 
individually grant increasing financial aid to Arafat, while allowing for the basing of Fatah 
armed units there.
148
  Meanwhile, the PLO would experience a marked improvement in relations 
with three important neighbors: Jordan, Egypt and Syria. 
 In Jordan, King Hussein ceased his competition with the PLO for influence in the West 
Bank, moving to formally renounce Jordanian responsibility for, and claims of, sovereignty over 
the Territory.
149
  Further, following a subsequent warming of relations between King Hussein 
and the PLO, the embassy of the State of Palestine was opened in Amman, providing the PLO 
with a new freedom of action on Jordan‘s soil that enhanced Arafat‘s capability for directing 
political action in the Occupied Territories, while promoting his control of the Intifada.
150
  Syria, 
meanwhile was forced to move towards at least a partial reconciliation with the PLO, while 
forcing its client Palestinian NSTOs to soften and/or mute their rhetorical attacks on the 
dominant Palestinian NSTO, the PLO.
 151
  Perhaps most importantly, the magnification of the 
PLO‘s position in relation to the Intifada pressured Assad to issue the directive to lift the Shi‘a 
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Amal militia‘s siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon152, while allowing Palestinian 
commanders back into the Tyre region for the first time since 1982.
153
  Indeed, in Lebanon, the 
PLO was able to restore its strength in Lebanon to over 11,000 trained PLO militants.
154
 
 Perhaps most straining for Israel, however was the pressure from the United States that 
was demonstrating increasing concern over Israel‘s handling of the Intifada.  The Intifada had 
compelled the US to activate sustained diplomatic engagement, not seen since the Camp David 
talks of 1979, with Secretary Shultz making numerous visits to the region. Indeed, the position of 
the US government began to take up the position that the peace process could not be advanced 
without the engagement of the PLO. 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 By the end of this episode, Israeli efforts at implementing isolation of external support for 
Palestinian NSTOs and their political cause was faltering.  Political and diplomatic support were 
at an all time high for the Palestinian national movement, new funds were issued to the PLO 
from supporting Arab countries while the issue of Palestine was moved to the top of the agenda, 
Israel‘s most important ally began to place pressure on it for political movement contrary to its 
desires, and the PLO was able to reconstitute itself and consolidate its position once again in 
Lebanon.  Still, it is difficult to assess this episode as one where Israel‘s efforts to enact an 
isolation of external support rank as ―failure‖ or worse—despite the increase in support for the 
PLO following the outbreak of the Intifada, Israel managed to prevent (whether through 
deterrence, negotiated agreements, or its security zone in Lebanon) any neighboring state from 
serving as a launching pad into Israel.  For this episode, isolation of external/international 
support is thus assessed as ―limited‖. 
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Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 During this episode, Israeli efforts to implement denial against Palestinian NSTOs mainly 
centered upon efforts to put down the Intifada, which the Israeli government believed to be 
sustained by members of Palestinian NSTOs—namely the PLO and their involvement through 
the UNLU.  It should be pointed out that Israel benefited during this time period from a cessation 
of the targeting of Israeli civilians by the Fatah-lead PLO, in accordance with Arafat‘s February 
1989 Geneva declaration.  However, Israel would still have its hands full: in attempting to put 
down the Palestinian popular uprising, the IDF was placed in the unfamiliar position of initiating 
a policing mission—something it was not prepared for.155   Undertaking this policing mission 
was a new and difficult experience for the IDF, however, undermined by a lack of greater 
strategic guidance from Israel‘s political leadership.  This issue was even further complicated by 
lack of specific training provided to prepare soldiers to undertake this new mission.
156
 
 Meanwhile during the Intifada, Israel attempted to maintain its capacity for cracking 
down on and implementing denial against Palestinian NSTOs.  In doing so, the IDF tried 
restricting Palestinian movement to quell riots in order to facilitate the movements of IDF troops, 
Israeli border police (Magav units) and GSS agents around the Territories.  However, with the 
uprising in full effect, Israeli security personnel found it increasingly difficult to undertake 
preventative and retaliatory operations against Palestinian NSTOs, as they became vulnerable 
and subjected to rock and Molotov cocktail throwing (not to mention physical and human 
barricades all over the Territories).
157
  At the same time, vital intelligence for conducting denial 
operations was being undermined.  Following the resignation of massive numbers of Palestinian 
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civil administrators and the public recantation of collaborators and informers that followed the 
outbreak of the Intifada, the Israeli intelligence network in the Territories took a severe hit.
158
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 During this episode Israel‘s capacity to effectively carry-out denial operations was 
increasingly undermined in the Territories, with the IDF enjoying only limited success in putting 
down the Intifada, and the PLO re-establishing its strength in Lebanon.  Still, Israeli 
countermeasures held to prevent or deter most significant acts of terrorism from NSTOs 
unwilling to abide by Arafat‘s Geneva declaration to renounce violence against civilians, and 
border infiltrations and attacks were kept to a minimum. In light of this information, the level of 
denial is assessed as ―limited‖. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 Following the previous episode of strategic coercion, popular support—whether for 
Palestinian NSTOs, violence, or general civil disorder—was exploding.  Under Rabin‘s ―Iron 
Fist‖ policy, widely unpopular actions were carried over into this episode of Israeli strategy, 
including deportations, house demolitions, collective curfews and press censorship.
159
  Within 
the first eight weeks of the Intifada, Israeli heavy-handedness in putting down the uprising 
resulted in the death of 38 Palestinians, as well as the imprisonment without trial (under 
indefinite administrative detention) of many others.  As the next year (1988) progressed, more 
than 150 Palestinians would be killed, and more than 11,500 wounded—almost two-thirds of 
which were children under 15 years of age.  Indeed, the death rate of rock-throwing Palestinian 
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children was six times the annual per capita death rate of American soldiers in Vietnam.
160
  
Adding to these unpopular fatalities, Israel often targeted high profile activists/organizers in the 
Intifada for liquidation. 
 While Israel would attempt to rein in excessive violence within six weeks of the 
Intifada’s outbreak, their new rules for engagement often proved difficult to implement.  This 
combined with Defense Minister Rabin‘s policy of ―force, might and beatings‖ that employed 
plastic and fiberglass truncheons because wooden ones shattered too frequently on Palestinian 
bodies did little to win away any popular support within the Occupied Territories.
161
  Frequent 
deaths from the employment of plastic bullets—within the first 5 months of the implementation 
of plastic bullets, 47 Palestinians were killed as a result and 288 suffered serious injury—only 
exacerbated the situation.
162
 
 Matters only worsened with the ever-declining morale of IDF troops, which lead to a loss 
of self-control, restraint and professionalism of soldiers in the Occupied Territories.  The result 
was that ―shooting deaths of Palestinian youths sometimes occurred as visceral reactions by 
soldiers to stone throwing and other incidents.‖163  And similar to the British in Northern Ireland, 
any attempt to pass along clear rules of engagement (RoE) for IDF troops dealing with rioters 
was difficult to achieve given the reluctance of the top brass to pass along unambiguous 
guidelines.
164
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Administrative/Collective Punishment, House Demolitions, Settlements and Other Provocative 
Israeli Policies 
 To exacerbate matters, the Israeli implementation of administrative and collective 
punishments remained in full swing.  The first of these involved administrative detention; a 
process that saw about 175,000 Palestinians pass through Israeli jails during the Intifada, where 
some 23,000 thousand were subjected to ―harsh interrogation‖ techniques.165  Regarding house 
demolition, some two thousand Palestinian homes were destroyed as punishment, with 
demolitions stepped up following the uprising.  To crush the tax revolt, Israel would often raid 
shops, camps and villages, as well as seize automobiles at checkpoints.
166
  Nor were the Israelis 
reluctant to implement various forms of collective punishment.  Throughout the Intifada, the 
Israel government would often cut off electricity and telephone communications, impose limits 
on money being brought from Jordan, ban agriculture harvesting and commerce and impose 
general economic restrictions.  However, perhaps most abrasive to the Palestinian community 
involved curfews of whole villages and cities, and closures of schools and universities.
 167
    
Overall, it was estimated that the standard of living in the territories following the Intifada had 
plummeted another 40%.
168
 
 Meanwhile, to exacerbate matters further, the Israeli government continued its policy of 
establishing and expanding settlements, while expropriating Palestinian property and 
encouraging Israeli citizens to move into the Occupied Territories.  By 1987, Israel had 
expropriated over 55% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip, and it continued to expand 
its grasp.
169
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Shamir Unsuccessfully Attempts to Win Some Palestinian Support 
 Prime Minister Shamir attempt to defuse the situation somewhat by proposing elections 
aimed at selecting individuals to participate in negotiations towards an interim settlement.  This 
effort failed miserably, however, for several reasons.  The Palestinians were not allowed to vote 
for anyone with ties to the PLO, and Shamir clearly stated that the outcome of negotiations 
would preclude Palestinian self-determination and an independent Palestinian state.  At best, 
Shamir was only willing to countenance autonomy (not including security control) as an 
outcome of these negotiations.  Little support for either the elections or the Israeli government 
was won as a result.                       
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 This episode was clearly marked by ―backfire‖ in Israeli attempts to isolate popular 
support for Palestinian NSTOs.  Clearly, popular support for Palestinian NSTOs increased; 
primary grievances remained (very) poorly addressed; excessive violence and collective 
punishment were present in full force; and new significant grievances were continuing to emerge 
following harsh Israeli crackdowns. 
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome? 
 Additional significant factors affecting the outcome of this episode were few.  Perhaps 
the most important dealt with an Israeli decapitation strategy against ―hard-core‖ activists 
helping to organize the Intifada.  In implementing this strategy, the Israeli military targeted 700 
―bingos‖ identified by their ID card numbers.170  Israel also organized direct assassinations 
through the Israeli Secret Service, the Shin Bet, Sayeret Matkal and ―units of Arabists‖ whose 
task was to ―go after individual suspects and arrest or kill them‖ by infiltrating local populations 
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in the Arab territories while in Arab guise.
171
  It is unclear to what extent such a strategy affected 
the situation in the Territories, but it clearly did little to help put down the Intifada or win any 
popular (or international) support for the Israel. 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 By the end of this episode, Israel had made little progress in bringing an end to the 
violent campaigns waged by Palestinian NSTOs.  A full-scale popular uprising remained in 
effect, meanwhile acts of terrorism continued and even increased, with casualties continuing as a 
result of violence organized by Palestinian NSTOs.  Figure 5.3 illustrates this: 
 
Figure 5.3: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1988-1991
172
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Meanwhile, any tangible political resolution remained a long way off.  During this episode, 
Israel did not engage in negotiations with Palestinian NSTOs—indeed, the Israeli government 
under Prime Minister Shamir maneuvered as best it could to avoid them.  In 1988, a group of 
American Jews met with PLO representative Khalid al-Hassan to announce a joint statement. 
Dubbed the Stockholm Declaration, it stated that the PNC recognized Israel as a state and 
rejected terrorism in all its forms.   Arafat confirmed the position at the General Assembly in 
Geneva, where he disavowed terrorism
173
  (though this was not necessarily the case for all the 
component groups of the PLO). Shamir, however, was not impressed, claiming Arafat‘s move to 
be a ―monumental act of deception,‖ while proclaiming, ―We are not ready and will never be 
ready to talk to the PLO.‖174   
 Still, this episode was not a total failure.  Violence levels from terrorist attacks were 
generally kept from exploding out of control, and the Fatah-lead PLO was increasingly 
recognizing that Israel could deny Palestinian NSTO success enacted through terrorist 
violence—the outcome being Arafat‘s renunciation of terrorism in late-1988 and his continued 
push for diplomatic initiatives.  This episode of strategic coercion is thus assessed as a ―limited 
success.‖ 
 
Within-Case Episode #4: 1991-2000—The Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords, 
Peace Process and its Collapse 
 While the Intifada was beginning to lose steam at the beginning of this episode, it had 
made a huge impression on the Israeli public.  Combined with the awareness of the rise of radical 
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Islamic groups, Israeli public opinion began to shift in favor of finding more sustainable paths to 
peace that involved engagement with the Palestinians.  Under pressure, Prime Minister Shamir 
agreed to partake in the Madrid Conference in 1991.  This peace conference (chaired by 
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev) involved negotiations amongst Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon 
and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.  Under these auspices, a number of formal rounds of 
negotiations would subsequently take place in Washington.  Little tangible progress towards 
peace would be made, however, with Shamir resisting any direct dialogue with the PLO. 
 However, with the public mood increasingly favoring compromise with the Palestinians, 
the Israeli elections in 1992 saw Yitzhak Rabin and the Labour Movement come to power.  This 
resulted in a series of goodwill overtures by Rabin that would eventually see engagement in 
secret channels in Oslo, with Rabin and Labour accepting the principle of ―land for peace‖ with 
the Palestinians.
175
  This secret channel thus eventually yielded the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements (known as the Oslo Accords) on September 13, 1993, 
and laid the framework for the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA), 
beginning in Gaza and Jericho.
176
  The PA, furthermore, was tasked with limited-autonomy in 
the Territories—taking up authority and responsibility in place of the withdrawing Israeli 
security forces from Palestinian population centers—and the Oslo Accords would see the 
emergence of a peace process.   
 Following the turnover of Israeli Prime Ministers, the peace process would continue.  In 
the wake of Yitzhak Rabin‘s assassination, Shimon Peres continued to proceed with the 
implementation of the Taba accords, speeding up Israel‘s redeployment from the remaining Arab 
population centers in the West Bank, thereby allowing for the continued expansion of the newly 
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established PA.  The Taba accords also established three areas in the West Bank: Area A, 
comprised of territory placed under direct Palestinian control; Area B, jointly controlled territory, 
in which the Palestinians would exercise civil/administrative control but Israel would retain 
security responsibility; and Area C, territory where Israel maintained exclusive control over 
administrative and security functions.
177
 
 Following Netanyahu‘s victory in 1996, negotiations initially stalled, particularly 
regarding further Israeli redeployments from the West Bank.
178
  However, negotiations did 
eventually proceed.  In the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, both sides agreed upon an Israeli 
redeployment plan and a security cooperation plan.
179
  With the election victory of Ehud Barak 
in 1999, a new wind emerged to carry the negotiations forward.  Sadly, however, despite Barak‘s 
best efforts, negotiations—and the peace process—were destined for failure.   Despite Barak‘s 
attempts to break a deadlock in talks through speeding up the transfer of land control to the PA, 
little resolution was achieved and a February 13, 2000 target date for the achievement of a 
framework agreement came and went without an outcome.   
 In attempting to see the resumption of progress towards a framework agreement for a 
final peace settlement, President Bill Clinton stepped in, summoning Barak and Arafat to Camp 
David for summit meetings.  Barak accepted the invitation, but at a great cost that significantly 
weakened his bargaining position: the Sharansky party, NRP and Shas defected from Barak‘s 
coalition, leaving Barak with a minority government of 42 of 120 members, and on the eve of the 
summit, Barak himself narrowly escaped a no-confidence vote in the Knesset.
180
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 By Barak‘s final attempt at negotiations at Taba in January 2001, he made the boldest 
offer of any Israeli head-of-state.  Barak would offer concessions on Jerusalem in exchange for 
Palestinian flexibility regarding refugee resettlement.  Accordingly, Israel would agree to 
Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, and Arafat would in turn 
abandon claims to the right of return.
 181
   Barak also publicly stated for the first time a 
willingness to recognize a Palestinian state, while offering a return of 94-96% of Palestinian 
Territory (including land swaps)
182
, and proposed to symbolically accept some of the refugees 
from 1948 while arranging for a compensation package for those refugees not returning to 
Israel.
183
   
 Still, a number of problems were manifest in Barak‘s offer.  These included sovereignty 
issues and Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, disproportionate land exchanges and the division 
of the West Bank into non-contiguous cantons overseen by Israeli security control.
184
  To 
compound the issue, Arafat and his negotiators would also refuse to budge on the issue of right 
of return.  The progress towards a settlement that Barak sought to achieve would thus prove to be 
elusive, with Arafat leaving the negotiating table and the Al-Aqsa Intifada moving into full 
swing.  Subsequently, any efforts at negotiating a framework agreement towards a final 
settlement came to an end for this period.    
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 For the first time in years, Israel witnessed some gains in the domain of isolation of 
external/international support against Palestinian NSTOs—though much of this was due to 
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external factors, rather than Israeli efforts.  Of consequence, the PLO found much of their 
external material support drying up, following the collapse of the USSR, and Arafat‘s mistaken 
choice of publicly backing Saddam Hussein.  In the latter case, Arafat‘s decision resulted in a 
considerable loss of funds from his primary financial backers: the Arab Gulf States.  This would 
have catastrophic ramifications for the PLO, as their reserves dwindled from $7 billion in the 
mid-1980s to $2.5 billion in April 1993, and their annual budget dropped from $245 million to 
$85 million between 1991 and 1993.
185
 
 Problematically for both the PLO and Israel, however, the weakening of external support 
for the PLO corresponded with a broadening of support for Hamas.  By 1993, it was estimated 
that Hamas was receiving as much as $20-30 million annually from Iran.
186
  Moreover, it had 
come to support itself with a well-established transnational network in cooperation with other 
Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and various Gulf states.  Meanwhile 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, angered by Arafat‘s siding with Saddam Hussein, now began to re-
channel financial support from the PLO to Hamas.
187
 
 That being said, two additional factors helped Israel in the realm of isolation of 
external/international support.  The first came from the transfer of PLO security forces into the 
Territories, in line with the Oslo Accords and the construction of the PA.  The result being that 
foreign sanctuary diminished as a significant issue: PLO militant forces were now in the 
Territories, tasked with policing and counter-terrorism duties (no longer hiding with the 
potential/goal of infiltrating into Israel from foreign borders).  The second factor resulted from a 
less hostile Israeli relationship with the Arab world following the signing of the Oslo Accords.  
Most importantly, this involved a peace treaty signed on October 26, 1994 between Israel and 
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Jordan.
188
  Tangibly, this new relationship saw important results for Israel, with King Abdullah‘s 
government enforcing controls on Hamas and other militant Palestinian organizations operating 
in Jordan.  Additionally, Jordan cooperated closely with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
in closing down Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood offices in Amman, and arrested a number of 
Hamas activists, including three senior Hamas leaders.
189
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Isolation of external/international support was relatively successful during this episode, 
even if much of this success could be attributed to external factors and changing circumstances 
as a result of the Oslo Accords.  The dominant Palestinian NSTO, the PLO, saw a sizeable 
decline in international material/financial aid, and foreign sanctuary for sizeable PLO 
deployments and camps became a much less significant issue—meanwhile Israel maintained a 
degree of control over what entered the Territories.  Israel also now possessed peace treaties and 
cooperation with two very important neighbors—Jordan and Egypt—and infiltrations from 
Lebanon by Palestinian NSTOs was no longer the concern it once was.  NSTOs remained well-
armed and funded—especially rising radical groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad—however, 
in relative consideration, this episode probably saw the most success yet enjoyed by Israel in 
isolating external support and sanctuary as an issue in its efforts at strategic coercion.  The level 
of isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as ―significant‖. 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 When Rabin came to power, he paired increased overtures and willingness for 
engagement/diplomacy with the PLO with a heightened security policy.  As Rabin stated, the 
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government would ―wage a ruthless war on terrorism with every means permitted by Israeli 
law.‖190  One of the prime objectives of this new security policy was ―to get Gaza out of Tel 
Aviv‖; an act that namely entailed ending the current situation whereby Palestinians could freely 
move between the heart of Israel and the Territories.
191
  In pursuit of this policy, Rabin imposed 
a closure on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
192
 
 Meanwhile, the Israeli government implemented a number of denial counter-measures.  
One such measure included the employment of security guards at the majority of public venues 
to provide a final-line of defense against the increasing occurrence of suicide bombers.
193
  
Another measure entailed the construction of secure bypass roads within the Territories to ensure 
the safe transport of Israeli citizens and security forces.  These roads helped to secure 
settlements, while allowing for the IDF to redeploy into the West Bank and reinforce its position 
along the Jordan River.  This also enabled the IDF to establish a significant military presence 
anywhere inside the West Bank within 48-96 hours, and allow it to only risk serious casualties if 
it decided to establish strong points within Palestinian towns and cities.
194
  Finally, in 
foreshadow of things to come, Israel erected a security fence around the Gaza Strip, which 
proved to be nearly 100% effective in preventing terrorists from entering Israel from Gaza.
195
 
 
Denial Short-comings Associated with Entrusting Security and Counter-Terrorism to the 
Palestinian Authority 
 During this episode, Israel also suffered a number of denial setbacks, linked to the 
transfer of security and counter-terrorism responsibilities to the PA.  Tasked by the Security 
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Annex of the September 1995 accords, the Palestinian Police were to take over security within 
specified areas in the Territories (known as Area ―A‖).  The Palestinian Police were charged with 
the responsibility to take action against all expressions of violence and terror, confiscate illegal 
arms, and arrest and prosecute individuals suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism.
196
 
 However, the Palestinian Police (and security forces under the PA in general) faced a 
number of problems in assuming such responsibilities.  The first issue hindering these efforts 
involved the simple fact that the Oslo Accords had not involved the consent of radical Islamic 
groups—notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad—now growing in strength and opposed to the efforts 
of Arafat‘s security forces.  To perpetually exacerbate matters, these radical groups were bent on 
committing major acts of terrorism to undermine the Peace Process; a fact that was not helped by 
the Palestinian Authority‘s reluctance to counter/discourage such violence. 
 The lack of ability to rein in terrorism on the part of the PA was not simply constrained to 
a perceived willingness (or unwillingness), however.  Pragmatically, the Palestinian Police and 
PLO associated security forces were lacking in the resources necessary to effectively carryout 
counter-terrorism operations.
197
  The PA could only attempt to build an effective counter-
terrorism force from cadres that had lost much of their income after the Gulf War.
198
  Moreover, 
Arafat himself exacerbated the situation by dividing the security forces into competing factions 
that he could personally control.  To make matters worse, Arafat—who was concerned with 
preventing the emergence of a contender for power, or a cohesive general staff with authoritative 
power—also staffed the various security services with a heterogeneous group of generals at odds 
with each other.
199
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 Not surprisingly, efforts to implement denial within the Territories took a plunge in terms 
of effectiveness.  Whereas before this period, most terrorist attacks had originated from outside 
Israel‘s borders, the majority of attacks were initiated within the Territories.  With black holes 
emerging within the Territories, Palestinian NSTOs were able to much more freely plan, 
organize and initiate attacks.  Smuggling and hiding military equipment was much easier, 
terrorist groups could operate openly (and even run bomb factories), terrorist leaders and key 
personnel were largely immune from arrest, and once an attack had been conducted, the ability 
of the attackers to evade Israeli security forces was also greatly increased.  Correspondingly, the 
number of attacks on Israelis zoomed upward.
200
 
 Still, it would be inaccurate to state that the PA‘s takeover of security functions did not 
have some positive benefits in terms of denial efforts.    Through training by the CIA and 
material assistance from a variety of countries, the PA‘s capacity to implement counter-terrorism 
increased over time.
201
  Israeli and Palestinian security forces also came to successfully 
cooperate, with national, regional, and district level security liaison offices established and 
manned on a 24-hour basis with special communication links.  Following the Wye Accords, 
Israel and the PA engaged in sharing intelligence, conducting joint patrols on key roads, and 
organized joint mobile units to rapidly respond to disturbances and terrorist attacks.
202
  Through 
joint cooperation, Israel and the PA were able to extensively disrupt Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
networks that were planning large-scale attacks against Israeli targets.  Palestinian security forces 
even frequently undertook unilateral action, pre-empting terrorist attacks by Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad.
203
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Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 Levels of denial fluctuated widely during this episode.  As it unfolded, the level of denial 
dropped to what could be assessed as ―limited‖, as PA security forces had difficulty enforcing 
security and enacting counter-terrorism measures in the Territories.  However, levels of denial 
were brought back up and then some—nearly to ―high‖ levels—in 1998 and 1999 as the PA‘s 
security forces improved in their capacity for conducting counter-terrorism and general security 
functions, as well as cooperation with Israeli security forces.  Unfortunately, however, Israel‘s 
inability to make progress in both winning over the Palestinian populace away from support for 
violence and advancing a diplomatic solution would see a rapid breakdown in security 
cooperation with the PSS, with the Territories increasingly coming to serve as safe havens and 
launching pads for Palestinian NSTOs.  Thus, despite initial success, this episode of strategic 
coercion is assessed as ultimately achieving no greater than ―limited‖ levels of denial. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 This episode initially held promise for an improvement in popular isolation with the 
defeat of Likud, and the entry of Yitzhak Rabin and a Labor-led coalition government.  Shortly 
after his assumption of power, Rabin made several goodwill gestures, freeing over 800 political 
prisoners, allowing for the return of some 30 Palestinians that had been deported, halting most 
settlement activity, and reiterating Labour‘s position of land for peace.204  His efforts soon lead 
to successful negotiations through secret channels in Oslo, resulting in the Oslo Accords.  These 
accords established a peace process between Israel and the Arafat-led PLO (though it excluded 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad), and involved the principle of ―early empowerment‖, whereby a 
Palestinian National Authority (PA) would come into being, charged with taking over control of 
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certain aspects of civil administration in the Territories, including health, education and culture, 
welfare, tourism and direct taxation.  Israeli military forces, meanwhile, would eventually be 
redeployed outside of populated areas in the West Bank (though they would continue to protect 
Jewish settlements), and the PA would eventually take over security functions.  Some progress 
would be made over water allocation, with Israel officially recognizing Palestinian rights to 
water resources in the West Bank.
205
  And a series of negotiations would proceed in search of a 
political settlement.  
 Unfortunately, despite these historic efforts, Israel‘s attempts to isolate popular support 
for terrorist violence were hampered by a number of shortcomings.  First, while Israel halted 
settlement activity, their reluctance to withdraw—while holding in possession 55% of the total 
land area of the West Bank and 30% of the Gaza Strip in 1992
206—only served to frustrate 
expectations that peace would bring Palestinian statehood.  Second, the enhanced security 
measures under Rabin translated into significant economic hardship for the Palestinians, as new 
travel restrictions prevented as many as 120,000 Palestinian day laborers from maintaining their 
jobs in Israel.  Combined with Israel‘s efforts to import laborers from East and South Asia, 
Eastern Europe and Africa, Palestinian unemployment jumped to 50%, with 68% of the Gaza 
population living below the poverty line.
207
  
 With the return to power of Likud, and the arrival of Benjamin Netanyahu to the post of 
prime minister, the peace process would run into some major difficulties costing Israeli efforts at 
popular isolation.  On his assumption of power, Netanyahu quickly announced that the four-year 
freeze on settlement expansions would be lifted, while it was reported that the Israeli Army had 
come up with plans to pave some 300 miles of new roads to link the Jewish settlements (which 
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required the confiscation of more Palestinian land).
208
  Netanyahu further liberalized rules on 
expanding existing settlements, while offering financial incentives to settlers.  Further, by March 
1998, Netanyahu announced plans to proceed with a 6500-unit housing project for Jews on Har 
Home/Jabal Abu Ghneim, overlooking East Jerusalem.  Netanyahu also pursued the provocative 
excavation of the Hasmonean Tunnel along the western perimeter of the Temple Mount/Harem 
al-Sharif, with a new exit opened on the Via Dolorosa.  The act was met with outrage, and 
fighting broke out for 3 days, leaving 55 people dead and hundreds wounded.
209
   
 With Ehud Barak replacing Netanyahu as prime minister in 1999, some progress was 
once again made.  Barak sped up redeployment of the IDF, expanding PA control over portions 
of the Territories (Area ―A‖), released several hundred Palestinian prisoners and moved for 
progress towards a final settlement following the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement.  Barak‘s 
government, however, would also be hounded by some of its own shortcomings.
210
  Despite a 
pledge that he would permit no new settlements, Barak gave into pressure from the National 
Religious party and authorized the construction of nearly 2600 housing units in the existing West 
Bank settlements.
211
  Additionally, in response to Palestinian terror attacks in 2000, Barak 
authorized reprisals that involved bombing Palestinian offices and targets in Gaza and the West 
Bank, border closures, the blocking of Gaza roads, the isolation of Palestinian towns behind IDF 
checkpoints, the prevention of imports, and blocked exports (which greatly disrupted the 
Palestinian economy)—all of which aroused Palestinian furor.212  
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Peace Process Fails to Isolate Popular Support 
 Most problematically during this episode, Israel‘s attempts to isolate popular support 
through the peace process established at Oslo failed.  Much of this failure was tied to inherent 
shortcomings in the peace process itself: while small, limited steps were taken at a grudgingly 
slow pace towards a settlement, all the key final status issues—Palestinian sovereignty and 
statehood, the status of Jerusalem, the refugee issue, Israeli settlements, and water—were kept 
off the table at the insistence of Israel.
213
  In addition, Palestinians did not just see settlements 
continue, but the number of Israeli settlers in the Territories doubled to over 400,000.  To make 
matters worse, these settlements were strategically located to make the creation of a contiguous 
Palestinian state in the West Bank impossible.  Meanwhile Israeli regulations over control of the 
Palestinian Territories increased.  There was even a complete absence of any financial dividends 
associated with the peace process: Palestinian GDP per capita increased by only $6 from 1995 
($1,380) to 2000 ($1,386).
214
  Thus, while the Oslo process was established to ―build 
confidence‖ leading toward a final settlement, it actually only served to destroy it, along with 
any faith in the Palestinian community for the political expediency of non-violent negotiations. 
 
Assessing the Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 While this episode may have begun with the best of intentions following Rabin‘s 
assumption of office, the peace process that defined it turned out to be an abysmal failure in 
terms of popular isolation.  If the Israeli government meant to convey the narrative that it truly 
desired a settlement leading to a two-state solution in exchange for peace, what it conveyed 
instead was that it never truly intended to leave—as illustrated not only by the failure to 
permanently freeze and remove settlements, but by their massive growth during this period—and 
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that Israel would use such a time of peace to consolidate its control over the land, while avoiding 
progress on any of the key political issues.  The result was a complete disillusionment in the 
Palestinian population for supporting the peace process and non-violent means towards a change 
of the (ever worsening) status quo.  Unsurprisingly, this discontent would explode as soon as the 
right trigger was available.  Thus, with a deteriorating situation, lack faith in the peace process, 
significant political grievances/issues remaining unresolved (if not worsening), and the 
emergence of renewed support for violence, the degree of isolation of popular support is assessed 
as ―backfire‖. 
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?  
 A number of additional significant factors did influence the outcome of this episode.  The 
first of these involved the rise of Hamas, which served to place a sense of urgency not only upon 
the PLO—that sought to preserve its primacy—but also on the government of Yitzhak Rabin that 
began to fear that the ascendancy of Hamas over the PLO would yield a situation where 
negotiations would be impossible.
215
  
 Other significant factors included: 
 
Operation Accountability  
 Operation Accountability, launched in the summer of 1993 against Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, served to undermine any Israeli efforts at popular isolation and caused initial bumps 
for the peace process.  The operation proved to be the most forceful Israeli attack against 
Hezbollah in a decade.  A particular aspect of the operation, involving bombardments within and 
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around Lebanese civilian population centers certainly had a negative impact on popular 
perceptions of Israel both within the Territories and the broader region.
216
  
 
Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin 
 On November 4, 1995 a Jewish zealot by name of Yigal Amir assassinated Rabin, 
claiming to prevent the land of Israel from being handed over to the Palestinians.  Known as 
―Mr. Security‖, Rabin—a former general and defense minister—brought a credibility to the 
peace process that would be difficult to replace.
217
  Rabin was succeeded by Shimon Peres who 
lacked the respect of his predecessor in terms of security credentials, and was politically defeated 
by the hard-line Benjamin Netanyahu within a year.  The peace process would thus be left bereft 
of a political dove with the security credentials needed to push for a settlement until long after it 
began to lose steam with the election of Ehud Barak. 
 
Decapitation Efforts: Israel‘s Policy of Targeted Killings   
 As in other episodes, Israel continued to pursue its policy of targeted killings.  This 
policy, however, had the unintended consequence of escalating violence.  Following the 
assassination of Fathi Shqaqi in October 1995 and of Yahya Ayyash in January 1996, Islamic 
Jihad and Hamas engaged in a series of revenge attacks resulting in the death of 59 Israelis.
218
  
These attacks, combined with the bolstering of support in the Palestinian community for Hamas 
following the assassination of the very popular Ayyash led to the weakening of Arafat‘s position.   
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Operation Grapes of Wrath 
 In 1996 another major Israeli incursion into Lebanon took place.  After strikes from 
Katyusha rockets, the Israeli government authorized a number of ―surgical strikes‖ with F16 
fighters that resulted in the death of some 200 Lebanese villagers and noncombatants, 
accompanying the displacement of some 400,000 Lebanese.  Similar to Operation 
Accountability, Grapes of Wrath—which ended following the shelling of a UN outpost that 
resulted in the death of more than 100 men, women and children seeking shelter there—
negatively impacted Israeli efforts at popular isolation.
219
 
 
Lebanon Withdrawal 
 In May 2000, following nearly a generation of occupation, Ehud Barak withdrew Israeli 
forces from southern Lebanon without negotiations or preconditions.  Israel‘s unilateral 
withdrawal, dubbed Operation Early Dawn, would portend negative consequences for Israeli 
strategic coercion against Palestinian NSTOs and the peace process.  As Sergio Castignani 
explains, the withdrawal ―had been a serious blow to Israel‘s deterrent posture and proved a 
major galvanizing factor for a second uprising in the Territories.‖220  Indeed, Marwan Barghouti, 
a senior leader in the PLO Fatah Tanzim, stated at the beginning of 2001 that ―the thinking of the 
entire new Palestinian generation is influenced by the experiences of our brothers in Hezbullah 
and by Israel‘s retreat from Lebanon… I must say that Israel‘s withdrawal from Lebanon was 
indeed one contributing factor to the [Al-Aqsa] Intifada.‖221  Israel‘s unilateral withdrawal thus 
served to inspire Palestinian NSTOs and frustrated members of the Palestinian community to 
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believe that violence could force the hand of the Israeli government, thereby bypassing fruitless 
negotiations. 
 
Ariel Sharon Visits the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif 
 On September 28, 2000, Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-
Sharif, and made a speech in which he pledged that Israel would never surrender the Mount.  
This provocative act, combined with a considerable police presence in this sensitive area, served 
as a flame to a growing powder keg, igniting riots leading to the deaths of several Palestinians.
222
  
A wave of violence would thereby commence.  Accompanied by the failure of negotiations at 
Taba II, this new outbreak of violence would mark the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 Accurately scoring the outcome of strategic coercion for this episode is somewhat 
challenging, given the degree to which circumstances and conditions varied between the earlier 
and latter part of this episode.   Initially, some important political progress was achieved as a 
result of the peace process.  The Declaration of Principles established through the Oslo Accords 
saw mutual recognition finally take place: Israel unconditionally recognized the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people, and Israel received unconditional recognition of its 
legitimate right to exist in peace and security.
223
  As Sven Behrendt explains, ―On the Israeli 
side, recognition of the PLO meant an end to the ideological foundations on which the very 
concept ‗Eretz Israel‘ was based; recognition of Israel by the PLO implied the end of the struggle 
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for the liberation of the whole of Palestine.‖224  Along these lines, on April 24, 1996, Arafat 
convened a meeting of the Palestinian National Council and amended the PLO covenant to 
remove those articles calling for the destruction of Israel.
225
  This achievement was followed by 
the abandonment of Israel‘s Labour party of its longstanding opposition to a Palestinian state.226 
 Moreover, this episode of strategic coercion initially enjoyed considerable success as the 
promise of a peaceful settlement held in the early years.  While violence initially rose due to 
problems of transferring security responsibilities over to the PSS, violence levels were eventually 
brought down to very low levels by 1998 while cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians 
continued—which is illustrated in Figure 5.2:  
Figure 5.4: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1991-2000
227
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 Unfortunately, however, stalling progress in negotiations, the inability to freeze and 
withdraw settlements, ongoing (and new) grievances, and Palestinian intransigence at times in 
reining in violence from rejectionist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, would see a 
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critical deterioration in the situation.  Palestinians were disillusioned by the prospect of 
successfully changing the status quo through peaceful means, and frustrated by settlements and 
Israeli policies in the Territories.   
 The peace process in turn, would come to an end, failing to result in either a negotiated 
settlement, or a framework agreement towards one.  By the end of this episode, following 
Sharon‘s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, violence would once again explode—this 
time to heights previously unseen—in what would be called the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  Thus despite 
the initial gains made, this episode would end with higher tension, higher levels of death and 
destruction, and a much greater embrace for a strategy of violence amongst both Palestinian 
communities and NSTOs.  The overall situation thus moved from one of a ―significant success‖ 
to a final assessment of ―backfire‖, whereby violence-levels skyrocketed, any efforts at political 
resolution were completely sidelined and the situation rapidly deteriorated. 
 
Within-Case Episode #5: 2001-2004: The Al-Aqsa Intifada and Israeli 
Military Coercion 
 By the beginning of 2001, the peace process had failed.  In its place emerged the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada—named after the riots that ensued following Ariel Sharon‘s provocative visit to the 
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.  The Al-Aqsa Intifada transpired in several phases, quickly 
evolving from more traditional stone throwing protests to include:  1) gunmen hiding within 
angry mobs; 2) the launching of ambushes and laying of roadside bombings by NSTOs while the 
PA turned a blind eye; and 3) the conduct of large-scale attacks with suicide bombings
228—
assisted by the PA—while simultaneously plotting ―mega attacks‖ aimed at killing thousands.229 
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 Initially, Prime Minister Ehud Barak responded to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
by adopting a dual strategy of continuing negotiations with the PA while allowing the IDF to 
conduct restrained preventive and retaliatory operations—forbidding the IDF from entering PA-
controlled ―A‖ areas.230  Neither Barak nor his strategy was long to last, however, as the Israeli 
public was tired of fruitless negotiations accompanied by increasingly virulent acts of terror.  
Accordingly, on February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister.  Perceiving the Al-
Aqsa Intifada and Palestinian terrorism to pose an existential threat to Israel, Sharon sidelined 
negotiations while pursuing a much fiercer security strategy.   
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 By the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, militant Fatah elements of the PLO (Force 17, 
Tanzim), as well as Hamas, had enhanced links with Iran.  Iraq under Saddam Hussein, 
meanwhile, provided $10,000, and later $25,000, to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.  
Additional funds for dead and wounded Palestinians were generated through private Islamic 
foundations linked to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
231
  Syria renewed its relations at an Arab summit 
in Amman with Arafat after a ten year freeze, while providing financial and military assistance to 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, DFLP and PLF.
232
  Hezbollah, meanwhile was suspected of 
providing significant material assistance to Palestinian NSTOs through the smuggling of arms 
and military intelligence, as well as providing training and guidance for conducting ambushes, 
roadside bombings and rocket attacks.
233
 
                                                 
230
 Castignani, 103. 
231
 BBC News, ―Palestinians Get Saddam Funds,‖ 13 March 2003, Available Online at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm [Last Viewed 22 August 2009]. 
232
 Cordesman, 239. 
233
 Castignani, 106. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
235 
 Israel enjoyed some success in reducing this support, however.  In January 2002, for 
example, Israeli naval commandos intercepted the Karine-A, which contained more than 50 tons 
of weapons bound for the PA.
234
  Meanwhile, US efforts under the administration of George W. 
Bush resulted in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein‘s regime and subsequent ouster of the PLF 
and capture of their leader, Abu Abbas, in Iraq.  Additionally, Israel enjoyed some success in 
uncovering and destroying smuggling tunnels on the Gaza-Egypt border in Rafah, known as the 
Philadelphi Route, while Egypt assisted Israel by increasing its security presence along the 
border.
235
  Maintaining control of Palestinian borders, coasts and airspace, Israel also managed to 
prevent tangible aid from reaching Palestinian NSTOs.  In achieving this, the IDF demolished 
runways at Gaza International Airport, while enforcing a naval blockade of Gaza, setting up an 
array of intelligence sensors and cooperating with Egypt.
236
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Generally speaking, while Palestinian NSTOs continued to receive external support from 
the usual suspects (Iran, Syria, Iraq for a time during the regime of Saddam Hussein, Hezbollah, 
etc.), external/international support was relatively low during this period.  Despite the 
maintenance of foreign headquarters and training camps, no major foreign sanctuaries serving as 
launch pads for attacks were in play as in earlier periods, and Israel enjoyed a considerable 
degree of success in sealing and blocking the Territories from the reception of external support 
through a combination of its own measures and cooperation with its neighbors, namely Egypt 
and Jordan.  The degree of isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as 
―significant‖. 
                                                 
234
 Stacy Perman, ―Business Innovation from Israel‘s Masters of Espionage: The Intercept,‖ Financial Times, 22 
July 2005. 
235
 Cordesman, 251. 
236
 Cordesman, 355. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
236 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 With Ariel Sharon succeeding Barak as prime minister, Israel‘s security strategy would 
rapidly shift, with the perception that the Al-Aqsa Intifada posed an existential threat to Israel.
237
  
Israel brought to bear a wide array of military instruments, including AH-64A Apache and AH-1 
Cobra attack helicopters, F-15I and F-16 aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), armor and 
tanks, artillery, special forces, a Field Intelligence Corps
238
, bulldozers and naval forces.  Israel 
also introduced a number of new weapon systems to reduce its soldiers‘ exposure to enemy fire.   
Finally, by June 2002, Israel launched a new program to upgrade the IDF‘s Tez‘elim National 
Training Center in the Negev Desert in order to provide enhanced urban warfare training.
239
 
 In effectively utilizing these tools towards an overall denial strategy, Israel pursued a 
number of tactics.  These tactics included: 1) deploying specially trained anti-guerrilla units 
accompanied by airpower and standoff weapons
240
; 2) the destruction of high-value PA targets 
with heavy firepower; 3) infantry search and seizure missions targeting militant leaders and 
terrorist infrastructure
241; 4) the employment of the method of ―Environmental Air Control‖ 
using air power to detect and prevent infiltration, enforce curfews, destroy weapons caches, and 
attack terrorist cells; 5) provision of real-time intelligence to assist raids and operations through 
the Field Intelligence Corps, Mistar’aravim (―to become an Arab‖) units blended into the local 
populace, and the presence of UAVs and AH-1S Cobra helicopters
242
; 6) the implementation of 
real-time intelligence digitally distributed to ―swarm‖ Palestinian forces from all directions with 
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small-unit infantry, armor and power
243
; 7) the use of D-9 bulldozers to clear to clear out 
dangerous alleyways riddled with booby-traps, snipers and suicide bombers
244
; and 8) the 
dedication of substantial resources to enhancing rapid medical responses designed to swiftly treat 
injuries from suicide bombing attacks.
245
 
 
Isolating Palestinian Cities and Territory 
 Throughout this episode, a key feature of Israel‘s denial strategy involved isolating 
Palestinian cities and territory to prevent access to vital resources needed to conduct acts of 
terrorism, make it difficult for militants to travel, and to enable search and seizure operations 
while preventing Palestinian terrorists from fleeing Israeli forces.  To achieve this, Israel erected 
numerous checkpoints, physical barriers and separation zones, while maintaining a network of 
security access roads that enabled Israeli forces to quickly travel and deploy at will.  Israel also 
worked towards containing the entire territory of Gaza, through sealing off and patrolling its 
borders and coasts, while controlling its airspace.  Indeed, to enable the separation and isolation 
of Gaza from Israel proper—as well as the outside world—Israel effectively employed UAVs, 
unattended ground sensors, ground-based radars, night vision and surveillance equipment, and a 
separation barrier.
246
 
 
Setbacks from Oslo Arrangements 
 Initially, Israel suffered setbacks as a result of arrangements carried out under the 
auspices of the Oslo Accords—most notably the transfer of security responsibilities to the PA in 
―A‖ areas.  Such setbacks included difficulties in resolving the right of hot pursuit of terrorists, 
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providing for the security of settlements, a ready stockpile for Palestinian NSTOs accounting for 
tens of thousands of rifles and small arms, mortars, rockets and other light weapons, an absence 
of actionable intelligence for raids and operations
247
, and a platform for launching mortar and 
rockets attacks.  Moreover, with the collapse of the peace process and the faltering of 
cooperation between Israel and Palestinian Security Services, such ―A‖ areas increasingly served 
as sanctuaries and launching pads for a variety of Palestinian NSTOs.
248
 
 
Israel Punishes PA Security Services 
 In order to prevent ―A‖ areas from becoming complete safe havens for Palestinian 
NSTOs, Israel launched strikes against the PSS in order to compel the PA to implement denial 
operations itself against terrorist groups.  Such strikes were typically launched in response to acts 
of Palestinian terrorism against Israelis, and often targeted PSS training facilities, police 
installations and infrastructure supporting Arafat‘s personal security forces.249  Following this 
course of action, the IDF destroyed most the 150 PA security facilities by 2002.
250
  The results of 
this strategy were mixed.  On the one hand, Israel did achieve some success in compelling Arafat 
to crackdown on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, going after their infrastructure and arresting their 
militant supporters.  On the other, Israel severely weakened the PA and its security services, 
allowing for a growing power vacuum to emerge favoring the growth of Hamas, Islamic Jihad 
and other radical groups. 
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Operation Defensive Shield 
 Israel embarked upon Operation Defensive Shield with the purpose of retaking the 
security functions it had delegated during the peace process.  In April 2002 the operation 
commenced following the March ―Passover Massacre‖ suicide bomb attack.  The largest urban 
warfare operation conducted since the siege of Beirut in 1982, Defensive Shield marked a shift in 
limiting action to short anti-terror and guerrilla raids, to engaging in full-scale operations.  
20,000 reservists were mobilized, and moved into PA-controlled ―A‖ areas, which the Israeli 
government hoped would, ―take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst 
threats before they emerge.‖251  Accordingly, the main objectives of Defensive Shield were to 
perform major weapons seizures, arrest terrorists and dismantle their support network, destroy 
weapons factories and suicide bomb workshops, engage in the targeted killing of ―ticking bomb‖ 
suicide terrorists, and the gathering of intelligence for conducting further raids and operations.
252
 
 From a denial standpoint, Defensive Shield yielded great success: numerous significant 
arrests of NSTO operatives were made; Israel made significant progress in the dismantling of 
terrorist infrastructure and seizure/destruction of small arms, munitions and weapons factories; 
and ground-breaking evidence of the PA‘s connection to terrorist activity was discovered.253  
 
The Separation Barrier 
 On June 17, 2002, Israel began construction of a ―separation barrier‖ (or ―security 
fence‖) along the West Bank, initially running roughly near the old green line that marked the 
pre-June 1967 borders.  This security barrier encompassed a combination of structures such as 
walls, ditches, patrol roads, fenced portions, multi-layered composite obstacles, and electronic 
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surveillance units—tailored to the security problems of different areas.254  The security fence was 
also built to encompass Israeli settlements in the West Bank.  The construction of this security 
fence has been viewed as a great success, credited with dropping successful suicide bombing 
attacks in Israel from 55 in 2002 to 11 in 2004.
255
 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 Israeli efforts at denial enjoyed considerable success.  Israeli interdiction efforts served to 
thwart some 80% of attempted terrorist attacks during this period.
256
  Meanwhile, Israeli efforts 
prevented mass-casualty attacks such as the one planned on the Shalom Towers.  Overall, Israel 
was able to make important progress in denying Palestinian NSTOs access to vital resources, the 
ability to operate and conduct successful attacks, and evade Israeli security forces. Terrorist 
attacks still continued through both suicide bombings and rocket attacks, however the 
effectiveness and lethality of such attacks—as well as their overall frequency—dropped off in 
large measure.  The degree of denial is thus assessed as ―significant.‖ 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
 During this episode, little effort was made by the Israeli government towards popular 
isolation.  As Sergio Castignani explains, ―The emphasis on providing military tactical solutions 
to Palestinian threats led to an almost complete oversight of a ‗hearts and minds‘ strategy.‖257  
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of this was evidenced in issues of excessive collateral 
damage.  Israeli security forces used excessive force against protesters and rock throwers, whilst 
responding to threats during patrols, in the pursuit of fleeing suspects, and in responding to 
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trespassers in restricted areas—at times resulting in death.258  The implementation of heavy 
weaponry in dense urban areas resulted in additional collateral damage.  Notable examples of 
this include the decision to deploy the Merkava battle tank for the first time to assist in 
operations in the Territories, as well as dropping heavy payloads from F-15 and F-16 aircraft.  
The result from the firing of tanks shells and heavy machine gun rounds, as well as aerial 
bombardment, in such densely populated areas was that of unneeded civilian casualties.  Such 
collateral damage was further increased, moreover, through Israeli policies of targeted killings, 
which often killed more innocent bystanders than targeted individuals.
259
 
 Also apparent was the adverse economic impact of Israeli security measures in response 
to the new uprising‘s violence.  The World Bank, for instance, published a report in 2004 noting 
an approximate annual 40% percent drop in Gross National Income since the beginning of the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada, a 25-30% decline in per capita food consumption over two years with child 
malnutrition rates climbing, and 60% of the population living on less than $1.5 a day.
260
  In 
addition to serious economic and collateral damage problems, however, a number of other issues 
prevailed that would drive up popular support for violence and NSTOs. 
 
Mass Arrests and Detention 
 Mass arrests and detentions posed a serious issue during this episode.
261
  Hundreds of 
Palestinians were held in administrative detention per year, while individual administrative 
detention orders could be issued for up to six-month periods with the possibility of being 
                                                 
258
 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices: Israel and the Occupied Territories 2003, 25 February 2004, Available Online at: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm [Last Viewed 22 August 09]. 
259
 Aryeh Dayan, ―One Day in Five, the IDF Attempts Assassination,‖ Haaretz.com, Available Online at: 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=295256&contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContra
ssID=0&listSrc=Y [Last Viewed 29 June 09]. 
260
 World Bank, Four Years – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment, October 2004. 
261
 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ―2004 Human Rights Report: Israel 
and the Occupied Territories‖, 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Available Online at: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41723.htm [Last Viewed 29 June 09]. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
242 
renewed indefinitely.
262
  Moreover, once detained, Israel often provided harsh conditions for 
Palestinian prisoners, while police officers often beat and (allegedly) tortured detainees.
263
 
 
Friction: Checkpoints and Curfews 
 Israel caused increasing friction within the Territories through the increasing 
implementation of checkpoints and curfews.  At its height, tens of thousands of Palestinians 
traveling between towns and villages faced as many as 730 different barriers to movement—all 
the while often encountering some form of abuse from soldiers at the various checkpoints.
264
  
Extensive curfews, meanwhile, affected every aspect of Palestinian life, severely impacting 
society and the economy, causing food and water shortages, and impeding the provision of 
medical care and supplies.
265
  Operation Determined Path served to exacerbate matters, 
extensively implementing checkpoints and wide-ranging curfews, in addition to the closures of 
businesses and schools and home demolitions.
266
 
 
Questionable IDF Conduct and Practices 
 Questionable IDF conduct involved the arbitrary destruction and/or looting of Palestinian 
property; the soliciting of bribes during military operations and at checkpoints
267
; the subjecting 
of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to beatings, and tire slashings and gunfire directed 
against them or their vehicles because they were traveling on, or trying to circumvent IDF 
blocked roads
268
.  Certain Israeli practices also helped to exacerbate the situation by raising the 
ire of the Palestinian community.  Such practices included: excessive house demolition—i.e. 
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leveling entire apartment buildings after a single terrorist hid there; the punitive use of home 
demolition, and house demolition not met with (any) compensation; the quartering of Israeli 
troops in Palestinian homes; the failure to regularly investigate the actions of Israeli security 
force members who killed and injured Palestinians under suspicious circumstances; obstructing 
the movement of, and firing on ambulances and Palestinian medical personnel; the IDF 
destruction of Palestinian agriculture and irrigation systems
269
; allowing IDF soldiers to engage 
in the ―neighbor practice‖270 of using Palestinians (often against their will) as human shields 
either to make contact with homes suspected of housing militants, or literally to fire behind
271
; 
and  the practice of not restraining Israeli settlers violently rampaging against Palestinians and 
their property in the Territories.
272
 
 
The Separation Barrier: Issues 
 An important part of Israel‘s denial strategy, the separation barrier posed a number of 
problems adversely impacting popular isolation.  Such problems included construction over 
Palestinian land—especially around settlements—that resulted in cutting tens of thousands of 
Palestinians off from their work, land and families, and the spreading of the perception that Israel 
was attempting to unilaterally draw-up territorial lines and annex Palestinian lands.
273
  As Rashid 
Khalidi describes the situation: 
Whatever this barrier may have done for Israeli security, it would have done even more 
had it been erected within Israel, along the Green Line marking the 1949 armistice 
boundary.  Instead, it has been built virtually in its entirety within the West Bank, in 
many cases deep within it, thereby making possible the seizure of thousands of hectares 
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of additional Palestinian land, along with valuable water resources, separating Palestinian 
farmers from their livelihood, sowing more resentment and anger for the future.
274
                                                                                                                                             
 
Losing the Media Battle 
 Several incidents that transpired with poor considerations for media implications entail an 
adverse impact on Palestinian (and international) perceptions.  Two important such episodes 
include the death of 12-year-old Mohammed Aldura and the Battle of Jenin.  In the first case, 
Mohammed Aldura was caught on video on September 30, 2001 in a crossfire and gunned down 
by the IDF along with his father who became paralyzed.  The incident exploded in internet and 
television media—especially in the Arab and Islamic world.  Following a rushed investigation, 
the IDF accepted that its troops were likely to blame, and attempted to put the incident behind 
them.
275
  Yet years later, following a detailed investigation, it was found that—in terms of 
physics—it would have been impossible for the IDF to have gunned down Aldura and his 
father.
276
  Regardless, Israel learned the importance of needing a way to rapidly respond with a 
public relations approach following such an incident. 
 Another such media failure involved the ―Battle of Jenin‖.  The ―Battle of Jenin‖ took 
place on April 3, 2002, when Israeli troops entered the densely populated Jenin refugee camp as 
part of Operation Defensive Shield.  In conducting the operation, the IDF decided to exclude 
access to international media.  With the absence of first-hand reporting and video footage, 
rumors quickly spread of intensive civilian casualties and collateral damage on the level of an 
―unprecedented massacre‖, claiming that over 600 people had been killed.277  Though never 
substantiated, these claims were quickly accepted as fact in world opinion and international 
media outlets.  Ironically, civilian casualties in Jenin were remarkably low considering the 
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circumstances, with the UN and Human Rights Watch eventually confirming that no such 
massacre had taken place.
278
  Still, the damage had been done—made possible in no small part 
by denying access to the media, with the result being that the worst was suspected without 
confirmation. 
 
Assessing the Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 At the conclusion of this period, primary grievances remained poorly addressed (while 
new ones were emerging from Israeli security operations and the implementation of the 
separation barrier), excessive violence and collective punishment were present, and the general 
security situation throughout the Palestinian Territories significantly deteriorated.  Overall then, 
the degree of popular isolation for this episode is assessed as ―backfire‖. 
 
Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?  
 Several additional significant factors may have influenced the outcome of this episode.  
First, following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the US invasion of Iraq, the regime of 
Saddam Hussein was brought down, which had been supportive in providing financial assistance 
to Palestinian NSTOs and the families of suicide bombers, as well as sanctuary to certain 
terrorist groups like the PLF.  External US efforts thus played some (limited) role in reducing 
external/international support for Palestinian NSTOs.   
 Another possible additional factor may have been Israel‘s decapitation strategy.  The 
effectiveness of such a strategy is questionable in terms of tangibly disrupting the operational 
capability of Palestinian NSTOs.
279
  What is certain, however, is that such attacks did raise the 
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ire of the Palestinian community, as they were often accompanied by excessive collateral 
damage.  Such targeted killings were also likely to have encouraged revenge attacks, as was 
apparent by statements from groups such as Hamas.
280
  Interestingly, a study examining this 
period found that Israel‘s policy of targeted assassination had little effect in either decreasing or 
increasing Palestinian violence.
281
 
  
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 During this episode, little headway was achieved in resuming political progress towards a 
settlement.  Upon election, Sharon pledged not to negotiate ―under fire‖.282  Any hope for 
negotiations were further dashed in December 2001 following a Hamas bus bombing, whereupon 
Sharon‘s cabinet declared Arafat irrelevant and cutoff contact with him.283  On June 24, 2002, 
the Quartet (USA, UN, Russia and the EU) attempted to restart negotiations, proposing a ―Road 
Map‖ aimed at achieving peace.  The Road Map was planned to be carried out in three phases 
between 2003 and 2005 as follows: 1) provision for a cessation of Palestinian violence and the 
establishment of Palestinian political reforms (including the appointment of a new leader—a 
prime minister—through democratic elections); 2) the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state; 3) the achievement of final-status agreement on issues such as final borders, the 
status of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees and remaining Israeli settlements.
284
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 Following elections in line with the first phase of the Road Map, Mahmoud Abbas 
became prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority.
285
  Under US pressure the Israeli 
cabinet accepted the principle of a Palestinian state, and Sharon soon began negotiations with 
Abbas.  Sharon offered to withdraw the IDF from most Palestinian city centers in the West Bank 
and from the northern Gaza Strip, as well as lift border restrictions in exchange for a 
commitment to crack down on terrorism.  Sharon also stated that if Abbas were successful and 
violence ceased, then Israel would participate in negotiations to form a provisional Palestinian 
state.  Abbas agreed to Sharon‘s terms and worked toward ending violence and attempting to 
secure a ceasefire from Hamas.  Unfortunately, within a few days, Arafat publicly stated that 
Abbas had made too many concessions, and Hamas announced that it would not hold any 
ceasefire-talks.  Abbas soon found his position untenable without the support of Arafat or the 
security serves still under his control.  By September, with Arafat actively engaged in a 
destabilizing power struggle with Abbas, Abbas decided to resign.  Along with him, any short-
lived hope of the resumption of meaningful negotiations under the Road Map died.
286
 
 Despite short-comings on the front of political progress, however, Sharon‘s strategy 
succeeded in greatly reducing violence levels: at the episode‘s conclusion, Israeli casualties from 
Palestinian NSTO violence were brought down from a peak of 453 in 2002, to 118 by year‘s end 
in 2004.  This is illustrated by figure 5.5:  
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Figure 5.5: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 2001-2004
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 However, It was also becoming clear to Israel that denial measures and security 
cooperation with its neighbors would be insufficient in themselves to resolve the situation, given 
the significant continued commitment (and ability) towards carrying out acts of violence by 
Palestinian NSTOs.  Indeed, both sides discovered (once again) the impossibility of attaining a 
zero-sum victory through force.  Based on this outcome and the achievement of little political 
resolution, the level of success for this episode is assessed as ―moderate‖.  
 
Within-Case Episode #6: 2004-Present (2009) – Unilateral disengagement, 
Hamas Comes to Power, Entrenched Stalemate 
 By 2004, Prime Minister Sharon came to the conclusion that the conflict‘s stalemate had 
to be resolved on a political level.
288
  Accordingly, Sharon began to take action on a decision he 
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had made in December 2003 to progress with the Road Map through unilateral disengagement.
289
  
As the original architect of Israel‘s settlement policy, Sharon‘s new policy caught everyone by 
surprise—including his own party (soon requiring him to forge a new one, Kadima).  By late 
Spring of 2004, Sharon‘s disengagement plan called for the dismantling of all twenty-one Jewish 
settlements in Gaza, the evacuation of approximately 8,000 settlers, and the dismantling of four 
small settlements in the northern West Bank.  Following the withdrawal, however, Israel would 
retain control of the border between Gaza and Egypt, patrol security along the Israeli-Gaza 
border maintained by a 650 kilometer-long security fence, and enforce control over Gaza‘s 
airspace and seacoast.  The rationale behind Sharon‘s disengagement plan was that it would 
reduce the chances of friction between the Israeli and Palestinian populations.
290
 
 Sharon‘s plan, however, was hounded by a number of concerns.  Sharon‘s decision to 
implement his plan unilaterally meant Israel would receive no quid pro quo towards peace.  Both 
the PA and some Israelis were also concerned that the unilateral Israeli withdrawal would leave 
Gaza without effective government in an area where the PA had been unable to establish firm 
control, leading to greater instability as Hamas and Islamic Jihad extended their own 
influence.
291
 
 
Arafat Dies, Abbas Elected President of the PA, Hamas Electoral Victories 
 Following the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected 
President of the PA in January 2005.  The new development briefly yielded an improvement in 
relations between Israel and the PA, with Sharon and Abbas jointly announcing an end to the 
violent conflict that had prevailed since late 2000.  Unfortunately, however, newfound hopes of 
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progress towards a political resolution were not long to last.  In municipal elections between 
January and May 2005, Hamas scored major victories, particularly in the Gaza Strip.  But most 
dramatically, in 2006 Hamas won the majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative election, 
obtaining 74 of the 134 seats and defeating the Fatah government
292
, whom many Palestinians 
considered to be ineffective and corrupt.  After the election, Hamas came into control of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council and the government, while Fatah controlled the Presidency 
(Abbas), the Palestinian Security Services (PSS), and the PLO (the only recognized Palestinian 
representation abroad).
293
 
 Hamas‘ initial signals upon assuming control were problematic: upon presenting its 12-
point political program, it claimed the legitimate right to maintain (violent) resistance to end 
Israel‘s occupation and did not recognize Israel, thereby disregarding the Quartet‘s 
preconditions.  Accordingly, the PLO rejected Hamas‘ position, while Israel, the US and the EU 
began a political and economic boycott against the PA.
294
  Hamas, meanwhile, faced challenges 
from Fatah.  Following the formation and deployment in May 2006 of a 3,000 man ―Executive 
Force‖ charged with internal security duties—and directly challenging Fatah and the PLO‘s 
monopoly on force—President Abbas committed a substantial deployment of the PSS in the 
Gaza Strip.  Factional clashes soon broke out eventually ending in June 2007 with Hamas‘ 
takeover of the Gaza Strip, while Fatah/PLO formed its own government and confronted Hamas 
in the West Bank.  The end result saw Israel pursue a double-track strategy of engaging in 
dialogue with Fatah/PLO leadership in the West Bank, while boycotting Hamas rule in the Gaza 
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Strip.  Indeed, following continual rocket and mortar attacks, Gaza would be declared a ―hostile 
territory‖, and would continue to be subjected to IDF operations. 
 
Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were 
achieved? 
 During this episode, Iran continued to provide Palestinian NSTOs—Hamas in 
particular—with both financial and material support.  Such support included arms transported by 
sea.  In these instances, Iran would either send a freighter to unload weapons at Egypt‘s Port 
Said, at which point the illicit cargo would be smuggled into Gaza by land, or drop off containers 
at sea picked up by Palestinian fisherman.
295
 
 The largest concern for Israel has been the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Gaza 
via the Philadelphi Route along the Egypt-Gaza border.  Such smuggling is enabled by the 
construction of tunnels under Palestinian homes (primarily in Rafah).  Preventing such 
smuggling has proven very difficult, due to the short time needed to construct such tunnels by 
engineers, an ever-willing network of smugglers, and the financial appeal to Palestinians willing 
to allow their homes to be used for smuggling tunnels.
 296
  In isolating such external support, 
however, Israel has enjoyed some success—particularly from cooperation with Egypt—as 
witnessed by Egypt‘s interception of an Iranian freighter bearing arms on January 22, 2009.  
Israel has also enjoyed some degree of success through operations into Gaza, aimed in part at the 
destruction these networks of tunnels. 
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Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support 
 Palestinian NSTOs continued to be deprived of major sanctuaries serving as launch pads, 
and Israel‘s control of the borders, coasts and airspace of the Palestinian Territories—along with 
cooperation from Jordan and Egypt—helped to minimize material support that could be 
smuggled into the Territories.  Significant financial support, as well as material support—
particularly from Iran—continued to make it into the hands of Palestinian NSTOs, however, 
especially through smuggling into Gaza.  The degree of isolation of external/international 
support during this period is assessed as ―significant.‖ 
 
Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial? 
 Throughout this episode, Israel successfully managed to deny Palestinian NSTOs the 
capacity to conduct suicide bombing attacks against civilians within Israel and against Israeli 
settlements—aided largely in part by the effectiveness of its newly constructed separation 
barrier.  Indeed, Israel was so successful at this that it likely played a significant factor in Hamas‘ 
April 2006 announcement that it would be stopping such attacks.
297
  In place of suicide bombing 
attacks, Palestinian NSTOs thus began to pursue alternative means of assault—including the 
launching of mortars and rockets (in particular from Gaza), and attacking IDF bases and outposts 
by constructing large underground tunnels rigged with explosives beneath them.
298
 
 In responding to these assaults in 2004, while making preparations to carryout Sharon‘s 
unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza, Israel launched Operation Rainbow in May, and 
Operation Days of Penitence in September.  Both operations involved the deployment of Israeli 
troops into Gaza—supported by airpower and D-9 bulldozers—in order to destroy smuggling 
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tunnels, weapon stockpiles (especially Qassam rocket equipment), rocket/mortar launch pads, 
known NSTO leaders/militants, and terrorist infrastructure.
299
 
 Problems concerning rocket and mortar fire from Gaza would both persist, however.  
Indeed, following Israel‘s withdraw from Gaza in August and September 2005, rocket and 
mortar fire increased dramatically.  The situation even further worsened following Hamas‘ 
establishment of control in Gaza.  The following figure of annual rocket and mortar attacks from 
2005 (Gaza disengagement) onwards clearly depicts the situation: 
Figure 5.6: Annual Rocket & Mortar Attacks, 2005-2008
300
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2005 2006 2007 2008
Rockets
Mortars
 
 
 Israel accordingly followed up with a number of operations, including Operation Summer 
Rains (June–November 2006)—which included the major sub-operation, Autumn Clouds—and 
Operation Hot Winter (February 2008).  Similar to Rainbow and Days of Penitence, these 
operations aimed to target militant groups and infrastructure in Gaza, while cracking down on 
smuggling and weapons stockpiles—and in particular providing for the destruction of the means 
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of producing, transporting and firing Qassam rockets.  The operations also sought to secure the 
release of Corporal Gilad Shalit (captured by Hamas in June 2006). 
 Despite these operations, rocket and mortar attacks continued.  In June 2008, a ceasefire 
was negotiated between Israel and Hamas that provided for a near complete cessation of rocket 
and mortar attacks for several months.  However, following the ceasefire‘s gradual collapse from 
November to late December, hostilities once again resumed, with Palestinian NSTOs 
recommencing with considerable rocket and mortar fire. 
 Israel responded to these attacks by launching the massive Operation Cast Lead into 
Gaza, commencing on December 27, 2008.  During the operation, Israel targeted tunnel 
complexes; rocket and mortar launching points; Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives and 
leadership; Hamas outposts; weapons storage facilities/bunkers containing weapons and rockets; 
and Hamas police headquarters.  Operations were carried out by the IDF and IAF with the 
support of Israel‘s Navy.301    By the Operation‘s conclusion, the IDF assessment was that it 
managed to destroy roughly 1,200 rockets (one third of Hamas‘ arsenal), and killed 700 
militiamen.  Still, as Diego Bailani points out, the IDF ―…destroyed no more than 2.8% of 
Hamas estimated forces.‖302 
 
Assessment of Degree of Denial 
 Throughout this episode, Israel managed to cement its implementation of significant 
denial levels, increasing its ability to thwart suicide attacks with further construction of the 
security fence, relying on increasing cooperation with Fatah/the PLO in the West Bank to rein in 
assaults from Palestinian NSTOs, and launching operations into Gaza that helped reduce Hamas‘ 
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access to vital resources, and capacity to operate and launch attacks.  Despite this success, 
however, Israel‘s withdraw from Gaza has provided a safe haven for militants where they can 
create/stockpile weapons and launch rocket and mortar attacks.  Indeed, even after Operation 
Cast Lead, some 481 rockets and 183 mortars were fired into Israel by June 2009.
303
  Despite the 
relatively low fatality levels of these rocket and mortar attacks, they continue to pose a 
significant challenge to Israel‘s security.  Denial for this episode is thus assessed as ―significant‖. 
 
Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved? 
  Initially, following Arafat‘s death, Israel made some positive movement on the popular 
isolation front.  In January 2005, Israel announced that it would stop marking Palestinian 
militants for death, and in February Abbas and Sharon declared an end to the violence that had 
prevailed since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  The Israeli attorney general also declared 
unlawful the government decision to seize land around Jerusalem from Palestinian owners, while 
in a goodwill gesture, the Israeli cabinet agreed to release 900 Palestinian prisoners, and Israeli 
forces pulled troops back from West Bank towns, including Jericho.  Sharon also announced that 
Israel would allow exiled militants involved in the siege of the Church of the Nativity in 
Bethlehem (2002) to return to their hometowns.  Shortly thereafter, Sharon announced that Israel 
would pull back from major West Bank cities and return control to the PSS, work towards 
issuing more work permits for Gazans, and had Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz order a halt to the 
policy of demolishing the homes of Palestinian militants.
304
  By August/September 2005, 
moreover, Sharon made good on his promise to withdraw settlements and Israeli security forces 
from the Gaza Strip.  The departure of these 8,000 settlers marked an important milestone, and 
one that initially promised to ease tensions, given that Israeli settlements in Gaza took up 40% of 
                                                 
303
 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―The Hamas Terror War Against Israel,‖ Available Online at: 
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA [Last Viewed 13 July 09]. 
304
 Bickerton and Klausner, 370. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
256 
the land and siphoned off scarce water supplies.
305
  Unfortunately, Hamas electoral victories in 
2005 and 2006 would quickly undermine these efforts to warm relations with the Palestinians. 
 
Limitations of the Gaza Withdrawal 
 Despite the important milestone set by the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from Gaza, 
the event was undermined by Palestinian perceptions that the disengagement from the Strip was 
meant to help distract international attention and assist in consolidating Israel‘s control over the 
West Bank.  Indeed, both before and after the withdrawal, Sharon authorized new homes in the 
West Bank, including a government plan to build an additional 3,500 housing units in a 4.6 
square mile area (known as E-1) extending the municipal boundaries of the settlement Ma‘ale 
Adumim.
306
  The construction of these new housing units would link the settlement to Jerusalem, 
creating Israeli territorial contiguity in an area where the status was supposed to be determined in 
peace negotiations with the Palestinians.
307
  Indeed, with settlement construction expanding in 
the West Bank, the Israeli settler population increased from 441,828 in 2004 to 484,862 by the 
end of 2007
308
; a large net increase despite the number of settlers removed from Gaza. 
 Another problem posed by the Gaza withdrawal involved perceptions as a consequence 
of Israel‘s unilateral disengagement.  Since Israel decided to leave without a negotiated quid pro 
quo, Israel‘s action helped give credence to the claim by radical groups that violence and armed 
resistance had forced Israel‘s hand in withdrawing.  Hamas used the occasion to plan large, post-
pull out victory celebrations
309—and it is likely that Israel‘s unilateral decision helped to 
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convince many in the Territories of the utility of armed resistance and terrorism in place of 
fruitless negotiations. 
 
Security Fence Issues 
 During this episode, the construction of Israel‘s security fence—particularly on areas of 
Palestinian land, often surrounding Israeli settlements—remained an issue of tension.  In June 
2004, the Israeli Supreme Court did rule that a 40-kilometer (25-mile) section of the proposed 
620-kilometer fence in the West Bank be rerouted for violating the human rights of 35,000 local 
Palestinians.
310
  However, the continued presence of the fence around (growing) settlements in 
the West Bank and around Jerusalem—cutting off Palestinians from their land, family, and work, 
while making travel even more complicated—continues to generate considerable friction. 
 
Civilian Casualties Resulting from Israeli Operations in Gaza 
 The various (repeated) operations waged in Gaza between 2004 and 2009 to destroy 
smuggling tunnels, rocket and mortar launching capabilities, and terrorist infrastructure took 
their toll in terms of civilian casualties and damages.  As a consequence of such operations, 
many civilians were left homeless following the demolition of homes suspected of being used in 
smuggling operations.  Meanwhile hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed—including 
women and children (an issue exacerbated by Palestinian gunmen hiding amongst civilian 
quarters).  In particular, during Operation Cast Lead (December 08-January 09), Israeli forces 
killed over 1,300 Palestinians—many of which were civilians, and among them a large number 
of whom (315) were minors under the age of 18.
311
  Many such civilian casualties could be 
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attributed, moreover, to the extensive (and avoidable) use of imprecise artillery and mortar fire 
into densely populated areas by the IDF.
312
 
 
Gaza Declared ―Hostile Territory‖ 
 Following the June 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the Strip was declared ―hostile 
territory.‖  A direct consequence of this was Israel closing Gaza‘s border-crossings and greatly 
limiting the entry of goods, including fuel, medical equipment, and replacement parts.  The effect 
of this policy proved disastrous for the residents of Gaza.  As stated by B‘Tselem, ―People who 
previously worked to support their families became totally dependent on handouts of basic 
commodities and services.‖313  Further, the economic situation in Gaza greatly deteriorated 
following Israeli policies, seeing unemployment reach 50% in the second quarter of 2008, with 
79% of Gazan households living below the poverty line—70% of which were in deep poverty.314  
Palestinians have perceived the situation as collective punishment against them in Gaza.
315
 
 
Questionable Israeli Policies During Operation Cast Lead 
 During Israel‘s massive Operation Cast Lead, a number of questionable policies/actions 
were carried out.  The first, and perhaps most high profile of these, involved the use of white 
phosphorous, which is prohibited by international law, especially when targets are located within 
a residential area.
316
  Another involved the employment (once again) of the ―neighbor practice‖, 
where the military used Palestinians as human shields during the operation, as well as ordered 
them to enter buildings and check suspicious objects ahead of the military to see if they were 
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booby-trapped.
317
  Similarly, reports again emerged of Israelis firing on ambulances and 
impeding their transportation of wounded, while failing to setup an effective mechanism for 
allowing humanitarian agencies to evacuate the wounded.
318
  Israel also kept the crossings into 
Gaza closed after 19 December, cutting off humanitarian supplies, and resulting—due to a lack 
of spare parts—in Gaza‘s power being shut off (exacerbated by Israel striking several power 
lines), affecting all aspects of daily life including sanitation, water, and power supply.
319
  It 
should be mentioned that Israel made efforts to open up a humanitarian corridor for a few hours 
each day by early January, however this corridor was vastly insufficient to deal with the 
humanitarian disaster in the strip that had been worsening since Israel declared Gaza a ―hostile 
territory.‖  Finally, Israel‘s decision to conduct aerial bombardment also proved to be 
particularly devastating.   
 
Assessing the Degree of Isolation of Popular Support 
 Despite initial attempts to do so, little was positively achieved during this episode to 
isolate popular support for violence and Palestinian NSTOs.  Primary Palestinian grievances 
remained poorly addressed, excessive violence and collective punishment were present in Israeli 
operations and policies in Gaza, and new significant grievances began to emerge due to the dire 
humanitarian plight in Gaza.  Given these circumstances, isolation of popular support is assessed 
as ―backfire.‖ 
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Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome? 
  Several additional factors may have had an effect on the outcome of this episode.  The 
first deals with the death of two prominent figures of the conflict: Yasser Arafat and Ariel 
Sharon.  Following the death of Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004—and the subsequent 
election of Mahmoud Abbas to president of the PA—an opportunity for some progress was 
made, including the declaration of an end to hostilities between Israel, and Palestinian NSTOs 
associated with Fatah/the PLO.
320
  While such progress would be short-lived with the electoral 
victories of Hamas, it is important to take note that Arafat‘s death did have an important impact 
on altering Israel‘s relationship with the Fatah/PLO-leadership divide of Palestinian NSTOs.  
With the loss of Ariel Sharon on January 4, 2006 to stroke, Israel lost the primary figure driving 
its centrist movement, Kadima.  Ehud Olmert, the hawkish mayor of Jerusalem would replace 
Sharon as acting prime minister, however Olmert never possessed the security credentials or 
national support that Sharon had—ultimately undermining Kadima‘s agenda for disengagement 
and a return to negotiations. 
 
Israel‘s Policy of Targeted Killings/Assassinations 
 Once again, Israel pursued its policy of targeted killings against Palestinian NSTO 
leadership.  This was most clearly demonstrated with the assassination of Hamas leaders Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi.  As a result of these decapitation strikes, Hamas would 
become more reluctant to announce the names of its leadership.  However, other consequences 
were also apparent.  Targeted assassinations against such leaders enraged public supporters and 
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helped escalate levels of violence.
321
  Further, despite such assassinations, Hamas remained 
undeterred—as was illustrated by an increase in Qassam rocket attacks.322 
 
International Sanctions Against Hamas 
 These international sanctions were targeted at Hamas by the US and EU following 
Hamas assuming control of the Palestinian government in March 2006.  Applied for 15-months 
as a means of prodding Hamas into changing its positions on Oslo and the two-state solution, 
these sanctions meant that the US and EU would not provide financial support (worth hundreds 
of millions of US dollars) to the PA until Hamas agreed to recognize Israel, renounce terrorism, 
and commit itself to observing previous agreements.  Even after the sanctions were brought to an 
end, the US added further pressure, moreover, by informing Hamas that banks transferring 
money to Hamas would face strong penalties under American anti-terrorism laws.
323
 
 
The Second Lebanon War 
 Finally, it is also important to mention the Second Lebanon War.  Launched by Israel 
between July 12 and August 14, 2006 in response to Hezbollah rocket fire into Israeli border 
towns, an anti-tank missile assault on two Israeli Humvees, and the capture of two Israeli 
soldiers (and killing of three others), Israel‘s operations against its northern neighbor marked a 
massive 34-day military conflict.  The war resulted in the death of approximately one thousand 
Lebanese civilians
324
, while damaging Lebanese civil infrastructure, and displacing 
approximately one million Lebanese
325
 (as well as 300-500 thousand Israelis
326).  Israel‘s 
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onslaught that lead to large numbers of civilian casualties—including its use of widely 
proscribed cluster bombs—against other Arabs and Muslims just north of the border almost 
certainly had a negative impact on any efforts at winning over popular support. 
 
Assessment Question 5:  How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode? 
 The overall outcome of this episode of strategic coercion was one of entrenched 
stalemate.  During this episode, Israel managed to further consolidate its security position 
through the separation barrier, controlling the boarders, coasts and airspace of the Territories, 
and launching multiple operations into Gaza.  Consequently, Israel was able to increasingly bring 
down casualty levels (despite increasing rocket and mortar attacks), as illustrated by figure 5.7:  
Figure 5.7: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 2004-2008
327
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  Several attempts at resuming political progress did take place during this episode.  The 
first transpired following the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, and the election of 
Mahmoud Abbas as President of the PA in January 2005.  During this period Sharon resumed 
political contacts with the PA and a cessation of hostilities was announced.  Abbas ordered 
security forces to prevent attacks against Israel, and Sharon moved to implement a number of 
goodwill gestures.  Abbas was unwilling and unable, however, to dismantle other extremist 
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad for fear of unleashing a civil war.  With electoral 
victories for Hamas in 2005 and 2006, maneuvering on negotiations towards any sort of political 
settlement was put on ice. 
 In late 2007, circumstances changed following the Annapolis Conference that was put 
together at the behest of the George W. Bush Administration.  An important conference, it 
marked the first time that the two-state solution was articulated as the mutually agreed-upon 
outline for a final settlement, and the willingness of an Israeli prime minister to engage in serious 
negotiations on all final-status issues.
328
 Unfortunately, though, negotiations under the aegis 
of the Annapolis Conference soon ran into problems as both sides had difficulties implementing 
obligations under the Quartet‘s 2003 Road Map.  Olmert‘s government, meanwhile, proved too 
weak to serve as a serious interlocutor on negotiations over final status issues—it possessed only 
48 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, and Shas (a prominent member of its coalition) used its 12 
seats to veto any serious discussion on the issue of Jerusalem and its division.  No position 
acceptable to the Palestinians could thus be negotiated.
329
  As a result, little real negotiated 
progress was achieved. 
 Finally, negotiations between Israel and Hamas—brokered by Egypt—were attempted to 
at least reach a ceasefire in 2008.  These were successful, resulting in a six-month ceasefire 
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beginning on June 19.
330
  However, following Israel‘s failure to ease restrictions on Gaza border 
controls and the blockade, and Hamas‘ intransigence over negotiations for the release of Gilad 
Shalit, the ceasefire was not extended and fell apart in late 2008, culminating in the 
commencement of Operation Cast Lead.  Despite the sending of George Mitchell as a US peace 
envoy in 2009 following the Israeli operation
331
, little progress has yet to manifest in regards to 
renewed negotiations. 
 In conclusion, despite the maintenance of violence levels at relatively low levels, 
Palestinian NSTOs (particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad) remained committed to pursuing 
terrorist violence—as evidenced by rocket and mortar attacks, attempts at suicide bombing, and a 
variety of other violent acts—and any real progress towards a political resolution or settlement 
(not to mention its implementation) remained elusive.  The level of success for this final episode 
of examined Israeli strategic coercion is thus assessed as ―moderate‖. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 The purpose of this dissertation has been to develop a theoretical framework drawing 
from strategic coercion literature, suitable for providing an explanation of the coercive elements 
necessary for bringing about an end to hostilities posed by formidable nationalistic substate 
terrorist organizations (NSTOs).  The result was the creation of the Balance Theory of strategic 
coercion, which contends that three key coercive elements are necessary to compel an enduring 
end to hostilities from an NSTO: isolation of external and international support, denial, and 
isolation of popular support.  Moreover, the Balance Theory also assumes an interdependence 
amongst these key elements; thus gains in one element may enable and lead to gains in another.  
Conversely, failure in one element may negatively impact other elements.  In review, the 
Balance Theory posits the following hypotheses: 
H1: The presence of overall significant to high levels of the key elements of isolation 
of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support will be 
associated with higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
H2: The presence of overall levels of failure or worse in the key elements will be 
associated with similar levels of failure in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
H3: Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial will 
correspond with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against an 
NSTO(s). 
 
H4: Significant to high levels of denial will correspond with no less than moderate 
levels of success (stalemate) in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
H5: Significant to high levels of isolation of popular support will correspond with 
higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 
 In order to assess the Balance Theory of strategic coercion and test the validity of its 
hypotheses, this dissertation has examined, through case-study analysis, the campaigns of 
strategic coercion pursued by Britain and Israel against Irish Republican and Palestinian NSTOs, 
over approximately a 40-year period in each case.  The result is that some 80-years of strategic 
coercion against NSTOs have been examined.  In conducting these case studies, moreover, the 
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method of focused, structured comparison has been applied to provide a standardized means of 
rigorous assessment of the two cases studied, and their multiple within-case episode (12 in total), 
so as to obtain as accurate an assessment of the validity of the Balance Theory and its hypotheses 
as possible. 
 This chapter provides: 1) a brief review of the results of the case-study analysis; 2) an 
assessment of the Balance Theory and its hypotheses; 3) an elaboration of the implications of the 
findings in this study; and 4) a conclusion that examines if and how the Balance Theory may 
offer policy advice in dealing with the pre-eminent substate terrorist organization of the modern 
day: Al Qaeda. 
 
Reviewing Results of Case-Study Analysis on British and Israeli Strategic 
Coercion against NSTOs 
 Both efforts of strategic coercion by the UK and Israel transpired in different ways.  For 
the British, efforts at strategic coercion began as a catastrophic failure in implementation of all 
three key coercive elements—and correspondingly, the outcome.  As the conflict progressed, 
however, the British were able to achieve a stalemate, bringing violence down to relatively 
acceptable levels through improved efforts at denial and isolation of external support.  By the 
latter stages of the conflict, following great strides in isolation of popular support, the British 
eventually set the stage for negotiations towards a political settlement, which they successfully 
achieved and implemented.  Conversely, in its efforts at strategic coercion, Israel began with 
better—albeit limited—end results in terms of success achieved against Palestinian NSTOs.  
However, while Israel‘s impressive efforts at isolation of external support and denial were often 
able to reduce violence to relatively ―acceptable‖ levels, little more than a stalemate was ever 
achieved in the face of abysmal efforts to isolate popular Palestinian support for NSTOs and 
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violence.  This stance in Israeli strategic coercion has largely remained unchanged—including 
during the peace process following the Oslo Accords—and remains in place today.   
 The following two figures provide a summary of the results of assessments involved in 
the case-study analysis of these two episodes: 
 
Figure 6.1: Assessment Results – UK vs Republican NSTOs, 1969-2007 
UK vs. Republican 
NSTOS 
Isolation: 
External Support 
Denial Isolation:  Popular 
Support 
Overall Success at 
Completion of 
Episode 
 
Episode 1: 
1969-1972 
 
Backfire Backfire Backfire Backfire 
Episode 2: 
1972-1975 
 
Failure Limited Limited Limited Success 
Episode 3: 
1975-1982 
 
Limited Significant Limited Moderate Success 
(Stalemate) 
 
Episode 4: 
1982-1989 
 
Limited Significant Limited Moderate Success 
(Stalemate) 
 
Episode 5: 
1989-1997 
 
Significant High Significant Significant Success 
Episode 6: 
1997-2007 
 
High High High High Success 
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Figure 6.2: Assessment Results – Israel vs Palestinian NSTOs, 1967-Present (2009) 
Israel vs. 
Palestinian NSTOs 
Isolation: External 
Support 
Denial Isolation:  Popular 
Support 
Overall Success at 
Completion of 
Episode 
 
Episode 1: 
1967-1977 
 
Limited Limited Limited Limited Success 
Episode 2: 
1977-1987 
 
Limited Significant Backfire Moderate Success 
(Stalemate) 
 
Episode 3: 
1987-1991 
 
Limited Limited Backfire Limited Success 
Episode 4: 
1991-2001 
 
Significant Limited Backfire Backfire 
Episode 5: 
2001-2004 
 
Significant Significant Backfire Moderate Success 
(Stalemate) 
 
Episode 6: 
2004-2009 
 
Significant Significant Backfire Moderate Success 
(Stalemate) 
 
 
Assessing the Balance Theory 
 Having compiled the results of the case-study analysis conducted, it is now possible to 
assess the validity of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, beginning with an evaluation of 
its hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of overall significant to high levels
1
 of the key elements of 
isolation of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support will be 
associated with higher
2
 levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 This hypothesis was confirmed in two regards.  To begin, of the only two within-case 
episodes to achieve a level of success of ―significant‖ or ―high‖, an overall significant to high 
level of the key elements was present.  In the first case—the UK versus Republican NSTOs, 
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Episode 5 (1989-1997)—a significant level of isolation of external support, a high level of 
denial, and a significant level of isolation of popular support were present.  The outcome, in turn, 
was one of significant success—that is violence levels were kept ―acceptably‖ low, some 
important political resolution was achieved, and the ground was set for a future political 
settlement.  
 In the second case—being the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 6 (1997-2007)—
high levels were present in all three elements of isolation of external support, denial, and 
isolation of popular support.  Correspondingly, the outcome achieved was a high success, 
marked by an enduring ceasefire by the Provisional IRA implemented in July 1997, the 
establishment and implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in May 1998, the 
decommissioning (or disarming) of IRA weapon stockpiles in October 2001, the announcement 
of a formal and permanent end to the Provisional IRA‘s armed campaign in July 2005, and the 
erection of the new devolved power-sharing government of Northern Ireland in March 2007.  
Further, while splinter groups such as the Real and Continuity IRA continue to exist, they lack 
popular and external support, and their capacity to successfully carryout terrorist attacks has been 
kept at considerably low levels through effective denial efforts. 
 Moreover—and in the second regard of confirmation—in all of the examined within-case 
episodes where overall significant to high levels of the three key elements were not present, a 
higher level of overall success was not achieved at the conclusion of the episode of strategic 
coercion.  Thus, after examining approximately 80 years of strategic coercion efforts in two 
different historic instances by democratic states against NSTOs, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.  In 
both cases where higher levels of success were achieved, overall significant to high levels of 
isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support were also 
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present.  In all cases where overall significant to high levels of the key coercive elements were 
not present, higher levels of success in the outcome of strategic coercion were not achieved.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of overall levels of failure or worse in the key elements will be 
associated with similar levels of failure in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 Evidence from the results of case-study analysis provided limited support for this 
hypothesis.  This assertion was confirmed in one of the two cases where a coercive backfire took 
place.  This case was that of the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 2 (1969-1972).  In that 
episode, overall levels of backfire in isolation of external support, denial, and isolation of 
popular support also corresponded with an outcome of backfire in strategic coercion.  In the 
other case of failure/backfire, however, similar overall levels in the three key coercive elements 
were not present.  In this case of Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs, Episode 4 (1991-2000), the 
level of isolation of external support was ranked as significant, the level of denial was limited, 
and only the level of isolation of popular support was assessed as backfire.  Yet a backfire in the 
overall outcome of strategic coercion transpired nonetheless.   
 Having conducted the case-study analysis of this episode, a qualitative assessment would 
explain the second backfire in the outcome of strategic coercion as follows.  Isolation of popular 
support against Palestinian NSTOs and their campaign of terrorist violence was initially won 
through the Oslo Accords and promise of peace.  By the end of the episode, however, not only 
had many of the major political issues remained, many of them had been exacerbated, with the 
number of settlers doubling, land continuing to be seized to protect, expand and link settlements, 
and stiff Israeli enforced security regulations remaining in place.  To Palestinians, what was 
initially seen as a peace process leading to an acceptable resolution of the political status quo 
became perceived as an underhanded means of consolidating Israeli control of Palestinian land, 
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while Palestinian lives did not improve and the realization of a Palestinian state appeared an 
increasingly distant dream.  Accordingly, by the end of the episode, isolation of popular support 
had completely backfired, moving rapidly towards the embrace of violence—especially 
following Ariel Sharon‘s visit to the Temple Mount/Harem al-Sharif and the ensuing riots. 
 While a backfire in terms of isolation of popular support was also present in many other 
episodes of Israeli strategic coercion (Episodes 2 through 6), this was accompanied in Episode 4 
by an altered situation in terms of Israeli denial.  In accordance with the peace process, security 
responsibilities and policing duties had been transferred over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 
many Palestinian urban centers within the Occupied Territories—referred to as ―A‖ areas.  
Overall, as long as the PA and the Palestinian Security Services (PSS) embraced the peace 
process, they generally co-operated with Israel in maintaining counter-terrorism efforts within 
the Territories (despite a number of early challenges).  When their cooperation disappeared, 
following public outrage over lack of progress and unmet expectations with the peace process, 
these areas effectively became sanctuaries for Palestinian NSTOs in terms of stockpiling 
weapons and explosives, planning and launching attacks, and evading Israeli security forces.  
The combination of this striking room provided for by these new security arrangements and the 
outrage at the ineffectiveness of the peace process—not to mention a general failure in Israel‘s 
popular isolation strategy—allowed for an explosion in violence and a rapidly deteriorating 
situation embodied in the Al Aqsa Intifada. 
 Thus, in the second case, even though levels of isolation of external support and denial 
remained significant and limited, respectively, a backfire still transpired in strategic coercion.  
The conclusion that can perhaps thus be reached is that while failure or worse in all three key 
elements will result in a similar outcome for strategic coercion, such a failure (or worse) may be 
accounted for in other coercive circumstances that are not as deficient overall.  Alternatively, 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
272 
limited to significant degrees of success in two of the key coercive elements may still result in 
the failure/backfire of strategic coercion overall against the NSTO.   
 To provide a clearer understanding of what might produce an outcome of failure, and 
better test this hypothesis, further research could prove most helpful.  Such research would 
provide needed insights through identifying a wider number of cases of failure/backfire in 
strategic coercion against NSTOs, and investigate the possible causes associated with this failure. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial will 
correspond with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against an 
NSTO(s). 
 Hypothesis 3 was confirmed in the results of case study analysis.  In no instance was an 
outcome greater than ―limited success‖ achieved while the overall levels of both isolation of 
external support and denial were limited or below.  This situation was illustrated in four of the 
within-case episodes, as depicted in figure 6.3:  
 
Figure 6.3: Assessment of Cases with a Limited (or Less) Implementation of External Isolation and Denial 
 
Within-Case Episodes Isolation: External 
Support 
Denial Overall Success at 
Completion of Episode 
 
UK vs Republican NSTOs, 
Episode 1: 
1969-1972 
 
Backfire Backfire Backfire 
UK vs Republican NSTOs, 
Episode 2: 
1972-1975 
 
Failure Limited Limited Success 
Israel vs Palestinian 
NSTOS, Episode 1: 
1967-1977 
 
Limited Limited Limited Success 
Israel vs Palestinian 
NSTOS, Episode 3: 
1987-1991 
 
Limited Limited Limited Success 
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Still, it is also important to note that an overall level rising above limited implementation 
of isolation of external support and denial does not guarantee that the outcome of strategic 
coercion will rise above ―limited success‖.  This was demonstrated in Israel versus Palestinian 
NSTOs, Episode 4 (1991-2000).  In that case, a significant level of external isolation was 
achieved, and denial was implemented to a limited extent.  Nonetheless—and as discussed 
above—a backfire in overall strategic coercion still resulted.  Thus, while overall levels of 
limited implementation or below of isolation of external support and denial may correlate with 
no more than limited levels of success, the presence of levels of implementation beyond this do 
not necessarily guarantee greater gains in the outcome of strategic coercion. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Significant to high levels of denial will correspond with no less than moderate 
levels of success (stalemate) in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 The results of case study analysis supported this hypothesis.  In all cases where 
significant to high levels of denial had been implemented, the outcome of strategic coercion bore 
no less than moderate success.  This is illustrated in figure 6.4: 
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Figure 6.4: Assessment of Cases with a Significant to High Implementation of Denial 
 
Within-Case Episodes Denial Overall Success at Completion of 
Episode 
 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 3: 
1975-1982 
 
Significant Moderate Success (Stalemate) 
 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 4: 
1982-1989 
 
Significant Moderate Success (Stalemate) 
 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 5: 
1989-1997 
 
High Significant Success 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 6: 
1997-2007 
 
High High Success 
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS,  
Episode 2: 
1977-1987 
 
Significant Moderate Success (Stalemate) 
 
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS,  
Episode 5: 
2001-2004 
 
Significant Moderate Success (Stalemate) 
 
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS,  
Episode 6: 
2004-2009 
 
Significant Moderate Success (Stalemate) 
 
 
 It is important to note, however, that while the presence of significant to high levels of strategic 
coercion correlated with no less than moderate levels of success, in only two of the seven cases 
demonstrating such levels of denial was an outcome greater than moderate success achieved.  In 
the majority of circumstances (five out of seven cases), a stalemate ensued, whereby despite the 
constraint of violence to levels considered ―acceptably‖ low, the NSTO remained committed to 
continuing its campaign of terrorist violence, with little hope of a resolution to the conflict in 
sight.  Thus, while significant to high levels of denial may be a necessary component in 
achieving at least moderate success, high levels of implementation of this coercive element alone 
do not guarantee higher levels of success in strategic coercion. 
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Hypothesis 5: Significant to high levels of isolation of popular support will correspond with 
higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s). 
 Evidence from case-study analysis supports Hypothesis 5: in the only two cases where 
significant to high levels of isolation of popular support were implemented, higher levels of 
success in the outcome of strategic coercion were also achieved.  Figure 6.5 illustrates this:  
 
Figure 6.5: Assessment of Cases with a Significant to High Implementation of Popular Isolation 
 
Within-Case Episodes Isolation: Popular Support Overall Success at Completion of 
Episode 
 
UK versus Republican NSTOs, 
Episode 5: 
1989-1997 
 
Significant Significant Success 
UK versus Republican NSTOS, 
Episode 6: 
1997-2007 
 
High High Success 
 
  
Interestingly, in all cases where significant to high levels of isolation of popular support 
were not present, higher levels of success in the outcome of strategic coercion were also not 
present.  However, it is important to note that despite the apparent correlation between 
significant to high levels of isolation of popular support and success, higher levels of isolation of 
popular support were only manifest in cases whereby an overall significant to high level of 
denial and isolation of external support were also present.  Indeed, even the achievement of 
limited implementation of popular isolation was not recorded to have transpired where the level 
of denial itself was not at least limited or greater.  This is illustrated in figure 6.6: 
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Figure 6.6: Assessment of Limited and Greater Levels of Popular Isolation  
 
Within-Case Episodes Isolation:  
External Support 
Denial Isolation:   
Popular Support 
 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 2: 
1972-1975 
 
Failure Limited Limited 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 3: 
1975-1982 
 
Limited Significant Limited 
UK vs Republican NSTOs,  
Episode 4: 
1982-1989 
 
Limited Significant Limited 
UK versus Republican 
NSTOs, Episode 5: 
1989-1997 
 
Significant High Significant 
UK versus Republican 
NSTOS, Episode 6: 
1997-2007 
 
High High High 
Israel vs Palestinian 
NSTOS, Episode 1: 
1967-1977 
 
Limited Limited Limited 
 
 This is not to say that significant to high levels of either isolation of external support or 
denial (or both) promote higher levels of isolation of popular support.  Indeed, in a number of 
cases the reverse was true, particularly when security-centric external isolation and denial 
strategies were conducted at the expense of isolation of popular support, resulting in high 
collateral damage, civilian casualties, and the emergence of new grievances.  However, what can 
be inferred from this discussion of the evidence is that despite the correlation between higher 
levels of popular isolation and higher levels of success in outcomes of strategic coercion against 
NSTOs, attaining such higher levels of isolation of popular support is not possible without first 
implementing significant to high levels of external isolation and denial. 
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Assessing the Possible Influence of Additional Factors 
 Having monitored for alternative influences over the course of case-study analysis, it is 
possible that both the levels of the key elements of strategic coercion and the outcome observed 
may have been skewed by additional factors.  These factors can be broken down into: 1) 
alternative coercive elements that were employed; 2) salient occurrences/circumstances recorded 
in the histories; and 3) influential international events.   
 
Alternative Coercive Elements 
 Three alternative coercive elements were observed within the case-episodes studied that 
may have impacted the levels of isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation 
of popular support, as well as the outcome observed, in both positive and negative fashions.  
These alternative coercive elements include decapitation, punishment targeted against NSTOs, 
and punishment targeted against the civilian population/collective punishment.  In the case of 
decapitation, this alternative coercive element demonstrated a tendency to both positively and 
negatively impact the level of denial, as well as the outcome, observed.  In the one case of 
positive influence
3
, for example, decapitation managed to empower moderate elements leading 
to a relatively-lengthy ceasefire.  The result was lowered levels of violence, which both affected 
the measurement of the observed outcome, and allowed security forces to regroup and improve 
denial efforts.    
In several other cases, however, the results of decapitation likely had a negative impact 
on the level of denial and outcome observed.  In these instances
4
, decapitation efforts that 
eliminated prominent figures within the NSTO were often followed by waves of revenge 
                                                 
3
 See the case of the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 2 (1972-1975), following decapitation carried out 
through the arrest of younger radical leadership elements within the Provisional IRA, known as the ―Young Turks‖. 
4
 For particularly salient examples, see Israel‘s assassinations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders: Fathi Shqaqi 
(1995), Yahya Ayyash (1996), Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (2004), and Abdel Aziz Rantisi (2004). 
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violence—confounding denial efforts through heightened and/or renewed levels of motivation to 
carry-out attacks on the part of the NSTO, as well as skewing the outcome observed through 
higher levels of violence suffered by the democratic state.  Additionally, decapitation efforts also 
demonstrated a tendency to negatively impact the level of isolation of popular support in 
instances where assassination strikes were accompanied by high-levels of civilian casualties. 
Regarding the punishment strikes targeted against NSTOs, this alternative element of 
coercion appeared to have a mixed affect in influencing the key coercive elements of denial and 
isolation of popular support.  Punishment targeted against the NSTO and its operatives, for 
example, demonstrated a positive influence in several instances, deterring further acts of 
terrorism for fear of lethal response.
5
  This positive effect, however, was limited in instances 
where the NSTO‘s membership were (or had become) committed to acts of suicide terrorism and 
martyrdom.  Punishment targeted against NSTOs also demonstrated a capacity to negatively 
influence the level of isolation of popular support.  This was the case when public furor was 
roused following the perception that the security forces were acting as executioners rather than 
protectors
6
, as well as following punishment measures that indirectly had a negative effect upon 
the populace themselves—including the demolition of homes and property, and high-civilian 
casualties resulting from collateral damage.
7
 
Finally, punishment targeted against the civilian population—also referred to as 
―collective punishment‖—also appeared to play a role in impacting the levels of external and 
popular isolation observed.  While it is controversial to allege that either state employed 
measures amounting to collective punishment, from the perspective of Catholic Nationalist and 
Palestinian communities the British and Israelis did employ such measures through the 
                                                 
5
 For examples, see the British shoot-to-kill policy in the 1970s and 1980s, and Israel‘s no-negotiations stance 
accompanied by lethal response to hostage-takers in the 1970s. 
6
 For a prominent example, reference the SAS killing of three suspected IRA terrorist in Gibraltar in 1988. 
7
 See fallout within the Palestinian communities following Israel‘s policy of ―targeted killings‖ against known 
operatives of Palestinian NSTOs that often resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. 
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imposition of extended curfews, internment, and travel restrictions.  Israel also enacted such 
measures as the demolition of entire apartment structures terrorists may have hidden in, and 
blockading Gaza following the election and maintenance of support for Hamas.  It is unclear 
whether or not such actions played any significant role in reducing popular support for NSTOs 
by turning the populace against these terrorist organizations—or in deterring those who were 
already sympathetic to the NSTOs from continuing to lend their support.  What was clear from 
case-study analysis, however, was that these actions negatively impacted the level of isolation of 
popular support through rousing the ire of the local populace, and may have even helped increase 
the levels of external/international support available to the NSTO(s) depending on how grievous 
the instance of collective punishment was. 
 
Salient Occurrences/Circumstance and Influential International Events 
 In addition to the presence of alternative coercive elements, other factors such as salient 
occurrences and circumstances, as well as influential international events, may have impacted the 
levels of the key elements of strategic coercion and the outcomes observed.  Beginning with 
salient occurrences/circumstances, overkill perpetrated by NSTOs demonstrated a tendency to 
have a positive impact on the level of popular isolation.  In these instances
8
, particularly 
gruesome acts of violence that claimed the lives of many civilians served to turn off popular 
support.  Meanwhile, the presence of a head of state/government widely resented by the 
populace/community championed by the NSTO
9
 may have resulted in a negative impact upon 
attempts to isolate popular support and the outcome of strategic coercion observed.  The very 
                                                 
8
 Reference the following perpetrated by the IRA: ―Bloody Friday‖ in July 1973; the bombing of La Mon House in 
1978; the 1987 Enniskillen bombing; the IRA‘s use of the ―human bomb‖ in the early 1990s; the Teebane 
Crossroads Massacre in 1992; and the Omagh bombing in 1998. 
9
 For notable examples, see the presence of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in the UK, who was resented for 
her role in the death of the 1981 Hunger Strikers, and Ariel Sharon as prime minister in Israel, who was associated 
with the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres, the designing of Israel‘s settlement policy, and the trigger for 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
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presence of such figures may have served to arouse consternation within the susceptible 
population(s), while impeding any efforts towards negotiated political progress.
10
 
 Another salient factor observed included governmental disunity, which may have served 
to exacerbate the outcome observed.  This was potentially the case through disunity: 1) 
confounding efforts towards political resolution and progress towards a negotiated settlement by 
depriving the state‘s leadership of the necessary political flexibility;11 and 2) undermining the 
credibility of any settlement proposed by the government during negotiations with the NSTO.
12
 
 Political courage—of both the state‘s government, as well as the NSTO‘s leadership—
also presented another potential factor that influenced the outcome observed.  In particular, a 
lack of political courage tended to negatively impact the outcome, resulting in stalled 
negotiations (if negotiations transpired at all) and limited political progress.  High levels of 
political courage, however, helped drive forward political progress and negotiations, without 
which the highest levels of success observed in this study likely would not have been possible.
13
  
Similarly, the loss of a strong leading individual possessing political courage demonstrated a 
propensity to have a negative impact on the observed outcome through undermining attempts at 
negotiations, and/or the implementation of any political agreements.
14
 
                                                 
10
 Witness the deadlock within the Northern Ireland conflict over political progress and negotiations until the end of 
the Thatcher government. 
11
 For prominent examples, see: 1) The case of the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 5 (1989-1997) whereby 
John Major‘s government was constrained in needing the approval of Unionists to maintain its thin Conservative 
majority in British Parliament (resulting in decommissioning becoming an insurmountable issue); 2) Israel 
throughout the peace process under the Oslo (Episode 4, 1991-2001); and 3) Israel under Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert during the Annapolis Conference negotiations, with Kadima‘s minority government in the Knesset held 
hostage to intransigent positions taken by parties such as Shas (Episode 6, 2004-2009). 
12
 For a possible example, see the failure of Ehud Barak‘s attempts at Camp David II and Taba II, where his 
proposals were offered whilst he held a very weak position in the Israeli government that made it apparent that any 
concessions that he promised would be difficult to implement. 
13
 For perhaps the most important example of political courage on all sides, see the UK versus Republican NSTOs, 
Episode 6, 1997-2007; such courage helped lead to the achievement of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and its 
subsequent implementation. 
14
 For good examples, see William Whitelaw‘s departure as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland following the 
achievement of the Sunningdale Agreement, and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. 
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 A further salient circumstance/occurrence observed involved the unilateral removal of 
support from state benefactors that had come into conflict with their NSTO client(s).  Such 
occurrences tended to correspond with a positive impact on the level of external/international 
isolation.  This tended to result as a consequence of funds, weapons, and sanctuaries once 
available to the NSTO drying up, often following either the shifting political interests of the state 
benefactor, or an event upsetting the state sponsor‘s government with the NSTO recipient.15 
 Finally, significant international events may also have affected the levels of the key 
elements of strategic coercion and the outcome observed.  Such events may include global 
recessions that can undermine the economic policies of a state aimed at reducing poverty levels 
to assuage extremism.
16
  Others may entail high profile international events that either positively 
or negatively affect isolation of external support through constraining the availability of 
international aid to the NSTO,
17
 or strengthening the position of the NSTO (morally, politically, 
and/or tangibly) in its conflict with the democratic state.
18
 
 International events of consequence may also involve major operations or wars carried 
out by the democratic state that affect the NSTO‘s co-religionists/ethnic groups/nationalists in 
other parts of the world.  These foreign interventions may adversely affect efforts to isolate 
popular support through arousing public furor as a consequence of excessive collateral damage 
on the part of the state.
19
  Additionally, a particular international event that demonstrated a 
capacity to adversely impact overall denial and popular isolation efforts involved the granting of 
                                                 
15
 For notable examples, see: Amman‘s ouster of the PLO from Jordan following Black September (1970); Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf States pulling hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from the PLO following Yasser 
Arafat‘s endorsement of Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait; and in the case of Northern Ireland, Qaddafi‘s 
cessation of support in the 1970s and 1980s following a media scandal and his embarrassment at being caught 
directly supporting the IRA. 
16
 This was clearly an issue during Episodes 2 and 3 (1972-1982) of the UK versus Republican NSTOs. 
17
 For events that helped constrain the availability of international aid to the NSTOs, reference the end of the Cold 
War and collapse of the Soviet Union, and the major terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
18
 See the Arab oil embargo in 1973, following the Yom Kippur War that served to coercively increase international 
political and diplomatic support for the cause championed by Palestinian NSTOs. 
19
 For examples, see major Israeli operations in Lebanon during Episodes 4, 5, and 6 (1991-2009), and the ensuing 
consequences for its public image in the region. 
Michael Andrew Berger 
 
282 
unilateral concessions by the state to NSTOs faced in different conflicts.
20
  Such events may have 
served to undermine denial through reinvigorating the motivation of NSTOs to pursue hostilities, 
and negatively impacted isolation of popular support through demonstrating the effectiveness of 
violence in changing the political status quo to susceptible populaces. 
 
Limitations of Findings 
 Prior to elaborating upon the overall assessment of the validity of the Balance Theory, it 
is important to discuss the limitations of the methodology used to test this theory, as well as the 
theory itself.  Methodologically, it should be noted that while the comparative case-study method 
has been employed in order to provide a greater test for the Balance Theory‘s generalizability (or 
external validity), only two different historical cases were examined.   Furthermore, while 
the cases analyzed possessed adequate degrees of control and variation, both cases were of 
Western-styled democracies.  Providing case-analysis of historical instances involving 
governments that were not Western-styled democracies would further enhance an understanding 
of the applicability of the Balance Theory.   
 Moreover, it should also be mentioned that the lack of (within-)cases illustrating higher 
levels of success in strategic coercion—only two in total—may have hampered validity 
assessments (though this may be a simple reflection of how inherently difficult it is to pursue 
strategic coercion against NSTOs).  Alternatively, only two cases present exhibited an outcome 
of failure or worse (backfire).  The shortcoming associated with this is that a more robust 
explanation could not be established accounting for the factors (coercive elements or otherwise) 
leading to the failure of strategic coercion against an NSTO.  Still, given the scope of analysis—
                                                 
20
 Perhaps the most notable example of this to be found in the episodes examined transpired in the case of Israel 
versus Palestinian NSTOs in Episode 4, following Israel‘s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 in the face of 
assaults from Hezbollah—and the corresponding resurgence of support for armed struggle within Palestinian 
communities and NSTOs that followed. 
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approximately 40 years of strategic coercion in each context over multiple within-case 
episodes—it would have been difficult to have provided additional cases and further analysis 
given the constraints of this dissertation.  However, future research, specifically aimed at 
examining the external validity of either the Balance Theory, or the applications of strategic 
coercion in general against NSTOs, would benefit from a more expansive range of cases—
particularly ones that involved clear instances of success and, conversely, failure. 
 Further, another methodological challenge hampering empirical observation of the 
Balance Theory and its hypotheses through case-study analysis included isolating the influence 
of alternative independent variables.  Such additional independent variables included alternative 
coercive elements, salient occurrences/circumstances, and influential international events that 
transpired during the within-case episodes.  As was evident from the preceding discussion, the 
presence of such independent variables may have skewed (both positively and negatively) the 
achievement of the key levels of strategic coercion and the outcome observed.  Such an issue is 
typical of the problems associated with the empirical examination of social phenomena, and in 
studies such as this—that examine more than one or two cases in a highly complex environment 
exposed to the influence of a confluence of factors—completely isolating for these influences is 
very difficult if not impossible.  The best that could be achieved throughout the course of this 
theoretical assessment was controlling for the possible influence of such alternative independent 
variables through actively monitoring for their influence in each within-case episode.    
 Regarding the Balance Theory itself, three theoretical limitations should be pointed out.  
The first is that while the Balance Theory may be correct in contending that failure or worse will 
occur in efforts at strategic coercion when overall levels of failure/backfire are present in the 
three key coercive elements, other conditions may also account for failure.  As was seen in Israel 
versus Palestinian NSTOs, Episode 4 (1991-2000), a backfire in strategic coercion occurred 
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while significant and limited levels of external isolation and denial (respectively) were present.  
What can be inferred from this is that other conditions may account for failure in strategic 
coercion against NSTOs.  Accordingly, both the Balance Theory and strategic coercion literature 
in general would benefit from future research geared towards investigating specific conditions 
leading to failure in coercive endeavors aimed at compelling an end to hostilities from NSTOs. 
 The second limitation is that the significant to high presence of all three elements of 
strategic coercion by themselves may not ultimately bring about an end to the conflict in terms of 
ensuring the successful negotiation of a political settlement and its implementation (should the 
state deem this necessary).  As seen in the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 5 (1989-
1997), despite an overall significant to high presence of the three key elements, the attainment of 
a political settlement—or even negotiations towards it—was constrained by the political 
exigencies of the Conservative government of John Major regarding the issue of 
decommissioning.  Thus, it should be noted that while these three key elements may serve as an 
important precondition for success in such negotiations, what will also be required are the skilled 
efforts of committed and courageous interlocutors whose position in government is well-
supported. 
 Third, simply because the Balance Theory prescribes the levels of certain coercive 
elements necessary to achieve success against NSTOs, it does not mean that any state (or state 
government) may simply be able to implement them.  High levels of entrenched 
international/external support will always be difficult to resolve—whether by force or 
persuasion—as Israel, a strong state, can work to reduce Iranian and Syrian support for 
Palestinian NSTOs, but cannot eliminate it.  Meanwhile hardline elements within a state‘s own 
democratic constituency may be reluctant to engage in popular isolation strategies or pursue 
negotiations with the NSTO.  Finally, implementing effective denial strategies is also a difficult 
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task.  This may require resources (material, financial, technological) that the challenged 
democratic state may not possess or cannot afford without outside support.  Alternatively, active 
denial operations can raise public and international criticism (both in terms of civilian casualties 
and the state‘s own body count), and the strategic culture of some democratic states may simply 
not be up to the challenge of committing itself to such possibly bloody tasks. 
 
Overall Assessment of the Balance Theory of Strategic Coercion 
 Despite its limitations, the Balance Theory of strategic coercion held widely true through 
the course of analysis conducted.  In two different historical cases, over a total of 80 combined 
years of strategic coercion against NSTOs and 12 within-case episodes, the Balance Theory and 
its hypotheses proved largely accurate.  Overall significant to high levels of the three key 
coercive elements—isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular 
support—correlated with higher levels of success in strategic coercion aimed at compelling an 
end to hostilities against NSTOs.  Failure or worse in the outcome of strategic coercion occurred 
in association with levels of failure or worse in the implementation of the three key coercive 
elements—even if this was not the only circumstance under which a failure/backfire in strategic 
coercion might transpire.  Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and 
denial corresponded with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against 
NSTOs.  Significant to high levels of denial corresponded with no less than moderate levels of 
success, and only in instances where a significant to high level of isolation of popular support 
was achieved was a significant to high level of success also the result of strategic coercion 
against the NSTO(s) in question. 
Accordingly, as contended in Chapter III, each element played its own part in 
contributing to the success (or failure) of strategic coercion against the NSTO(s).  Isolation of 
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external support and denial were necessary to rein in violence and the NSTO‘s capacity to 
operate and strike.  Moreover, the implementation of significant to high levels of denial—made 
possible through at least the limited implementation of isolation of external support—served to 
ensure a great reduction in violence-levels, while demonstrating to the NSTO that its campaign 
of terror would not produce an unconditional surrender on the part of the democratic state (often 
resulting in the moderation of the NSTO‘s end-objectives).  Isolation of popular support, 
meanwhile, was specifically required in order to attain levels of success beyond that of a 
stalemate through weakening, exposing and pressuring the NSTO, as well as bringing about the 
requisite progress towards political resolution necessary for ending the conflict and/or 
compelling the NSTO (or NSTOs) to end its campaign of terror and renounce violence against 
the democratic state and its interests.   
 Regardless of the additional factors also accounted for throughout the extensive analysis 
conducted, these principles of the Balance Theory held true in each of the 12 case-episodes 
examined.  Without the three key elements present in significant to high levels, successful 
strategic coercion against NSTOs was not to be found.  And in the only instances where higher 
levels of success were achieved, the three key elements were present at significant levels or 
above.  Though additional factors may have aided (or confounded) the achievement of these 
significant to high levels of the key elements, the Balance Theory held correct in that these three 
coercive elements—isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular 
support—were ultimately the most important strategic factors in achieving success against 
NSTOs.  And in line with the evidence that supported the Balance Theory‘s hypotheses, these 
elements mutually assisted one another in the overall campaign of strategic coercion. 
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 In conclusion, the Balance Theory of strategic coercion is assessed as demonstrating high 
validity in determining both the coercive elements necessary for achieving success against 
NSTOs, as well as how these elements work together to accomplish this end-result. 
 
Implications 
 As a result of the study conducted, a theory of strategic coercion specifically applied to 
the formulation of strategy for countering the terrorist threat of NSTOs has been established  
for the first time.  Consequently, a number of important implications derived from the findings of 
this study need to be considered in terms of: 1) theory; and 2) policy. 
 
Implications for Theory 
 The Balance Theory holds a number of relevant points for consideration amongst 
students of strategic coercion theory.  The first is that typical coercive instruments such as 
punishment and denial are not enough to achieve success against formidable nationalistic 
substate terrorist organizations.  Punishment is likely to backfire in instances where it is used 
excessively, and will likely enjoy only limited utility outside of coercing state sponsors of the 
NSTO.  Denial is a very important feature, but pursued alone it will likely achieve at best a 
stalemate, which will only last until the NSTO finds a way around such denial-based measures. 
 Two additional strategic conditions are thus also necessary, being isolation of 
external/international support and isolation of popular support.  Isolation of these two elements is 
needed in order to create a sense of despair and vulnerability on the part of the NSTO in its 
decision-making calculus.  Isolation of external/international support is also needed, in 
particular, to enable denial efforts, so as to create a sense of hopelessness and demonstrate to the 
NSTO and its members that they cannot achieve a successful alteration of the status quo through 
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terrorist means, nor avoid the repercussions of pursuing such a violent strategy.  Isolation of 
popular support, meanwhile, provides additional stimulus through: 1) depriving the NSTO of the 
political motivation required to compel its violent action onwards; and 2) creating popular 
resistance to the NSTO‘s terrorist campaign that may force it to moderate its methods, and at the 
very least will constrain the support available to it. 
 Furthermore, unlike in cases against conventional state actors where the primary target of 
coercion is an opposing state government, strategic coercion against substate terrorist 
organizations claiming to champion the political cause of a people or peoples must be directed 
against the decision-making calculus of multiple groups, including: 
 The NSTO‘s leadership cadre 
 Members of the NSTO, as well as those providing support to it (active and 
passive) 
 The population(s) the NSTO claims to champion and draw support from 
 States/external sources providing material aid and sanctuary to the NSTO(s) 
 Possibly other groups/communities that have a stake in the outcome of the 
conflict  
 
Addressing so many different groups through the application of strategic coercion is a much 
more complicated task than in more conventional episodes of state-to-state coercion, and will 
require a balance of the effective implementation of the three key elements of coercion.   
Such a balance is necessary to demonstrate to the NSTO‘s leadership and members the 
futility of its methods and, and the costly consequences associated with them.  It will be 
necessary to convince and/or win over elements providing support (passive or active) to refrain 
from doing so, if not place pressure on the NSTO(s) to pursue a non-violent (potentially 
negotiated) solution to their grievances.  And such balance may also be necessary to compel 
additional substate groups party to the conflict (particularly those championing other minority or 
majority groups) to refrain from violence exacerbating the conflict.  Achieving such a balance 
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will require the effective implementation of isolation of external support, denial, and isolation of 
popular support—and only through doing so will real success be achieved in strategic coercion 
aimed towards compelling an end to the threat of violence from an NSTO (or NSTOs).  
 
Implications for Policy  
 Lessons from the Balance Theory and its accompanying examination point to the reality 
that a balance must be struck between the forceful and accommodating ends of the spectrum 
when employing strategic coercion against NSTOs.  The message this should send regarding 
policy is that neither a strategy that is mainly centered on denial through implementing security 
measures and using military coercion against external supporters, nor one that is almost entirely 
focused on isolation of popular support through addressing root causes and grievances is enough.  
A balanced mixture between the two approaches is required. 
 There is a clear necessity to use the instrument of force in denial, and possibly in external 
isolation measures, in order to secure the situation.  If the situation cannot be secured, terrorist 
violence reined in, and the NSTO convinced that its violent actions will not succeed in producing 
the political change coveted, then efforts at isolation of popular support will likely achieve only 
limited results at best.  At worst, such popular isolation attempts in lieu of a secure situation will 
encourage the NSTO to carry on, convinced that it is compelling such change through terrorist 
action, while the situation violently spirals out of control.  
 However, isolation of popular support will be required in order to achieve higher, more 
enduring levels of success.  Without it, the NSTO(s)—or new rival/splinter groups—will 
continue to be motivated to pursue terrorist violence to change the status quo, and they will 
continue to be supported by their communities in pursuing such ends.  In providing for popular 
isolation, what will be needed is a degree of accommodation to political concerns, addressing 
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perceived grievances while avoiding the creation of new ones, keeping civilian casualties to 
minimal levels, and—if necessary—negotiating a political settlement to alter the status quo. 
 In implementing popular isolation, moreover, it is best to avoid moves that either involve, 
or can be interpreted as, punishment against the population/community that the NSTO(s) draws 
support from/champions.  While such measures may have an initial effect of making the 
population resent the NSTO, the more likely result—especially over the long-term—is that the 
populace/community will resent the democratic state, and side with the NSTO against it.   
 Perhaps of greatest importance to remember is that popular isolation involves a large 
component of perception.  Besides tangible issues such as avoiding civilian casualties, excessive 
force, ameliorating dire humanitarian situations, etc., of utmost importance is the necessity to 
convince the opposing community supporting the NSTO that violence is not necessary, and an 
alternative, non-violent approach is (credibly) available for adequately addressing issues in the 
current status quo that cause friction.  Doing so will be of particular value in situations that 
involve the legitimate claims of multiple groups regarding control of land or the rights of 
significant minority (or majority) groups, where a political settlement achieved through 
negotiations may be necessary to resolve the conflict. 
 Finally, it should be noted that there are no shortcuts in pursuing strategic coercion 
against NSTOs.  Simply focusing on decapitation efforts is unlikely to produce any lasting 
results.  They certainly did not do so in the case of either the UK or Israel in approximately 40 
years of strategic coercion for each.  Moreover, the result of pursuing decapitation measures is 
usually mixed, and can have seriously adverse consequences both in terms of popular isolation 
and in generating waves of revenge attacks that challenge denial efforts.  What is required 
instead for strategic coercion to be successful against NSTOs is the effective implementation of 
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the three key coercive elements and, based on the British and Israeli experiences, accomplishing 
this may ultimately require several decades of effort. 
 
Addressing Instances Where Success Has Been Achieved Through a Primarily Military-
Centric Approach  
 Before proceeding further, it is also important to address instances where success has 
been achieved against NSTOs without much ―balance‖ through a military or force-centric 
approach.  In these instances—for example an in the case of Algeria versus the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA)—the method of strategic coercion employed involves a very heavy focus on denial 
and, if necessary, isolation of external support (often pursued through force-centric measures).  
Efforts towards isolation of popular support are generally relegated to an ancillary concern, and 
where pursued tend to essentially confront the population with a choice: stop supporting 
terrorists or you will be violently punished (similar to the ―cost/benefits ratio‖ approach of Wolf 
and Leites discussed in Chapter II).  Hearts and minds operations tend to be a distant concern.    
 History reveals that such strategies can produce success.  This is especially the case 
where the substate terrorist organization possesses a large traditional guerrilla element—that is, it 
seeks to gain, hold and control territory of its own.  Removing its ability to control such territory 
may give way to a more conventional-style defeat.  Such an approach is also facilitated by cases 
where the NSTO does the job for the government of isolating popular support against it, as was 
the case in the aforementioned Algeria where the GIA‘s terrorist massacres against fellow 
Muslim Algerians helped to turn people away from the organization.   
 Regardless, there are two clear problems with such strategies that make them less suited 
for countering the hostilities of NSTOs than the approach outlined in the Balance Theory.  The 
first problem applies to democratic (especially Western) countries.  In order to pursue such a 
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strategy, these countries will likely encounter strong resistance from normative, ethical, and 
possibly legal standpoints in pursuing such strategies, given the heavy (and often indiscriminate) 
use of force required to achieve such success.  The democratic state‘s constituency may very 
well be unlikely to support such an approach from the start, and if so, its conviction may not last.   
 The second problem is that while such an approach may prove effective for a time, it 
possesses important limitations that constrain the sustainability of any end-result achieved solely 
through force.  The NSTO(s) may be eliminated, but like-minded groups are likely to spring up 
from the remains of the organization, and amongst the population which remain aggrieved.  Once 
again in reference to Algeria, this was evidenced by the replacement of the GIA with the Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which would later merge with Al Qaeda to form Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  All this is stands in contrast to the current situation in 
Northern Ireland following successful British strategic coercion, where despite the existence of 
minor splinter groups such as the Real and Continuity IRA, peace has endured and the peoples of 
Northern Ireland remain committed to supporting it. 
 Thus even if it is possible to conduct military-centric approaches, the end results of such 
a strategy are unlikely to be sustainable over the long-term.  As stated by the Balance Theory, 
military-based denial measures can play a very important role in providing for a secure 
environment and manipulating the decision-making calculus of the players involved in the 
conflict.  However, only through winning over the population, if not achieving and implementing 
a negotiated settlement, is the achievement of enduring positive results likely to be possible. 
 
The Balance Theory of Strategic Coercion and Al Qaeda 
 In concluding this dissertation, it is important to investigate the Balance Theory of 
strategic coercion vis-à-vis the most dangerous terrorist organization of the modern day: Al 
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Qaeda.  Namely, can the Balance Theory be used to provide insights about how the United 
States, its allies and the international community can counter Al Qaeda?  And if so, how? 
 
Al Qaeda as an NSTO 
 It can be argued that Al Qaeda fits the mold of an NSTO, as defined in this dissertation: 
Nationalistic substate terrorist organizations are organizations, which do not constitute a 
state government or recognized state apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, 
intelligence service, etc.), that are dedicated in whole or in part to achieving the primary 
objective of self-determination/nation (re)formation and/or freedom from occupation 
through employing terrorism aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or threatening to harm 
noncombatants and symbolic targets with the intent of creating and exploiting fear within 
a targeted audience, generating propaganda, or destabilizing critical political, 
constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures. 
 
Al Qaeda is certainly substate in that it does not constitute a state government or recognized state 
apparatus, and there is little debate that it constitutes a terrorist organization.  Importantly, Al 
Qaeda can also be interpreted as ―nationalistic‖ in that its primary objective is a combination of: 
1) ending the occupation of Western forces and influence in Muslim lands; and 2) nation 
reformation in the form of the re-establishment of the Caliphate, or pan-Islamic state, meant to 
encapsulate and represent the world‘s Islamic community or Ummah. 
 From Al Qaeda‘s perspective, the Muslim world has been vulnerable to exploitation and 
abuses from the West since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and as a consequence, the 
reformation of a strong Islamic super-state is needed to properly represent and defend the 
Ummah.  Al Qaeda thus seeks to re-establish the empire that, within a century of Muhammad‘s 
death, had spanned from the West African coast to northern India.
21
  In order to re-establish this 
Caliphate, Al Qaeda seeks to work with like-minded regional and local groups to conduct 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare.  In doing so, Al Qaeda aspires to remove Western influence from 
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the Muslim world and overthrow corrupt, apostate Muslim governments.  From there, the 
objective is to eventually erase Muslim state boundaries, unifying the Muslim world under the 
rule of the Caliphs (heads of the various regions under the Caliphate).
22
  Upon its re-
establishment, the Caliphate would then be used as a launch pad for jihad against the West, with 
the ultimate goal of remaking the world order that would place the Muslim world in a dominant 
position.
23
 
 Some may argue, however, that due to Al Qaeda‘s decentralized nature and transnational 
ideology, the organization constitutes something closer to a jihadist franchise, rather than a 
nationalistic group.  As Rohan Gunaratna explains the constitution of the terrorist organization:  
Al Qaeda‘s organizational and operational infrastructure differ markedly from other 
guerrilla or terrorist groups.  …It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it [is] 
comprised [of] a core base or bases… satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate 
of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on 
for offensive actions and other responsibilities.
24
 
 
Ideologically, though, Al Qaeda remains focused on a nationalistic goal—even if the nation it 
seeks to re-establish is not currently in existence, but is currently constituted by a variety of 
(what it considers to be) apostate nation-states that it does not recognize.  Further—as noted by 
the US State Department—despite its decentralized nature, Al Qaeda does possess a number of 
qualities resembling that of a more traditional terrorist insurgent organization, that being 
―propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions.‖25  
Moreover, the strategies it employs in carrying out acts of terrorism and guerrilla warfare share 
many similarities with more traditional groups such as Palestinian NSTOs.  Like elements of Al 
Qaeda, for instance, Palestinian NSTOs employed a combination of operating abroad and 
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planning international attacks from safe havens, and supporting terrorism and asymmetric 
warfare efforts in local areas such as Jordan, Lebanon, and currently the Occupied Territories.  
Furthermore, Al Qaeda affiliates—such as AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq)—tend to employ more 
traditional NSTO strategies themselves. 
 Finally, Al Qaeda‘s existence as a franchise group does not necessarily disqualify it as 
either an NSTO, or an organization to which the Balance Theory of strategic coercion can be 
applied.  Through deconstructing—or in David Kilcullen‘s terms, ―disaggregating‖26—the Al 
Qaeda universe, the terrorist movement/franchise can be broken down into the central Al Qaeda 
network run by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the variety of local affiliated 
groups such as AQI or AQIM.  In regards to the former, AQ central, this organization is 
nationalistic in its desire to re-establish the Caliphate, and the Balance Theory can be applied 
directly to the organization itself and to the main regions where it seeks sanctuary (i.e. the 
Afghan-Pakistan border area).  Concerning the latter, such groups constitute nationalistic 
organizations based upon their primary desire to realize freedom from occupation and/or a 
change in the ruling regime within their own countries, aided through an alliance to AQ central.  
Due to the more traditional nationalistic constitution of these local entities, the Balance Theory 
can be applied without issue to such terrorist organizations. 
 How would a broad strategy against the Al Qaeda movement be constituted, however? 
  
Forming a Strategy to Counter Al Qaeda 
 Applying the concepts of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, the aim of any 
strategy employed against Al Qaeda should be to contain the spread of the central organization‘s 
influence and ideology, as well as to weaken it and constrain its ability to operate and attack.  
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The ultimate objective of such a strategy will be to: 1) convey to Al Qaeda—its leaders, 
members, and supporters—the futility of pursuing terrorism and violence in order to bring about 
the political change it desires; 2) instill a sense of vulnerability and despair that weakens the 
organization‘s resolve and dries up a willingness to support Al Qaeda, both in terms of individual 
recruits and regional/local organizations willing to work as franchise groups under the AQ 
banner; and 3) eliminate the popular drive motivating the organization onwards.    In line with 
the Balance Theory, achieving these objectives will require the effective implementation of 
isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support. 
 
Denial and Isolation of External/International Support: 
Measures geared towards effectively implementing denial and isolation of external 
support need to be planned together in countering Al Qaeda, given its transnational nature and 
the fact that it is not based in any one state.  In countering Al Qaeda, the primary objectives of 
combined denial and external isolation efforts are to: 1) prevent the emergence and maintenance 
of area(s) that can be used as safe havens providing sanctuaries, a base of operations, and launch 
pad for attacks; 2) harden targets to make successful terrorist attacks more difficult to carry-out; 
and 3) eliminate access to the vital resources necessary to conducting a campaign of terrorism.   
In moving to eliminate areas that can be used as safe havens for Al Qaeda, the US and its 
coalition allies have made some progress through their intervention in Afghanistan, leading to 
the ouster of the Taliban.  However, a number of problems remain in this regard concerning 
areas within failed states, weak states and poorly-governed territories.  According to the US State 
Department, significant examples of safe havens providing varying degrees of sanctuary to Al 
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Qaeda include
27
: the Afghan-Pakistan border area; Somalia; Trans-Sahara
28
; Libya
29
; Sudan
30
; 
Yemen; Iraq
31
; and virtual safe havens
32
.  
In order for effective denial and external isolation measures to be implemented it is 
imperative that these safe havens be eliminated.  To achieve this, a number of challenging tasks 
must be pursued.  The first such task involves the successful stabilization and reconstruction of 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  In the case of the former, there has been an increasing drive to rapidly 
withdraw from Iraq.  While doing so is necessary in popular isolation terms, in freeing up assets 
for denial operations elsewhere, and to abide by the democratic will of the Iraqi people, this 
withdrawal should not be pursued too hastily.  Moreover, the US government must continue to 
work with the new Iraqi government to ensure the appropriate representation of minority—
particularly Sunni Arab—communities, and see that cooperation is maintained with local Sunni 
communities and former nationalist militants against Al Qaeda.  Should this fail, the stabilization 
of Iraq may also rapidly go south—especially following the withdrawal of US troops.  The 
prevention of this from happening must be a top priority, as an Iraqi failed-state would provide 
not only sanctuary to Al Qaeda members in the ensuing chaos, but a launch pad for its violent 
jihad in the heart of the Arab world. 
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In the case of Afghanistan, successful stabilization and reconstruction will require 
ensuring the necessary force levels, material assets, and financial aid.  If the requisite forces are 
not present in Afghanistan, then the Taliban will continue to be able to evade coalition forces and 
large ―no-go areas‖, especially in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan will remain, allowing the 
Taliban to eventually wear down the will of coalition forces, possibly forcing their departure and 
leading to the overthrow of the current government.  This too cannot be allowed to happen, lest 
Afghanistan be restored as the major safe haven it once was for Al Qaeda. 
Regarding the ongoing safe haven in the Afghan-Pakistan border area, this will require 
firm engagement and cooperation with Pakistan.  While Pakistan has recently reinvigorated 
efforts towards committing operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the area, it cannot be 
forgotten that the Pakistani government has been lax in fulfilling such responsibilities in the 
past—often forming counter-productive ―peace deals‖ with the Taliban that have allowed them 
to operate freely.  To ensure this situation does not recur, the US in particular must be sure to 
leverage its resources in terms of the billions of dollars in financial aid it provides.  This aid 
should readily be tied to Pakistan‘s willingness to crackdown on this threat. 
In areas such as Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, etc., the United States and the 
international community ought to continue work towards strengthening counter-terrorism 
capabilities.  Where reluctance is present, the US and its allies should be ready to impose 
adequate amounts of diplomatic pressure—or inducements—in order to coax the enactment of 
necessary laws and enforcement measures.  In cases—such as in southern Somalia—where Al 
Qaeda‘s sanctuary is guaranteed by a militant substate entity (al-Shabaab), the US and its allies 
should be prepared to work together with the country‘s government and provide logistical 
support, training, and arms if necessary.   
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Finally, in countering virtual safe havens, research should be undertaken into the most 
effective ways to counter this new threat as it emerges on the internet.  In addition, the US, its 
allies, and the international community should move to train agents capable of infiltrating such 
sites, create counter-information sites to appear under related internet searches, and actively 
attempt to shut down and block access to extremist sites where possible. 
 
Hardening Targets 
In hardening targets, the US and many countries around the world have made progress, 
especially in airline, shipping and cargo security, and in reducing the vulnerability of countries 
themselves to penetration from clandestine terrorist operatives through tightening visas and 
border-control schemes.  A number of problems remain, however.  The presence of air marshals 
is minute, and only a small percentage of cargo is actually inspected.  Meanwhile domestic 
vulnerabilities remain readily available to be exploited by extremists.  In the US, for instance, 
much of the expanse of its borders are still essentially open; its nuclear reactors and chemical 
plants remain vulnerable targets; US railroad security remains porous; US ports are open to 
devastating attack; and the US remains vulnerable to instances of bioterror.
33
  
Addressing these deficiencies remains critical to preventing further attacks, as well as 
demonstrating the futility of attempting to do so to Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist 
organizations.  Otherwise, as long as these gaps remain open it is only a matter of time before 
another major attack transpires. 
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Eliminating Terrorist Access to Vital Resources 
It is imperative to deny Al Qaeda and its affiliates access to vital resources, necessary to 
operate and carry-out destructive attacks.  In doing so, two resources are of particular 
importance: 1) finances; and 2) the materials necessary to construct weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  Denying access to finances is a considerably important undertaking.  While the cost of 
mounting individual terrorist attacks in relatively inexpensive, the cost of maintaining the 
infrastructure to support terrorist activities is high.  Terrorist networks require cash to train, 
equip, and pay operatives, secure materials and promote their cause.
34
  According to Rohan 
Gunaratna in 2002, for instance, the cost of maintaining several thousand members in 
Afghanistan and clandestine agents overseas costs Al Qaeda at least $36 million a year, on top of 
which the group‘s set-up costs—including weapons, technology, infrastructure, camps, vehicles, 
etc.—were thought to have been approximately $50 million.35  Al Qaeda‘s affiliates, moreover, 
are just as dependant on finances.  For example, as was discovered following seized AQI 
records, it was made apparent that facilitation of the terrorist network operating in western Iraq 
incurred significant costs related to salaries and family support, not to mention training, 
traveling, planning operations, bribing corrupt officials, and other activities.
36
  
To eliminate access to financial resources, what is most important is to focus on cutting 
off chokepoints critical to laundering and transferring funds.
37
  In doing so, it is important to 
encourage compliance from susceptible countries that have been frequently used by Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates to transfer funds—particularly the Gulf Countries.  Here, stern diplomatic 
efforts must be pursued to see countries such as Kuwait categorize terrorist financing as a crime 
and require currency reporting upon exit from the country, Saudi Arabia develop an effective 
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mechanism to oversee its charitable sector, and the UAE start convicting individuals for terrorist 
financing and money-laundering.
38
  
It is also important to reinvigorate international efforts to counter terrorist financing, such 
strengthening the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to ensure that not only do countries have 
adequate counter-terrorist financing regimes, but that they are enforcing them.
39
 Additionally, the 
US, its allies, and the international community ought to actively continue to improve its methods 
for cracking down on existing remittance systems such as Hawala, and address new trends in 
terrorists‘ attempts to gain access to funds through the internet, mobile phone banking, and cash 
smuggling through international couriers.
40
  The private sector can and should also become more 
involved, through information-sharing and training to make them increasingly aware of the threat 
and how to take steps to counter it. 
Regarding resources for creating WMD, it is of utmost importance to deny the ability of 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates to carry-out and/or threaten catastrophic acts of terror.  In doing so, it 
is fundamentally important to deny terrorists access to materials, expertise, and other enabling 
capabilities for WMD development, including weapons-usable fissile materials, dangerous 
pathogens and poisonous chemicals.  These denial efforts may also involve developing effective 
punishment methods to be employed against potential supporters or providers of such materials.  
And in preventing these resources from falling into the wrong hands, it is also imperative to 
expand the global capacity for detecting illicit materials and weapons in transit abroad.
41
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Isolation of Popular Support 
Measures directed towards isolation of external support and denial must also be 
accompanied by efforts to isolate popular support for Al Qaeda and its affiliates.  Al Qaeda itself 
attempts to sustain popular support for its cause through manipulating perceived grievances.  In 
particular, it demonizes the West for propping up cruel, apostate regimes, for supporting Israel; 
for maintaining forces on Muslim territory; and for Muslim lives lost as a result of military 
operations.  Indeed, the narrative told from the standpoint of Al Qaeda is that the West, the US in 
particular, seeks to destroy any effective Arab or Muslim military force close to Israel, while 
guaranteeing the submission of Arab and Islamic states to a Zionist-Crusader alliance.
42
 
In attempting to isolate popular support for Al Qaeda, it is vital to counter this narrative.  
To accomplish this, it is imperative to successfully complete operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The US should also be cognizant of the implications of threatening Iran with coercive military 
measures unless absolutely necessary.  Further, the US and its coalition allies must avoid and 
eliminate grievance triggers such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.  The West must 
vigorously pursue democracy promotion (different from democracy imposition), and it should 
take a strong stand in pushing for a resumption of progress in negotiations and diplomacy in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the goal of achieving an equitable peace for both sides. 
Importantly, the West—and the US especially—need to work towards promulgating their 
own narrative of the conflict while discrediting the one espoused by Al Qaeda.  That is that the 
West is not an enemy of, and does not exploit, the Muslim world.  That it is working diligently to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than cooperate in Palestinian oppression.  And that 
where dissatisfaction prevails regarding ruling governments, the West is working assiduously to 
be part of the solution, rather than the problem.  Furthermore, while Al Qaeda and its inspired 
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terrorist organizations may claim to be acting in the best interests of the Muslim world, it is a 
statistical fact that well over 50% of the victims of terrorism are Muslim, and that more than 65% 
of those victims are civilians.
43
  Al Qaeda and its affiliates, therefore, are not champions of 
justice, but rather a grizzly threat to life, stability and order.  To effectively convey this message, 
bolstered efforts and funds must be placed towards Western, and especially American, public 
diplomacy.  However, what is most important are the actions of the US and its allies, as well as 
the avoidance of further salient triggers for grievances.    
 
Following Implementation of the Three Key Coercive Elements 
Following the implementation of these coercive elements, Al Qaeda—the organization 
and its ideology—should be greatly weakened.  As a consequence of seeing the impotence of the 
group and its cause, as well as unpopularity accorded to those associated with Al Qaeda, its co-
opted regional affiliates will likely suffer in turn and disaggregate themselves from Al Qaeda‘s 
utopian cause of re-establishing the Caliphate.
44
 With the organization having been denied any 
place to enjoy safety, convinced of the futility of their efforts, and introduced to the despair and 
hopeless of their cause, the organization may simply collapse or fade away over time.  The 
decapitation—be it through arrest or liquidation—of hardcore resistant members may help to 
facilitate this in the end. 
If this is not the outcome, however, and Al Qaeda proves able to endure despite such 
successes, then indefinite containment of the organization, combined with some limited 
negotiations, might be necessary.  In such a case, what negotiations could involve might be a 
discussion of Al Qaeda and its members‘ fate.  Should the organization be greatly weakened and 
its members on the run, for instance, negotiations over amnesty and rehabilitation deals would 
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likely go a long ways towards the ultimate collapse of the transnational NSTO as an effective 
entity and the reintegration of its members into society.  Meanwhile the remnants of the 
organization, should they continue to exist, would be contained indefinitely by existing security 
cooperation and public diplomacy measures, relegating Al Qaeda and its ideology to a minor 
anachronistic nuisance. 
 
Remembering the Concept of Balance: 
 
In concluding the discussion of how to implement a successful strategy against Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates, it is important to remember to adhere to not only an implementation of the three 
key coercive elements of strategic coercion, but to maintain balance in doing so.  Pursuing 
successful security-based denial measures, and possibly employing military coercion to isolate 
external support is important, but these actions must not be over-emphasized or taken too far to 
the detriment of efforts to isolate popular support.  In attempting to isolate popular support, 
moreover, simply taking a hands-off approach to denial measures in order to make diplomatic 
goodwill gestures and focus on root causes will also come up short in producing an end to the 
threat posed by Al Qaeda and its dangerous ideology.  Failure in denial and external isolation 
will enable Al Qaeda to successfully conduct acts of terrorism and carry out its strategy, while 
failure to isolate popular support will swell Al Qaeda‘s ranks and coffers, and—if new 
grievances are salient—possibly hamper efforts to isolate external support as well. 
Such balance is especially important to bear in mind vis-à-vis the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In order to eventually be successful in selling our own narrative of the benign-
nature of the West and the malevolent one of Al Qaeda, it is important to expeditiously stabilize 
and withdraw from the two countries.  At the same time, however, too hasty of a withdraw prior 
to ensuring the stability required will likely have very adverse results, particularly in denial and 
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isolation of external support through the (re)creation of vital safe havens and launching pads for 
Al Qaeda.  It may also result in the perception of a new grievance, with the US and its allies 
blamed for the collapse/failure of a Muslim state, with only the deaths of tens of thousands of 
Muslims to show for it.  We must therefore commit ourselves to make the best efforts now, with 
a steady focus on what the end-goal will be and how our exit strategy will be implemented. 
Ultimately, a balanced implementation of the key coercive elements of isolation of 
external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support against Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates will likely take time.  Any hope that short-term action such as the invasion of one 
scapegoat country or the decapitation of high ranking leadership will lead to the demise of Al 
Qaeda and its ideology is misplaced.  In order to prevail, a balanced employment of strategic 
coercion may be required for years, if not decades. 
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